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SECTION II

TRANSCRIPT

OF

PROCEEDINGS

PUBLIC HEARING OP THE
ACCOUNTING OBJECTIVES STUDY GROUP.

May 15, 16, and 17, 1972
The Americana Hotel
New York, New York
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TUESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION
May 16, 1972
The meeting reconvened at two o'clock, Chairman
Trueblood presiding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think we're right on target,

and Mr. Defliese is right on time.
MR. PHILIP L. DEFLIESE:

Phil, it's your podium.
Very good.

Thank you very

much, Bob .
I'm Philip L. Defliese, and while I'm managing
partner of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery and Chairman of
the present APB, I'm here to present my personal views.

My

firm and I will present a formal paper at a later date, perhaps
within a month.

That paper will expand upon the views that

I'm expressing now, so to some extent there will he consider
able similarity.
I'd like to say at the outset that I don't envy this
Croup its chore.

It's probably one of the most momentous

undertakings that we could do in this half century, and as a
result of the challenging aspects of it I think that the Croup
certainly ought to consider seriously the implications of its
report.

And to that extent I respectfully submit a number of

procedural suggestions which I would suggest that they at least
attempt to follow, in order to give consideration to those
important aspects.
The time element, of course, is a very important re
striction.

I don't know how a subject of such far reaching
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importance could be accomplished within the time limit the Group
has set for itself.

But because of that, it must restrict its

emphasis by a considerable extent to the most pressing needs,
and those which no doubt gave rise to the issue itself; and
that is the needs of the public investors.
And when I speak of public investors, I include not
only those who invest in equity securities but also those who
invest in debt securities, because for the most part both are
essentially public investors, and look to and rely upon the
same data for their investment decisions.

Therefore, I see no

distinction whatever in terms of the information that they need.
Of course, I 'm talking not only about individual in
vestors but institutional investors, and to some extent the
indirect investors such as policyholders and the like; but
basically, the needs of these public investors are paramount.
The needs of private creditors, such as banks and vendors are
somewhat secondary.

These people are usually in a contractual

relationship, making it possible for them to obtain additional
data and additional information upon which a decision can be
made, and therefore the same statements are not as important.
Of course, government, taxing agencies, and regulato
ry commissions also have needs; but here again, because these
are special-purpose-type needs, they can be fulfilled through
additional input or perhaps through supplementary information
designed for a specific purpose.
So the concentration should be on the public investor.
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The Group should also spell out in its report those
objectives which they consider to be long range, short range,
and intermediate range, because whatever we do in the field
of accounting cannot be accomplished overnight.

Some of it

may take a considerably long period of time, and therefore in
making recommendations we need to distinguish between the short
long, and intermediate range.
Some of the problems that are involved will require
a considerable amount of concentrated applied research, and
only upon the completion of that research can we really deter
mine whether or not the objectives in each of these areas are
in reality desirable, and whether or not adequate techniques
can be established in order to determine if they are workable.
Again, recognize the importance of moving as rapidly
as possible.

You should concentrate on the precise definition

of the short range goals and the means of implementing, and
defer any in-depth consideration of the other two.

I think

that more will be achieved in this way than to attempt to cover
all three areas in greater detail.
And finally, after it has sifted through the material
that I ’m sure is presently descending rather rapidly, and
contemplating it, and reaching some tentative conclusions,
those tentative conclusions should be exposed for public com
ment and possibly public hearings.

Our experience on the

Accounting Principles Board indicates that until a tentative
solution is proposed, it’s difficult for interested parties to
focus adequately on the many problems that they create.

And
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since the results of this report will have such far-reaching
implications toward the final resolution of this problem, we
would certainly want to have an opportunity to express views
concerning the specific proposals that are being made.
As to the needs of the public investors--and I think
this is the thing that should be concentrated on--no doubt
the Study Group will carefully analyze the needs of these users,
since they constitute such a large segment of our population,
particularly with 32 million shareholders and the many indirect
holders such as those in pension groups.

But the question is:

these needs have to be defined, as simply as possible, and the
data categorized rather carefully, because, essentially, inves
tors are required to regularly make timely decisions as to
whether or not they will buy, sell, or hold a particular in
vestment.
I mentioned before that I don’t distinguish between
a stockholder and a bondholder in this frame of reference,
simply because the data upon which a decision of that sort rests
is essentially the same.

But, of course a decision has to be

made as to whether or not an investor wants to invest in debt
or equity securities.

But usually that determination is based

on considerations other than the financial data of the company
itself.

So we have to focus on the decision-making data for

this purpose.
Now, of course, in the process we should also recog
nize that there are many other factors that are involved in
making such decisions as to whether to buy, sell, or hold, and
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this relates to the state of the art, the character of the in
dustry, the movements in the economy, the competitive position
of the company, the strengths and weaknesses of management and
their research expertise, their relationships with labor, and
their relationships with regulatory agencies.

All of these

have an equal and sometimes a greater weight in determining
whether or not an investment should he made.
And so I would assume you will certainly put that
in as a caveat.
Now looking at the data that the public investor or
potential investor needs to know--he needs to know, first,
what are the prospects for an adaquate yield on his investment,
in terms of dividend or interest, and for capital appreciation.
And essentially that translates into a need for a realistic
determination of periodic income--past, present, and particu
larly, future.
So as I see it, the need for a forecast of at least
one year, and possibly several, is paramount.
The second thing he needs to know are the factors
he can rely upon for the safety and return of his capital.
In the bondholder situation, it's just as important that he
know what the market for his bonds may be, as well as the abil
ity of the company to pay off at maturity.

Very few public

investors investing in bonds actually look toward maturity
for return of their capital.

They are looking for the ability

to move in and out of that investment, and even many of those
insitutions that manage substantial portfolios look upon debt

4.6

securities in somewhat the same fashion.

So the return or

safety of capital is not necessarily dependent upon the archaic
concepts that we have of financial position, hut upon market
ability.
To that extent, I think that in addition to the
realistic determination of income that I mentioned, he needs to
know what the liquidity-viability condition of the company may
be; so some of our archaic concepts of balance sheet presenta
tion should be remodeled to give cognizance to that.
The fund statement likewise may need some restructur
ing in order to portray adequately these factors.
Third, a more helpful indication is needed of the
value of an investment, so that a proper choice can be made.
And here, of course, is where accounting frequently leaves him
very much in a vacuum— again because our balance sheets and
financial statements are not structured to make any realistic
portrayal of value.

That means we might need to reflect current

value rather than historical values in some areas, and to give
recognition to intangible resources and some personnel resour
ces.
Now, of course we have to recognize that accounting
will never be able to establish the true net worth of a company.
That can only be determined by the usual criteria of what a
buyer will pay or a seller will take.

We can only hope, I

suppose, to provide more meaningful financial data as a guide.
Now I ’d like to break down the three types of object
tives as I see them, and discuss what might be done about them.
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As the long-range objective, we should probably consider the
introduction of current fair values, intangible values, and
personnel values.

This has been proposed many times, and we

all recognize that presently it’s highly impractical.

What we

have to do first is to determine whether or not this is theo
retically possible, and then whether it can be implemented.
I can't see how that can be done without a concentrated research
project--lasting at least three years by a sizable, full time
research group, which should be comprised of particularly un
biased people of diverse disciplines and philosophies, so as to
make sure that we have all views presented.
I don’t know whether you could ever get such a group
as that to live together, but I don’t see how we can really do
the job well otherwise.
And of course it should be approached rather slowly
and carefully.
Personally,
I have an open mind on this.

I doubt

if fair values can be applied across the board, and I don’t
know whether they are necessarily needed for the determination
of income as such.

For example, I have a real question as to

whether plant and equipment should be fair valued regularly,
because this is not an asset that’s intended to be sold or
realized, but instead, to be used up in the production of income.
And consequently, the need for applying current values in that
instance is somewhat less.
Obviously, in other areas involving inventories and
other resources that are intended to be put into production
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or to be sold, fair values can have an important effect.
Now part of the study of this long range objective
would be to make a closer analysis of periodic income.

As I

said before, this is a primary investor tool; and of course
this means that we have to refine our realization concepts.
We should recognize that income is comprised of a number of
elements.

It first arises out of the ability to provide a

product or a service at a price in excess of cost.

That's

pretty basic; and of course here we use traditional cost ac
counting concepts to establish that basic profit.

Of course,

those concepts need some reexamination.
Second, another element of income is the effect of
economic forces upon our resources, such as market fluctuations,
which sometimes may be fortuitous and beyond our control, or
at other times may be premediatated and controlled to a certain
extent.

I have in mind here particularly the marketable se

curity problem that we are presently struggling with in account
ing.
We know that when a security is ultimately sold, and
a profit is made, we have a profit, and it's the difference be
tween the cost and the selling price; but the question is: when
is that income realized?

Is it realized at the time of sale, or

is it realized over the period over which it appreciates?

Ba

sically, that has to be established before we can really deter
mine periodic income on any reasonable basis.
Another factor affecting income is the effect of dis
covery and research.

One look at the oil and gas industry tells
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you, of course, that income is certainly derived out of the
discovery of oil, hut the question is, when should that he re
flected in accounting?

And shouldn't our concepts of realiza

tion give some cognizance to the fact that income is being de
rived as the oil is discovered?
Likewise, in the research area, when a new product
or a new element or a new method of something is derived as a
result of considerable research, is there an income factor?
Of course, that translates itself into sales of the new product,
and therefore one element of income is that effort.
Finally, we have price level changes that enter into
the determination of income.

At the present time we give no

cognizance to this, and we reflect the income at the time of
sale, when in reality it may he the result of nothing more than
a price level change.

The question is, is that income, or isn’t

it?
At some point, accounting perhaps ought to he able to
provide investors with an analysis of his periodic income along
these lines.

How much of it is attributable to price level

change, and how much of it is attributable to a discovery or
new research?

These will take a long time to develop, and

that's why I think the long study should be made in that area.
Jumping to the short range objectives, we have to
recognize that until we can get the long range ones defined and
implemented we have to concentrate on improving our historical
cost accounting concepts so that the user's needs will be sat
isfied as well as they can be within the confines of this frame
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of reference.
We should recognize that the alternatives that we
have in accounting today grew because of differing industry
practices and circumstances that frequently were borrowed by
other industries.

In our attempt to narrow these alternatives,

we have tried— rather unsuccessfully--to find fundamental truths
that can be applied across the board, and I don’t think we're
going to find that Holy Grail.
Instead, I think we need to concentrate on refining
our realization concepts again, industry by industry, and not
concern ourselves with inconsistencies that result from this.
For example, it’s rather foolhardy to consider that the same
realization concepts should be applicable to land development
companies as to a steel company, or to an oil and gas company,
or an insurance company, or as to timber land.

Even within

these industries, we might find that circumstances are differ
ent, and therefore they need to be recognized.
I think the thing that has brought this home to the
present APB more than anything else has been its current study
of marketable securities, where we find that there’s a differ
ence in a company--say an industrial--that might have a tempor
ary investment in a marketable security, or perhaps a longrange investment in a security that happens to be marketable,
as against an insurance company that manages a tremendous port
folio of equity securities.

And to say that the same realiza

tion concept should be applicable in each case is not to give
recognition to the differing circumstances, intentions, and
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mode of operation of these two different companies.

Therefore

the question is whether or not income realization concepts
should be the same or different in that instance.

I don't

believe they should be the same.
In the whole process of this reassessment of realiza
tion concepts of industry by industry, we should sublimate the
balance sheet to the proper determination of income.

We recog

nize that the balance sheet does not in any way present fairly
financial position today, and therefore to attempt to make it
so is a futile exercise until we have assessed the long range
goals that I mentioned, to determine whether or not they are
feasible.
We should provide a balance sheet, and nothing more
than a balance sheet, of resources and responsibilities that
will provide a better appraisal of liquidity and viability.
Right now our balance sheet doesn't attempt to do that very
well.

Our concepts concerning current assets and current liab

ilities are rather fuzzy.
The fund statement, of course, has attempted to put
some light on this area, but that too needs some reassessment
to see whether or not it will provide a better picture of
liquidity and viability as to the future, because this again-is what the investor is looking for:

How will his company sur

vive in the next few years and in the long run?
In this respect the Study Group's largest contribu
tion can be the refinement, as I see it, of the realization of
income concepts, sublimating the balance sheet in the process.
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Now, the intermediate range objectives are of course
those things that we might be able to do between now and the
time we get to the long range, and I would think that perhaps
what’s needed there is to provide some mode of supplementary
information to furnish the investor with additional information
in making his decisions.

Certainly, such things as a price-

level statement, such as has been recommended by APB, would
provide better perspective to the income statement, because
it would at least attempt to neutralize the effect of price
levels to some extent; second, perhaps the provision of some
current values--management estimates, if necessary--of other
resources, other liabilities, perhaps those that are particular
ly intended to be liquidated or to be placed into production,
such as inventories of land for a land development company, and
of course, the effects of discovery and research.

And in the

oil and gas field we need supplementary data to provide the
investor with a better concept of the resources available to
the company.
Now this is not going to be an easy task, but never
theless, such supplementary information would certainly bridge
the gap between our short range and long range objectives.
And with that I hold my peace.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much again, Phil,

for a lucid, complete, and helpful presentation.
I ’d like to start out with a question which kind of
ties to some testimony we heard this morning, having to do
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with the long range versus the short range versus the inter
mediate range.
First I ’d like to say that we certainly agree--all
of us, I'm sure--with everything you say about the horrendous
size and frustrating nature of this task and the time table
that was imposed upon us.

Success may be reasonable or zero.

The statement was made this morning that objectives
and goals should be rather pervasive.
ample.

Let me just try an ex

Financial statements should be useful for predictive

purposes.

Then, if you take that as an overriding goal, would

you agree that the distinction between the short range, the
intermediate, the long range, becomes more of an implementing
process than a goal stating process
MR. DEFLIESE:

I would agree with that, certainly.

Assuming that we can agree on the long range objective and re
cognize the need to move from here to there, this will be an
evolutionary process, hopefully at each step--providing the
reader with more of a basis for prediction.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But would that not make it more

possible, if we adopt that point of view, to come out with some
kind of reasonable set of large, pervasive goals on realization
and predictive capacity and so on, and give the profession time
to work on the research and the decision-making process at the
sublevel, which is really your breakdown--as I understand it—
of the long range, short range, and intermediate?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, as I indicated, obviously to
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refine these long range objectives in a true sense, some long
term research is going to be necessary, because the implementa
tion aspects have to be dealt with.
so readily obtainable.

They are not going to be

And without those you get nowhere.

And you may ultimately wind up nowhere if in the pro
cess of researching implementation it just is impractical.

And

so while it's fine to establish a pervasive concept of a long
range goal— and assuming that for the moment it’s fair value—
I don't think we can say that w e ’re going to have to go there unless
and until we have researched it adequately to know that it is a
practical answer.
W e ’ve always said regularly that we would like our
financial statements to more adequately portray the economic
facts of life.

Well, if we can get ten economists to agree

on what the economic facts are, we'd be in a good position to
move in that direction.

But because we have set ourselves some

what of an elusive goal, it’s almost impossible to get there.
Therefore there is a need for researching the goals as well as
the implementation.
MR. GELLEIN:
bit, Phil?

Gould I just follow that up a little

Because I think it’s pretty critical.

Do I interpret you correctly when you say, therefore,
that perhaps our group cannot--or should not at this point—
even attempt to state what the long range goals are?
MR. DEFLIESE:

I think you can attempt to state what

you think they should be, recognizing that it is subject to re
search and implementation factors.
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MR. GELLEIN: Well, that gets...
MR. DEFLIESE:

...I don't see how, in the time limit,

you can go much beyond that.
MR. GELLEIN:

You see, that gets to the point in the

paper where you say, for instance, that what needs to he done
first is to determine whether it's theoretically feasible and
then whether it can be implemented.
M R . DEFLIESE: Right.
MR. GELLEIN:

Now, it seems to me that it would be

rather presumptuous to state a long range goal if it weren't
theoretically feasible.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, I grant you that there is a

dilemma to that extent, but I think every research starts off
with a premise.

ing point.

MR. GELLEIN:

It would be a hypothesis, wouldn't it?

MR. DEFLIESE:

A hypothesis or a theoretical start

And I have no problem starting with that and then

saying well, we need to research this not only from an imple
mentation standpoint, but from a theoretical standpoint, be
cause there are elements here that might put the theory in
question.

We don't know whether users would be at an advantage,

or whether their ability to make investment decisions would be
enhanced by this data.

It might be more confusing, and to that

extent it can't support a theoretical user need.

You can create

a theory In vacuum, perhaps, but I don't think we want to do
that.

I think we want to create a theory in context, and un

less we can be satisfied that the contextual and the theoretical
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hang together, there’s no point in moving in that direction.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Well, I followed what you were saying

with great interest, except that I tried to go through a trans
lation process, both in what you were saying and--in fact--what
people were saying this morning, as I got going on this.

And

that is, whenever you said "current value," I would substitute
"historical cost" and see how that would make the statement
sound.
So--for example, you said the need for current values
on plant is somewhat less, and I translate that to say that the
need for maintaining historical costs on plant is somewhat less.
Why don't we just expense plant as we buy it?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, because our concepts of income

require a certain matching of costs and revenue.
D E M DAVIDSON:

Ah, yes, of values expired, and re

venues produced.
MR. DEFLIESE: Right.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

And so I can't help but wonder, if

we're seeking to measure income in this realistic sense, if
we may not be better off with current values than historical
costs.

Let me ask you if you do not feel that it would be

useful to always ask ourselves this:

Whenever we say something

about current value, to ask ourselves the same question about
historic cost.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Yes.

I have no problem with that.

But I think that to amplify my comment concerning plant--and
this relates to other things too, such as other intangibles,
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R&D, and the like;

to upgrade, or to revalue upward--

DEAN DAVIDSON:
MR. DEFLIESE:

...or downward-...or downward--those items which

essentially are going to enter into the income stream on that
basis--that is, they are not going to be realized at a higher
value--to then insist on a higher value being entered into the
income stream, thereby, perhaps, in the case of a plant that’s
appreciated, to reduce income--is not realistic in terms of our
realization concepts of income.
Now, maybe in the process of your long-range goals
you are going to change some of that, but I think until you do
you can’t automatically assume that current values should be
applied across the board.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

I would always say ”or historic cost.”

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, I think the point was made

somewhat this morning--and yesterday too, Phil--that part of
our preoccupation with historic cost has to do with its con
venience as a proxy for some kind of value.

So if you go Sid’s

suggested route, I fully agree that it’s interrelated with our
realization concept.
But many of the things you suggested it seems to me
by way of example would require some significant change of our
objective with respect to realization, at least on an industryby-industry basis.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Absolutely.

I think we have already

done that, for example in industries like land development,
where there is a realization concept quite different from,
let’s say, retail sales, or oil and gas, or any other industry—
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the recognition of the fact that income is predicated basically
on the result of an effort; even though you might inject the
statistical evaluations of that effort, the fact remains that
to apply any other industry concept of realization to that
situation creates distorted results.
For example, if you were to apply installment account
ing to that situation, we know that it would be unrealistic, in
terms of what the actual efforts and results of that company
may be.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Do you suspect that this may go

so far as to have different realization standards for various
industries?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Precisely.

That’s why I feel that the

realization concepts have to be reassessed industry by industry.
Certainly, we have three basic areas in the extrac
tive industry— oil and gas, mining, and timber land.

And to

say that the same realization concepts should be applied to all
three, within almost the same industry, is not recognizing
their totally different ways of operating.
These things need to be reassessed.
realized in these industries?
situation.

When is income

In timber, you have a growth

In mining, you have a combination of processing

and discovery.

And i n oil, principally you have the discovery

aspect, which is the major element, and then of course it's
combined with a refining and marketing operation.

So we have

in that area alone reason to depart from any pervasive concept
of realization.
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
grope

But I still would personally

for some overriding concept of realization which would

he applied industry by industry, with differing practices as
distinguished from differing objectives.
MR. DEFLIESE:

I understand what you are saying, yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. GELLEIN:

Oscar?

Phil, you have been on the Board for a

number of years when it’s gone through the resolution of some
pretty difficult problems, and I frankly think--considering
the circumstances— in a very satisfactory way.

My tenure

on the Board has been shorter, but I have seen some of these
things happen, and this is what I wanted to ask about.

I

don’t expect a specific answer, but I think any comments you
would have would be helpful.
Regarding every important issue that's been up before
the Board, in my judgement— the diverse views that were there
were in part attributable to deep seated, honest, sincere
differences of opinions on conceptual matters.
right straight through.

You can go

I think in all the important opinions

that the Board has issued, from the accounting for pension
costs, to allocating income taxes, to business combinations, to
good will--right through the list--there were deep seated,
sincere, honest differences of opinion, all within the frame
work, you see, of a historical cost framework.
I don’t want to ask a question.

I just want to ask

whether you have some observations--because I don't think there
is an answer to the question, really.

What would have been
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helpful to the Board within the historical cost framework to
have minimized some of these deep seated conceptual differences
in views?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, I agree with you, Oscar.

I

have lived through all of these; and as I have, I have, shall
we say, developed my own philosophy, and I think I have sort
of emphasized it briefly this morning.

Let me emphasize it again.

I think our hangup has been our concern over the
articulation between the balance sheet and the income state
ment, particularly by calling the balance sheet a statement of
financial position, which we know it is not.

Let’s face it,

the balance sheet originated as nothing more than a trial bal
ance of what was left over after somebody determined what
profit and loss was; and that’s all it ever should be in the
present context of historical cost accounting.
The result is, we have developed some rather fine
spun theories— take income tax allocation— as to whether or
not the deferred tax account is a liability, or whether it’s
a deferred credit, or whether it’s a net-of-tax approach, a
reduction of the asset to which it may pertain, or whether it’s
equity.

And, frankly, I don’t care which you call it.

could be any of them or all of them.

It

The fact is, what we are

attempting to do is determine income--periodic income--properly;
and to that extent we match our taxes with our accounting, and
as a result of that, whatever is left goes into the balance
sheet as a balancing factor.
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That is why, I think whether or not the deferred tax
account is a current liability or a noncurrent liability is not
a big issue.

If I restructure the balance sheet and eliminate

that problem, I'll get to the heart of the question of whether
the company has some liquidity, which right now isn't shown.
It is the same as to our debt-equity ratio, which a
lot of people have made Into a sacred cow.

Billions of dollars

today are being financed in Wall Street today on the basis of a
debt-equity ratio, when we recognize that we don't include all
of the true debts, such as the leasing aspects, but at the same
time we don't include all the assets, like the oil and gas under
the ground, which essentially is part of equity.
To create a debt-equity ratio, for example, for an
oil and gas company that might be leasing to a large extent, is
a real abortion of any concept that you can make from an account
ing theoretical standpoint.
And so we have made a real fetish of getting this bal
ance sheet to show assets on the left side, which really aren't
assets in many cases, and liabilities on the right side which
aren't in many cases liabilities, and then omitting many assets
and liabilities.

We need to stop concerning ourselves about

this articulation between the income statement and the balance
sheet.

I think that's been the major hangup, rather than the

question of historical cost.
We keep blaming historical cost only because we have
nothing better, and of course it's an easy thing.
whipping boy.

It's a good

But we're trying to keep our theories straight
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as between the statements, because we have a feeling that the
balance sheet should present financial position.
The question is, should it?

And if so, how can it?

And we certainly ought to reexamine the question of the balance
sheet function.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Before I recognize Don and Reed,

who want to be heard, some of the things you said in this last
statement relate directly to a question from the floor which I
want to recognize.

In effect, it says:

Is there some defini

tion of periodic net income unrelated to value change?
And if I may go on from there to indicate that (as
I understand) what you are saying is that there is on the asset
side— whatever they are, in our present practice--a different
series of values; in the current section, more or less the
lower of cost or market; in the fixed asset section, some kind
of amortized cost; and then all of those things which aren’t
there at all.
So we have a completely inconsistent valuation.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So you would answer this ques

tion that periodic income can best be determined if we have a
more consistent valuation scheme?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Not necessarily.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. DEFLIESE:

No.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
conclusion?

Not necessarily?
Absolutely not.
And how do you get to that
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MR. DEFLIESE:

Because if I concern myself about con

sistency in the balance sheet, I'll never get anywhere in my
income statement.

I think the income statement has to be dealt

with, and whatever is left--throw it into the balance sheet.
Then you let the reader know what the purpose of the balance
sheet is--not to present him with a picture of financial posi
tion, because it's never going to show that (at least in hist
orical cost) but will merely show him those assets that are
available to pay off debts, and the debts he has to pay off.
And that gets to the viability and the liquidity of the company,
which is the other thing he's looking for.
He's looking for two things— income, which is going
to produce his yield, one way or another, and the viabilityliquidity of the company.

Is it going to stand up and live

forever, or is it going to die within a year or two, on the
basis of what he sees?
To me, the balance sheet should be nothing more than
the repository of our income statement determinations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So, then, you put your empha

sis on realization and matching...
MR. DEFLIESE:

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

...as distinguished from valua

tion?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Right.

DEAN DAVIDSON: That's what guides you in the income
statement?
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MR. DEFLIESE:

That's what guides me.

DEAN DAVIDSON:

Realization and matching.

DEAN EDWARDS:

Phil, what pervasive objective might

you have which would permit you to develop realization concepts
industry by industry, and would permit you to keep this separa
tion of the current financial reporting structure?
MR. DEFLIESE:

I think you have to start with the

mode of operation of the industry; in other words, when do
they think that they have made their money?

When an insurance

company invests in equity securities and has billions of dollars
in portfolios along this line, we have to ask:

When do they

think they have made their money that results from the apprecia
tion of those securities?
It's not easy, but if they think hard and long about
it, they’ll come through and say:

Well, we expect this to

grow over a period of time, on some basis.
all told me:

In fact, they have

We invest for a five-to seven-year pull, and it ’s

over that period of time that we expect to make the money.
Now we all know they don’t make it the day they sell
the security, and the question is:

When and how?

That has to

be determined; so you have to take each industry and decide how
it applies its resources and what its intentions are, and then
analyze it from a realization concept.
It’s not easy, but it needs some rather deep study.
DEAN EDWARDS:

We realize i t ’s difficult, Phil.

we didn't in the beginning, we do now.

If

But what set of objec-
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tives would you establish for any one of these industries?
Maybe, going back to my original question— is there any allpervasive objective for financial accounting and reporting
that would permit you to develop these industry by industry?
Are you saying there is none?
MR. DEFLIESE:

I say that the realism within the

industry practice is the only guideline that you could set
from a top theory standpoint.
MR. PARKER:

I wonder if you haven't in some ways

given a partial answer to Don’s question.

I gather from what

you said that the income statement is the more important, and
we sublimate the balance sheet to that.

And accordingly, we

start presumptively with historic cost, because historic cost
does represent one thing all the time, which current cost may
never do, and that is an actual cash outflow from the company.
MR. DEFLIESE:

It’s an absolute investment of re

sources, yes.
MR. PARKER:

It sounded to me like what you might

have been saying, then, is that the time when you begin to look
to current value is when it tends to become significantly
different from original cost, but most importantly when it
attaches to an asset which is severable, and by golly is al
most assuredly going to be severed sooner or later.
the marketable security in the insurance company.
tree in the forest.

This fits
It fits the

If fits a number of these things.

MR. DEFLIESE:

Yes.
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MR. PARKER:

You operate on the historic cost assump

tion, because it does represent the cash flowed out, and that's
what has to get related in the income statement when the cash
is flowing in from revenues.
MR. DEFLIESE:
MR. PARKER:

Right.
And only if and when you begin to de

velop some values on assets that are all but assuredly going
to be sold, and revenues flow in therefore-MR. DEFLIESE:

Right.

Realized by sale or produc

tion.
MR. PARKER:

That's right--which significantly differs

from the original cost thing.
Now, that begins--doesn't it, Don--to be some kind
of a test as to when you begin to apply this?
One question beyond that would be:

How do we handle

these things in the income statement— the marketable security,
or one of these things--that is, the change in value?
happens on the balance sheet.

It

What do you do with it in the

income statement?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, that's the real hangup, this

articulation that I mentioned before.

Do you have the balance

sheet reflect historical cost at all times, or fair value at
all times, or something in between?

And I have no problem with

something in between, if in the process you get a better de
termination of income.
MR. PARKER:
on the income...?

But would you segregate this, at least
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MR. DEFLIESE:
tion.

Oh, I think disclosure is another ques

I haven't touched upon disclosure.

Certainly I think

that once you move to any basis other than historical cost,
you have a number of disclosure problems.
MR. GELLEIN:

Phil, is it fair to say--you know, I

sense this running through this, and I just wanted to know how
you would react to it--that perhaps accounting ought to get
geared more to the way in which decisions are made.
In other words, take leverage leases.
matter of depreciation.
sort of approach.

Even take the

Maybe it's, you know, a rate of return

So maybe the sinking-fund method is the bet

ter method, because it gets geared more to the way people make
decisions in business.
MR. DEFLIESE:
MR. GELLEIN:

Absolutely.
This seems to be running through what

you are saying.
MR. DEFLIESE:
step further.

Absolutely, and I'll take that one

You mentioned leveraged leases.

Real estate in

particular today--the financial statements of investment real
estate companies, those that invest in apartment houses, office
buildings, and the like are totally unrealistic as to what
their income truly is, because they are required to use standard
depreciation concepts which, coupled with high interest in
early years, give distorted results, when we recognize that in
many cases in the early years those buildings are appreciating
rather than depreciating.
There's no real indicator of income in that instance,
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and yet they are locked into an all pervasive concept of de
preciation giving no cognizance to industry characteristics.
So it's for this reason that I say we have to examine
the realization concepts and the approaches for each industry,
and give them a more realistic portrayal of what income is for
that company.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
DEAN CYERT:

One more question.

Dick?

It seems to me that a good hit of what

you are saying, and your whole position, really comes out of
any lack of definition of what income is.
MR. DEFLIESE:
DEAN CYERT:

Yes.
You are really saying income is what

the particular industry, through practice, happens to say...
MR. DEFLIESE:
terpretation on it.

Well, that's putting a loose in

I think it's what we say an industry

should reflect as income.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Let's put it that way.
Yes, but what guides us in saying

that?
DEAN CYERT:
searching for.

You see, this is the thing that I'm

It seems to me that what we should be looking

for is an over all definition, and then try to apply that in
the particular case of the industry.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, I think we have an over all

definition in the matching of costs and revenues.

I think we

start with that as a basic premise.
DEAN CYERT:
of income.

I ’m not sure that gives you a definition
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MR. DEFLIESE:

Income is the result of what you spend

versus what you receive--that’s income.

W e ’re never really

going to determine periodic income on a realistic basis until
a company liquidates.

Until then, anything else is nothing

more than an estimate.

And so, as long as w e ’re estimating,

let's estimate as pragmatically as we can, and not concern
ourselves about the conflicting theories that we frequently
have.

That really results through the articulation problem

with the balance sheet.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We have one seriously written,

formal input which would cure all of our problems, Phil.
says:

Forget quarterly statements.

impossible.

It

Annual statements are

Pick a cycle of fifteen to twenty years, and

you don’t have any accounting problem.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, I think that the example of

Lloyd’s of London is a good case.

To say that the one year

cycle is a good one for the measurement of income is really
unrealistic.

They operate on a three year cycle, and that

makes more sense.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
I think we must move on.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, helpful as this may be,

Thank you very much, Phil.
Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Accept our gratefulness for

your extended service on the Board and your considerable ac
complishments.

Thank you.

The American Valuation Consultants next.
introduce yourselves, please?

Will you
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MR. DONALD R. BRINKMAN:

Certainly, Mr. Trueblood.

I 'm Don Brinkman, President of American Valuation
Consultants, and joining me today is Lawrence Gooch.

Larry

is our Manager of Valuation Services, and of course one of our
more in-depth inputters to the materials we have available
today.
Our purpose here, basically, is not to discuss or
debate the pros--and cons, of course— of using current values,
or not using current values, versus those of historical costs.
We're here only to present at least an approach that is used
currently in the valuation business to measuring current values
if that becomes a need or something that the accounting profes
sion feels that it can use.
In reviewing the presentations that have been sche
duled for these hearings, it was interesting to note that of
the twenty four presentations, we reviewed seventeen written
papers and found that they broke down somewhat as follows:
Six presenters said there was a definite need for current
value information.

Four, including ourselves, requested fur

ther research into this area.

Four requested the status quo.

And three said "No comment."
That means that out of seventeen, at least ten are
suggesting that something be done is this area.

We fall into

that category of asking for further research.
Here I reiterate our purpose.

It's just simply to

ask that research be considered before any venture be made into
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this area, since it obviously gets to be a very complex ques
tion.
In terms of our definition, we like to think of
current values in terms of what might be synonymous with a
market value; but let's try and bring it down to more specif
ics.

In trying to value things, we think of valuing, let's

say, fixed assets in terms of a market value--or, let's say,
a current value.

So we are not really concerning ourselves

immediately with liabilities, current assets, et cetera.
And, of course, in these hearings it's been said
many times that this whole valuation question surrounds the
question of time; that is, the reporting time period, and also
the time period or life of the assets being questioned.

If

we take a closer look at this in terms of coming up with cur
rent value measurements, we find that current values within
an enterprise constitute three different types of measurement,
which obviously operate over a time continuum.
The first of these is:

If I am under a time pres

sure to dispose of something, I have to consider current value
in terms of forced liquidation, or the current period of time.
Second, I think of something in terms of orderly disposal, I
can consider it in terms of a time continuum, and of course the
value will change as that time frame changes.

And third, of

course no assets within an enterprise can exceed the value of
the entire enterprise.

So that puts a maximum on in terms of

the measurement question, when it comes to current value mea-
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surement.
In the valuation business, for years there have been
procedures developing--probably most heavily in the last three
to four decades--that start putting a measurement technique
together based on three approaches to value.

These values

can basically be summarized as what we consider replacement
cost less depreciation, discounted cash flow, and market
comparables.

You have all heard these terms before.

I'd like

to define them briefly.
Replacement cost less depreciation means to figure
out what it would take to replace the asset, and then consider
depreciation from all causes, whether they be economic, obso
lescence factors, et cetera.
In terms of discounted cash flow, Mr. Sprouse and
Mr. Moonitz put it very well in earlier years when they said
that the value of an asset is the future economic benefits to
be derived, or what you might say the present worth of the
future economic benefits to be derived that can be measured.
That really gives us the impetus for measuring, based
on discounted cash flow.
In the market comparable area, of course, w e ’re just
talking about simply that— trades in the open market.
Individual assets, of course, can be valued on these
bases, using one— or all three of them, hopefully--depending
on the type of data that’s available, and depending on the
techniques or the numbers available, to derive the answers.
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But in any case as we have briefly said, the assets themselves
cannot exceed the total value of the enterprise.

Therefore,

in order to make true measurements, we really have to take
into consideration what the value of the entire enterprise is
at that point in time.
If we expand the three techniques of valuation, we
can simply say that the replacement cost less depreciation
technique becomes, in effect, the current value of underlying
assets measured by the previous technique.

The discounted

cash flow technique is the discounted cash flow technique ap
plied to the entire enterprise.

And the market comparable

technique can be derived from financial information on the
open markets, the securities market, and sales of similar com
panies in an open economic environment.
Then, and only then, can we really support the under
lying asset values, if we are going to measure them based on
current values; but before we do that, a critical question
arises.

In measuring the value of the enterprise, we have to

consider risk factors, because unless we can quantify the
risk analysis, we are going to find that our measurements are
going to be very volatile.
We can measure that risk by breaking it down into
its finer components.

Basically, we talk about the three

components being the risk-free, which is synonymous with
government securities; the business risk rate, which is really
the risk of being in a given business; and the financial risk,
which is the risk of having a given financial structure.
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Then we can apply that risk analysis to come up with
the value of the enterprise, to check the current value mea
surements of the underlying assets within the enterprise.

I

might point out that these techniques are currently being
utilized quite widely.

They are quite accepted in terms of

generating what we call market values and current values for,
let's say, tax purposes.

In terms of purchase accounting,

sometimes they are being used in coming up with current values
of assets.
If they are being used now, why couldn't they be
further refined and researched, and possibly the accounting
profession if they wanted to employ them could use them?
Along with that, though, we find that there are also
other uses of this information once it becomes available; and
a dichotomy exists now, in the sense that management is mea
suring its investments on one basis and reporting on another
basis.

It's measuring whether or not it should invest in a

new business or a new plant, based upon the return it's going
to get from that investment; and yet, in looking back on its
old investment, it says:
I've got?

What is the current investment that

So the numbers are generated to try to generate a

current value, and then investment analysis is generally made
on that base.

Yet the balance sheet does not reflect this, and

the reports, as we know, do not reflect this type of informa
tion.
Another area of usage, if these numbers were employed
would be in the taxation area.

We're all aware of what munici
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palities and other goverments do in terms of ad valorem taxa
tion.

Most of these laws have a myriad of interwoven problems

because of the question of value, and most of them are based,
or should be based, on what is considered fair value, current
value, market value; but all generally should have the same
definitions.
So here we see that there are three major uses of
this type of information, if it were generally available.
We here again reiterate that this information, be
cause of the current situation, needs further research and
further refinement, and we have heard everyone speaking rela
tive to long-range and short-range goals, in terms of putting
together the requirements and the needs for accounting.

And

we would say that, in terms of doing the research, in this
area at least, steps should be taken to determine implementa
tion.

We all are aware that specific price indices exist for

given types of assets that can be employed in generating re
placement values, but further research is required to define
these more specifically and to simulate their effects, to try
to put them together.
In the building cost area there are available in
this country many data banks already on computer to generate
current replacement values of buildings based upon detailed
labor and material rates, and this information requires fur
ther research into its potential use.
The third key area in terms of an implementation
step for research is that in commom property items.

Of course,
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if you begin looking through the myriads of types of assets
that industries are now usings you will see that there are
common assets among all industry, there are noncommon assets
among all industry, but there needs to be a further refinement
relative to where the significant cost items are, and the num
ber of frequencies of their usage, et cetera.

Once that in

formation were available, we could have the market data com
parable information available for measuring current values on
that basis.
Of course, I ’m not an accountant.
aeronautical engineer.

I'm really an

In designing a new aircraft system, we

find that designers simulate the effects of what’s going to
happen when that design is completed.

They will input their

basic parameters to a computer, build a model of that aircraft,
and then make variations--or, you might say, a sensitivity
analysis— to see whether the plane is going to crash or not,
in terms of putting that system together.
So we say here that this same thing is possible,
using these tools in terms of the research area, to answer a
lot of questions which have been asked of the witnesses so far
in these hearings, to find out whether or not these things are
feasible and what their effect would be.

There would be no

reason why, for instance, a given company or a given industry
could not be put onto a computer model, and that information
could be modeled and simulated and sensitivity checked to see:
what if this happens?

what if that happens?

And it should

be able to be determined what these effects are before imple
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mentation is proceeded with.
You never fly an airplane until you have checked all
these things to make sure it's not going to fly apart while you
are in the air in it, and I think the same thing applies here
with the accounting business.
In summary, what we are saying is that current valuemeasurement techniques are available.

They are being widely

used nowadays; and as such, we feel that further research is
required into this area.

Of course, one of the key areas of

research would be, simply, economic feasibility.

Maybe it's

not economically feasible to ask a company to be making these
measurements, but why not test that and determine what the
economics of it are?
The second area, of course, is in determining objec
tivity and whether or not these quantifications are available
to a degree that we can objectively measure them, so the ac
counting profession would be able to audit them in terms of
completing their audit function.
Those are, basically, the conclusion of our remarks;
we have submitted our formal paper dealing with all these
areas in more specific detail for further reference.
MR. GELLEIN:

Thank you, Mr. Brinkman.

This is the

sort of input this Group needs— among others you know— and we
appreciate very much your well prepared and organized paper.
Let me start the questioning with this approach.
Among the overall objectives that have been stated for finan
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cial statements, the one of verifiability--meaning that two
experts independently take the same data with an understanding
of purpose and come up with somewhat similar numbers...let’s
take replacement cost new, less depreciation, as a measure
of a current value.

What would be your observation about the

range of values that might be developed by two experts in your
field with the same data, the same purpose, independently?
MR. BRINKMAN:

Well, it's been my experience, in

terms of actually using that kind of data, that if they are
using the same sets of data in terms of replacement cost new,
less depreciation, if they are using the same mathematical or
arithmetic formula, that they generally will come out with the
same answer, unless somebody has changed the numbers or changed
the formulas.
MR. GELLEIN:

But doesn't the market value feature

enter into the depreciation, as you view it?
MR. BRINKMAN:

Yes.

In fact, I was just going to

allude to that part of it, and the other part of it is in
terms of what we consider economic obsolescence.

That is where

the variability arises in the differences of opinion.
If you took three experts in a given area of valua
tion and asked them basically the same question, they generally
are within a range of five to ten percent on that answer.

If

you then said, well is it possible to further quantify this
information?— you will find that it is, when we take into ac
count the other techniques of valuation.

If we use three

approaches to valuation, if one of them is way out in left
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field somewhere, we know we have done something wrong in that
technique, and we go back and recheck it thoroughly to be cer
tain.
Once the three approaches are brought together, ob
viously the answers should reconcile and be similar or the
same.
MR. GELLEIN:

Do you find great variations in your

experience in this regard, depending upon the type of property
involved?
MR. BRINKMAN:
done in this area.

Well, there has been a lot of research

The Group that's currently looking at the

question of variability is the Appraisal Institute— which is
concerned basically with real estate appraisal; and they have
over the years been taking every court case where they have
appeared as witnesses, and trying to put together a compendium
of the types of variability that arise.

And whenever there is

a variation of, I guess, more than 10% , they have to reconcile
those differences out of court, to determine whether or not
they used the same techniques, and invariably they have been
finding a very nice incidence of these things being in error
in cases where they are off. Consequently, they have been
trying to pull these together.

This is the best research I

know in this area of trying to reconcile this variability,
because it does exist.
MR. GELLEIN:

There is variation, obviously.
Would there by anything in the way of,

let's say, written papers and studies that you might make
available to this Group that would help us--for the record,
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at least--in terms of the variability factor, that would not
be in the general literature?
MR. BRINKMAN:
doing.

Only what the Appraisal Institute is

I don’t know of any other studies that have been done

in this area.

And that would be a matter of collecting all

their information that they would have available.
MR. PARKER:

You made a point that management uses

the techniques that you described when they are contemplating
a purchase, but isn’t it true that when they do that, they
make the valuation for the purpose of that purchase and add
that purchase to the existing business?
Accordingly, you have to consider any synergistic
things that can come out of the purchase.

They don’t go

through this kind of study to work on the on-going results
of their own business.
And if that be so, then what would be the utility
of these procedures in working with a business not contempla
ting purchase?
MR. LAWRENCE GOOCH:

Well, first of all, management

currently uses this information on an on-going basis because
they need to get insurance coverage, so they have to have in
surance appraisals.
MR. PARKER:

Well, they make that for the purpose of

the insurance appraisal, though, not for the purpose of making
that a value of the business for any other purpose, do they?
MR. GOOCH:

Well, your point is well taken.

There
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is a difference in let's say, fair market value.

One company

may have greater value in buying it than another company be
cause of profit protection, for instance.
MR. PARKER:

Or because they have some cash that

they could use some place, or a plant they could use some
place--all of which is unique to that particular valuation of
that new company versus this existing company.
MR. GOOCH:

Well, this is true.

Primarily, what we

are talking about is fixed asset valuation, and not so much
valuation of the entire enterprise.
MR. PARKER:

Is that what all of your comments were

devoted to--fixed asset valuation?
MR. GOOCH:

Primarily fixed asset, although, as we

mentioned, to value fixed assets you have to look at the value
of the enterprise as a whole, because obviously some one is
not going to make an investment in fixed assets unless they
get a return commensurate with their investment.

So you have

to look at the total enterprise value to be able to prudently
value fixed assets.
MR. PARKER:
value?

How do you get to this total enterprise

I thought you were talking about using the same tech

niques to get that.
MR.GOOCH:

The main thing is that fair market value

means that there would be many buyers, or many sellers, at this
value; and this is the criterion that you have to use.

If

there is only one buyer that would buy it at this value, then
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that doesn’t constitute fair market value.
MR. PARKER:

Well, let’s get to another part of this

You said that these techniques were applicable for valuing the
whole enterprise— this market comparable technique, which
sounds very interesting.

For publicly traded companies, of

course, each one has one already established in the market.
Do you suggest that the proper valuation for, let’s say, the
Ford Motor Company is based on extrapolation from the stock
market price of General Motors?
General Motors sells twice as many cars, and General
Motors sells for a total market value of thus-and-so-much.
Therefore, Ford should be worth half that amount.

But, of

course, that isn’t ture, because Ford happens to make much
less money per car than does General Motors, and Ford’s ag
gregate market value is actually much less than one-half that
of General Motors.
But that market price is already there.
comparables are right in front of people.

The market

So how would this

market comparable technique in valuing the whole company for
publicly owned enterprises advance our process here of account
ing and financial statements?
MR. GOOCH:

Well, first of all, there are really two

components to consider that would go into a market comparable
approach; and we did talk about financial risk and business
risk.
Now, obviously the business risk of General Motors
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is less than that of Ford, because of the fact that they are a
larger corporation--more secure.
MR. PARKER:

Why would that necessarily be so?

In

some cases, the second company in the industry is the more
profitable one, and the more secure.
MR. GOOCH:

Well, these are the factors in each

case that would have to be considered.

In other words, there

are certain parameters that would go into business risk-fi
nancial size, operating margins, items of this nature that
would change the business risk factor.
Now, as you say, there may be companies that are...
MR. PARKER:

But these are already reported in the

financial statements— the size of their revenues and their
operating margins.
MR. GOOCH:

Well, as far as doing the market compara

ble, you are correct, but they are not put together in terms
in which the user is going to need them.
MR. PARKER:

Well, the user is quite interested in

the stock price, because that's exactly what he's going to
buy or sell.
MR. GOOCH:

Okay.

I agree with you.

How does this

affect our situation here?
In other words, what we are trying to say is that
we can come up, using various valuation techniques, with cur
rent or market values for fixed assets.
MR. PARKER:

Now we're back to just the fixed assets
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part.
MR. GOOCH:

Well, as I say, we have to look at the

value of the enterprise to be able to determine the value of
the fixed assets, because you can’t say that the value of the
fixed assets exceeds the value of the enterprise.

That

wouldn't make sense.
MR. PARKER:

I guess my question is:

How is it that

you’ve prepared to develop the value of the total enterprise,
in a way that’s different from what’s being done already?
MR. GOOCH:

Well, I think, realistically, w e ’re not

going to be able to come up with a market comparable approach
for an enterprise, and probably not for a number of specific
other types of assets.

For example, is it feasible to value

land by having a massive data bank, and just plugging in?
The answer to that question may be no.
MR. PARKER:

Well, then, you say that the market-

comparable technique, then, is out for valuing the total
enterprise?
MR. GOOCH:

Probably, because there are too many

subjective factors that would enter in; but what we're talking
about is the fact that for many types of assets, like buildings
and machinery and equipment, this would be feasible.
DEAN CYERT:

"This” being what?

The market compara

ble approach?
MR. GOOCH:

The market comparable approach.

Now,

as I say, the market comparable approach is only one approach
to value, because there is current replacement cost less de
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predation as another, and also an income approach.
MR. PARKER:

Current replacement cost less deprecia

tion sounds to me very much like just fixed assets.
MR. GOOCH:

Yes.

That's what we're primarily direct

ing our presentation toward, the fixed asset side.
MR. BRINKMAN:

Reed, I might also comment there.

You could apply this across the board, and you could actually
do it even in terms of management, or a research group— what
it would take to replace that group--the training-development
costs, the recoupment costs, and everything else, if you want
ed to apply it.

We're just saying that these theories and

these techniques have to be refined, to even eventually use
them in some of these other areas.
We have seen this done in some purchase acquisitions
where the company would actually value things on that basis.
MR. PARKER:

Do you have any idea to suggest as to

what the relevance of that would be, though, to the figures
we're talking about here?
MR. BRINKMAN:

Well, in terms of coming up with cur

rent values, we're just talking about the means of measurement
We are saying here--and we have prefaced in this manner— that
if you want to use current values, the means of measurement
are available, but even they need more research.
MR. PARKER:

But you have nothing to suggest as to

whether they would or would not be relevant?
MR. BRINKMAN:
MR. WESTON:

No.
This may sound like more of the same,
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but on pages 38 and 39 of your paper you display a series of
formulas which start with enterprise valuation, and as I under
stand them, deduct the present value of the cash flow of vari
ous items— receivables and cash and inventory— and then you
get down to the area that we have been concerned with for a
couple of days, the fixed assets, or the land and buildings,
machinery and equipment, and you deduct the present value of
the cash flow of those.
Now, I have two questions, I guess:

How do you

determine the cash flow of particular machinery or equipment,
or a building?

And if you then go to replacement cost, as

you have just alluded, do you replace the service utility of
the item, or do you price level the purchase cost, based on
price changes?
I guess the first part is, I don’t understand on
page 38 how you determine the present value of the cash flow
of a building, apart from the other assets.
MR. BRINKMAN:

Basically, Mr. Weston, what we're

doing here is, we're imputing that; and that is to say that if
you look at any given building or piece of land or equipment,
it can be leased and you could generate from that an imputed
lease cash flow.

Basically, we would be applying that same

technique here to look at these kinds of assets.
Within an enterprise, though, we would find that we
could impute this as, hopefully, a group, for a given type of
company; and these are some of the areas requiring some fur
ther research in developing a mathematical model for pulling
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these together and seeing how these variabilities would work,
if we made certain fluctuations or sensitivity analyses in
this area.
MR. PARKER:

Well, to help on Prank's question, how

would you impute the lease value of U. S. Steel's complex of
steel mills?
MR. BRINKMAN:

That’s a good question.

I don’t

know.
MR. GELLEIN:

Is it an incremental approach, basical

ly, or...?
MR. BRINKMAN:

What we are, in effect, doing in this

set of equations on page 38 is, we are presupposing we can
generate an imputed lease flow, and then go through the pre
sent worth analysis for the present worth of the future dis
counted cash flow, plus a residual at the end, to come up with
the current value.
Now, we really don’t even know how these things in
terrelate, until you put this on a computer and start modeling
these effects and figuring out what’s going to happen when you
start making these variations.

This is an area which requires

further research, and that’s why it appeared at one of the
last pages of our paper.
MR. GELLEIN:

If I could go back to a point that

Reed made, the thing that’s kind of concering us a little
bit— and I ’m not asking for an answer to it, but an observa
tion— is that if current value becomes a determinant of income,
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but if in turn income is a determinant of the current valuehaving to look to the value of the business as a whole then
we're in sort of a vicious circle.
MR. BRINKMAN: That's right.

Yes, that's why what

we say is that if we look at it on the basis of applying three
approaches in every case, in once case you are looking at his
tory, which is replacement cost, and which you would be genera
ting from past history; in another case you would be looking
at a discounted cash flow, which is future information; and in
the third case it's market comparability, which is what's hap
pening today.

And you do all three of them— past, present

and future— in that analysis.
MR. GELLEIN:

(Temporarily assuming the chair)

there any other questions from members of the panel?

Are

(There

were none.)
Thank you very much for a very fine presentation.
MR. BRINKMAN:

We appreciate the time of you

gentlemen.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
pany.

All right, Arthur Young & Com

We'll let Mr. Gillette go right ahead.
MR. CHARLES G. GILLETTE:

Well, Mr. Trueblood and

gentlemen of the Group, you are in possession of our written
statement, and we won't take time to repeat it or summarize
it today.

Rather, we would like to comment on a few points

on which there seemed to be conflict of views among those
who have made written submissions.
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Some of the papers you have received, generally those
which are considered conservative, have emphasized the steward
ship of management and management’s fiduciary duty to its stock
holders.

There is an implication in this view that financial

reporting should not concern itself with prospective investors,
stockholders or creditors, as distinguished from present stock
holders.

By contrast, our explicit view is that financial re

porting should he responsive without discrimination to both
present stockholders and future stockholders, as well as to
present and future creditors.
We think a realistic view of today's corporate life,
with a billion shares of stock changing hands every year and
public offerings being ground out by the hundred, must recog
nize that management constantly has its eye on the marketplace,
populated by the prospective investor, and whatever anyone may
say about how it should be, financial reporting is, in fact,
directed to that audience.
That being so, financial reporting should serve that
audience well rather than poorly.

Management has a public re

sponsibility to the investing public as well as a fiduciary re
sponsibility to its shareholders.
This leads us to the different question of public-in
terest reporting.

Public interest, as that term is being used

in the 1970 's, means something very different from the interest
of the investing public.

There is a widespread concern about

the impact of large corporations upon those with whom they do
not do business, concern about the impact of those corporations
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upon air, water, elections, and many other things.

Those who

pursue these subjects naturally want all the tools they can
get, and the Study Group is importuned with proposals either
to broaden the scope of financial reporting to deal with such
matters, or otherwise to apply the skills of the accounting
profession.

We would

like to note that there is a major distinc

tion between broadening the scope of financial reporting to
encompass such matters and applying the skills of accountants
to those matters outside the context of financial reporting.
We reject the idea of including such matters within financial
reporting, first because it is a distraction from the primary
objective of financial statements, as we see it, and second,
because we do not believe that financial statements have been
demonstrated to be the appropriate vehicle for reporting on
such matters.
The profitability of a company and its impact upon
our environment are both fruits of the corporate activities,
but they are fruits no more alike than apples and bananas,
and each should be handled differently, just as apples and
bananas are.
As to whether the skills of accountants should be
applied to measuring and reporting on such matters outside the
financial statements, we doubt that there is a single general
answer.

Some of the questions involved may be matters that

we accountants could handle skillfully, and some of them cer
tainly are not.

Our profession should not be hesitant to
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tackle new problems, but neither should we be flattered into
the belief that we are the world's leading experts in all types
of measurement and reporting.
It is interesting to note that those critics who are
quickest to question our motivations, or our morals, at the
same time express the most unqualified, blind faith in our
great skill.

Apparently, we, the accountants, are capable of

anything, in both the favorable sense of that phrase and the
derogatory sense.
Another issue which seems to cause some division, or
at least some confusion, is the matter of comparability; that
is, the question of whether comparability should be an objec
tive of accounting.

There are those who call for uniform

rules of accounting in order to establish comparability, and
on the other hand, there are those who say a shipyard is so
different from a grocery chain that the two cannot be compared,
and therefore that comparability is a false goal.
We believe that the truth lies between these two
positions.

It is true that a shipyard and a grocery store

are different in many ways, and comparisons are difficult; but
it is also true that they have certain attributes in common.
They both require capital.

They both strive for profit.

And

they both compete in the marketplace for the investor's dollar.
The investment community decides if and under what
terms it will invest in one or the other, and this necessarily
means that they are compared.

Thus it is a proper and neces

sary objective of accounting to minimize the difficulties of
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this comparison, insofar as possible.
To this end, the accounting concepts applied to one
should be compatible with the concepts applied to the other.
In spite of the fact that net income is an imprecise concept,
it should be an objective of accounting to make net income
mean the same thing for a shipyard as it does for a grocery
chain, insofar as that is possible.

The result will of course

be imprecise, but it will be better than if we don't try.
We therefore reject the idea that accounting prin
ciples should be developed independently, industry by industry,
without conceptual consistency.
Now I would like to talk briefly about the merits
of using replacement value in lieu of historical cost.

You

heard a few minutes ago both the hopes for and the limitations
on the appraisal techniques of the appraisal industry.

Other

advocates of replacement value have suggested that replacement
value can be provided, and can provide more relevant data,
avoiding the uncertainties of the appraisal process by deter
mining replacement values through the application of price in
dices.

This may be true with respect to certain types of cap

ital goods, such as trucks, buildings and freight cars.

We

submit, however, that price indices are totally useless for
determining the current value of many other categories of
long-term assets, which in the aggregate represent a major por
tion of the nation's capital resources.
Examples of assets whose current values cannot be
determined by price indices include the following short but
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important list:

natural resources in the ground, Series 360

computers, goodwill, a l4-story midtown hotel, patents,
Disneyland, East or West, franchises, a transcontinental rail
road track, land anywhere, a DC-8, or deferred R&D.

For assets

such as these, replacement cost, determined by index numbers,
does nothing for the investor.
In addition, there is a class of assets for which
price indices, however precise, are irrelevant, because the
financial significance of those assets is determined by specif
ic sales contracts rather than by the open marketplace.

This

class of assets consists of all the work in process, including
building construction in process, which is being performed pur
suant to sales contracts.

If a construction contractor has a

half-completed dam being built at a fixed price, it is totally
irrelevant to his financial reporting whether an index of dam
construction costs is up

20% since

or whether the index is flat.

he incurred his costs,

His profit will be measured by

the difference between his expenditures and his price, and not
by somebody else’s expenditures at a different time and place.
As indicated in our written presentation, we do not
advocate attempting to state a company’s assets at current
values, whether by appraisal, by the application of price
indices, or otherwise; but we do advocate the use of indices
to adjust past expenditures, in order to express them in terms
of current dollars.

In other words, we believe that a set of

financial statements should be expressed through a single,
uniform unit of measure, the current dollar.

This means that
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in the presence of inflationary conditions, such as have pre
vailed in this country, it is desirable to adjust historical
dollar amounts to express them in terms of today’s less valu
able dollars.

This, of course, is not current value accounting

it is simply historical cost accounting measured by today’s
money.
There have been some discussions, both private and
public, on whether the presentations to the Study Group are
conservative.

Those who are radical deplore the presentations

which are conservative.

The presentation to you by Mr. Henry

Hill, of Price, Waterhouse & Co., opens with the words:

"This

is a conservative paper.”
We are pleased to associate ourselves with the con
servative view.

Our paper is also a conservative paper, though

perhaps a little less so than Mr. Hill's.
Conservatism, as we are using the word, means pre
serving those values which have developed over time.

In this

sense, the Sierra Club is conservative, and so is Arthur Young
& Company.

We believe that the transaction based, investor

oriented accounting practices that have evolved in the Englishspeaking world are as valuable to the nation as our giant
redwood trees, and we hope that you gentlemen will not chop
them down to make way for an experimental farm.
And now we are available for questions.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Very well done, Charlie.

And

thank you very much.
And lest I forget, let me compliment you

onyour
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beautifully and very lucidly done monograph.
MR. GILLETTE:

Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Excellent reading.

I was interested particularly in a statement you
made which relates hack to some of the other things that were
said earlier this afternoon and, I believe, this morning.

I

did properly understand that you are saying that there may
well he different requirements, in the sense of practice or
procedure, industry by industry, hut you are looking for a
consistent, conceptual umbrella.
MR. GILLETTE:

Is that the way you put it?

The latter part is the way I put it,

and I have no quarrel with the first part.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
you ready, Reed?

Now, one further question.

Are

Go ahead.

MR. PARKER:

On the adjustment for changes in the

value of money, how would you do this on the income statement?
Would you just adjust net earnings, net per share, and divi
dends per share, or how would that work?
MR, ERNEST HICKS:

What we envision here is what I

call a full adjustment procedure.
number of contexts.

It’s been described in a

It was described generally in one of the

research studies.
I think w e 're not talking about just a one item
kind of adjustment, but a process of adjusting all the costs
in a set of financial statements for changes in the price level,
which process would produce profit-and-loss numbers that are
different from those that now appear.
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MR. PARKER:
the same amount?

Would every single item be adjusted by

That is, a change in the Consumer Price

Index— apply that from top to bottom?
MR. HICKS:

Yes. It’s difficult to look into your

mind, or you look into mine, and see what one envisions, but
I think generally the answer would be yes.
MR. PARKER:

You would find some measure of change

in the value of money, and it might be the Consumer Price
Index, or it might be-MR. HICKS:

That's right.

MR. PARKER:

...and whatever it is, it’s applied

from top to bottom.
MR. HICKS:

That's right.

MR. GILLETTE:
about the same thing.

Well, I'm not sure we are talking
Depreciation would not be adjusted by

the same factor as last month's sales,because depreciation
would be adjusted by the change in the value of the dollar
between the date the costs were incurred and the date they
are being amortized.
MR. PARKER:

So this would result in a different

net income figure than would simply result from taking all
past ten years' net income and adjusting them?
MR. GILLETTE:

Absolutely.

If it didn’t have that

result, we probably wouldn’t bother to advocate it.
MR. PARKER:

What figure would you use for the price

adjustment of the dividends that were actually paid?
MR. HICKS:

Well, it would depend on how recently
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they were paid, and what change there has been in the index
since the date of payment.

In the current year, the adjust

ment of dividends would he minimal.

On the other hand, divi

dends that were paid out a number of years ago, if I remember
the mathematics of the process--and I haven't thought about it
for a long time-MR. GILLETTE:

Ernie, wouldn’t the APB Statement

on this subject...
MR. HICKS:
the Statement.

Well, that’s right.

I didn’t refer to

I referred to the research study, but I over

looked the Statement.

The Statement also deals with this ex

plicitly.
MR. PARKER:

Well, as a financial analyst I was

just thinking of my treasured tool of payout ratio.

If I

am now going to get a set of figures that adjusts the dividends
that have actually been paid in the past, by one set of figures,
and the earnings that were originally reported in the year they
were reported, and against which you measured the dividend
payout once upon a time, by a different set of factors, what
do I have?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, I think, Reed, whether you

buy it or whether you don't buy it, they are suggesting essen
tially the techniques fully described in ARS No. 6.

They might

have their own adjustments, but in effect it would be a perva
sive change.
MR. PARKER:

The dividends and earnings would be ad

justed by exactly the same amount?
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

No, that doesn't follow.

We're

talking about...
MR. PARKER:

Yes.

Well, this, then, begins to pre

sent some real problems for the investor, I would think.

How

does he use this historic record for looking into the future,
if you have been adjusting every piece of the income statement
by a different percentage?
MR. GILLETTE:

I 'm not completely clear on my tech

nology on this, but I think that your ratios in a prior year's
income probably would not be changed, but if it were something
that last year was also on this method--assuming that this
method had been in existence over a period of time— the ratios
you determined from the income statement of 1965 would remain
the same.
MR. PARKER:
MR. GILLETTE:

Pretax margin and...?
But all of the figures in that 1965

statement would be different than if unadjusted historical
cost accounting had been applied.
MR. PARKER:

I guess the last question I 'd have is:

I wonder, if the basic purpose is to help the investor under
stand what the process of inflation has been doing, why it
wouldn’t suffice simply to adjust, say, the earnings per
share and the dividends per share figures themselves, and let
it go at that?

Because otherwise you are restating things the

way they didn't happen in the first place, and if there is any
variation up and down the line, you would be affecting the
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ratio calculations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
pler than that.

Reed, I think it's much sim

I think you are trying to get around to a

common dollar approach which would not affect his ratio
analysis.

Is that not correct, Charlie?
MR. GILLETTE:

It wouldn't keep changing it year by

year with respect to any given year.

It would change it as

distinguished from not using a common dollar figure.
MR. GELLEIN:

Just one last comment.

Wouldn’t it

help, Reed, just simply to say that everything would be stat
ed in terms of a current common dollar?
MR. PARKER:

Everything.

Well, if so, then why not just restate

the last two figures.
I gathered there was some part of the statement that
said pretty soon you might find that you didn't need to report
the historic dollar figures any more--the original ones.
DEAN EDWARDS:

In your Item 4, Mr. Gillette, in your

statement there's a reference there to the utilization of cur
rent, or economic values; that these would be preferable, were
there a practical way of measuring them.

Although you go on

and elaborate further in your document, would you visualize
this as being an objective, subject to measurement processes,
that would accommodate your criticism?
MR. GILLETTE:

No, we do not, because we think that

the basic difficulties in determining current values are so
overriding that we are unable to visualize the development of
technology which would change this.
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We are willing to concede the possibility that our
vision of the future is not perfect and complete, and some day
it might happen, but we don'
t regard it as a realistic and
practical goal for which to strive.
DEAN EDWARDS:

I think you said "foreseeable future";

so your timing is, in the life of the redwood tree you don’t
see it as a foreseeable obstacle to be overcome.
MR. GILLETTE:

Well, I understand the redwood trees

are in a lot of trouble; but subject to that, yes.
DEAN EDWARDS:

One other question that you referred

to— including forecasts or excluding them from financial state
ments.

Would you like to comment?

your Item 6.

I think that was under

Should forecasts be a part of the basic finan

cial statements?
Would you visualize the basic financial statements
remaining as they are, as a part of the objectives of account
ing and financial reporting, or would you visualize them
changing?

Do you visualize this accomplishing the objectives

within these contraints?
MR. HICKS:

Well, we don't envision changing the

structure to the point of saying that the basic financial
statements would not be the balance sheet, the income state
ment, the changes in financial position, and a forecast.

We

think the financial statements ought to continue to be the
first three, plus— in some cases--a couple that I didn't men
tion, and we think that in some cases it would also be useful
to present a forecast; but we think this is a different process
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than reporting on the past, and partly for that reason and
partly because we don’t believe that in every case it would
be useful to present a forecast, we don't believe that the
forecast should become one of the basic financial statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

This gives me a chance to bring

up a question which I had to pass over this morning, because
it didn't quite fit the conversation then.
The question that came from the floor was:

When we

do talk loosely about forecasts— and we have talked somewhat
loosely in these meetings about forecasts--are we really talk
ing about earnings per share, sales, or net income, or are we
contemplating, even though it’s not a part of the basic set-which terminology I think I understand--a rather detailed
breakdown of revenues, costs, expenses, and so on?
MR. HICKS:

Well, for one thing, I think it would

vary from case to case, depending on what is practical to pre
sent.

As we point out in the paper, for some companies what

would amount to a full forecast profit-and-loss statement
could usefully be prepared; and the question of whether it’s
useful or not depends upon how reliable it can be.

Other

companies could perhaps reliably predict sales, but wouldn’t
be able to predict other factors.
So we don't have in mind any single format, such as
earnings per share or net income, or a complete statement.
And yet it would just seem to me that if a relatively complete
statement could be prepared, this would be the more useful
format, for perhaps the same reason that a full income state-
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merit is— in the minds of all of us, I guess— better than a
single figure of earnings per share.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Well, I applaud your conservative

stance and your reference to the redwoods and your unwilling
ness to depart from the time honored historical cost and com
pleted transactions approach, even though there have been some
difficulties in recent years.
It reminds me of a session that I attended at Ox
ford College a few years back where there was some discussion
about the financial plight of the University.

Someone had

given them a fairly large gift, at least for those days, back
in the l600' s, and it had been invested in agricultural land
in the north of England.

This had not been producing very

much income for them, and there was a fairly general berating
of the man who had made this decision, until finally someone
rose to his defense and said:

But isn't it true that the

last 300 years have been unusual?
Now, it seems to me that aside from what's time
honored and been acceptable, I'm made uneasy by your statement,
and maybe I'm quoting you out of context here, but your
statement where you say:

"Even if we accepted the current

value goal, however, we would think it inappropriate to pursue
that goal piecemeal."

That is, whether we ought not to be

substituting current values wherever we can get reliable esti
mations of these amounts, even though we do do it in a piece
meal fashion.

4.63

In a way, it almost seemed to me that that phrase
was inconsistent with what appeared on the page before; and
so I would really ask, if we get demonstrated dissatisfaction-perhaps not 300 years of it, but some reasonable period-whether we ought not to seek piecemeal substitutions of cur
rent value.
MR. GILLETTE:

Well, we certainly have no objection

to partial solutions to problems.

Our objections to a piece

meal approach in this particular context relate primarily to
the difficulties of separating the values of individual assets
from the enterprise value.

We think in many cases there is

very little meaning to going through an elaborate ritual to
restate depreciation on a plant whose real significance to the
investor is that it is an integrated part of a business pro
cess.
The unattainable goal that we think would be very
helpful to the investor would be to tell him exactly the value
of that process, but we are not satisfied that he is helped
by tagging appraisals on bits and pieces of that process.
The appraisal experts that talked to you just a little while
ago talked about relating the value of components of an enter
prise to the whole, and said that the values of the components
must not exceed the whole--and that’s a valid test they are
proposing--but I don’t think they told you how to apply that
test when some of the components of the value of the enter
prise as a whole aren’t on the balance sheet.

I just don't

visualize how you go about saying that this asset now has a
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value of X dollars more than its cost; hut we don’t know how
that relates to the total value of the enterprise, because I
think that relationship is essential to the validity of the
original statement.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

I ’m not sure I follow all of that,

MR.

I ’m not sure I could repeat it.

Charlie.
GILLETTE:

DEAN DAVIDSON:
DEAN CYERT:

I'm not sure I ’d ask you to.

I think we should reverse the process.

You give an answer now, and see if he can give a question.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

But I do not understand your un

easiness where we can get reasonably satisfactory reproduction
costs, current value numbers to substitute for the historic
cost numbers.
To take an easy example, take the case, say, of a
trucking company, which does have some trucks which have an
unmistakable market value in a period of relatively rapid
price change that might occur.

It would seem to me you would

be much better off in analyzing that firm if you had the cur
rent values of the trucks, rather than the historic costs,
and those current values could be substantiated by reference
market figures.
MR. GILLETTE:

If the company was a trucking con

tractor, I will agree with you.

If the company was a fran

chised interstate trucking company, I would not agree. And I
suggest that 90-some percent of U. S. industry is in this
situation, more like the franchised interstate company than
the company that enters into short term contracts to lease
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heavy equipment.
So I think there could be— and are--cases where re
placement cost is enough more significant that it should be
used.

I suggest that that is such a tiny segment of industry

that making it a general practice to use that data would cause
more confusion than enlightenment.
MR. GELLEIN:

I think I was most intrigued in your

paper, which I thought was very well written too, ...
MR. GILLETTE:
MR. GELLEIN:

Thank you.
...by part of your point No. 2 where

you really make the pointy and I really think it gives us food
for thought--maybe it needs considerable elaboration, this
whole question of whether the changing nature of distributions
by corporations from dividends to financing that comes from
ploughing back earnings— whether, in terms of objectives of
accounting, that causes a change, or a shift in the emphasis
away from what you call the classical measures— book value,
dividends, earnings.
Now, you conclude that this manifests itself in
heightened interest for forecasts, presumably on the ground
that, well, they are going to look more to appreciation than
to dividends; I take this to be the analysis.

And therefore

the ploughing back of the earnings, and therefore the forecast
of the earnings, becomes much more important in connection with
appreciation versus dividends.
I don't know whether you want to elaborate on it now,
but I would think this would be worthy of some elaboration at
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some point in time.
MR. HICKS:

Well, Charlie may have a comment.

I

would like to add only to what you said--and I think I agree
with it--that the emphasis this gives is certainly to the
question of forecasts, as we discussed it a few minutes ago,
but it also runs to the predicative value of the financial
statements.

And that's perhaps the same thing, and perhaps

a little different.
Do you want to add to that?
MR. GILLETTE:

No, I don't think I'd add to that.

I agree with what you said.
MR. REINHART:

I'd like to know if you could perhaps

give us some specific instances of where your proposed method
of using these present values, however they are constituted,
would have affected the allocation of resources in the United
States, or would have resulted in lower cost products to the
consumer.
MR. GILLETTE:

I don't understand the question.

MR. REINHART:

Well, the purpose of change is usually

to do something better.

We presumably are changing the account

ing in order to determine a better allocation of resources to
various and sundry businesses, who are then going to supply,
presumably, product to the consumer.

So what I was curious

about was, by making these changes you are describing, where
is an instance where they would have affected that basic
situation?--which is, I think, what we are driving toward, is
it not?
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MR. GILLETTE:

Well, I think Mr. Defliese mentioned

a little earlier a category of companies where this would he
applicable. I think that you would get very different results
on companies with long term real estate holdings if you took
inflation into account, as we suggest, and most particularly
where those real estate holdings are leveraged.
Our present accounting doesn't reveal the benefits
of leverage until disposition.
leverage.

It reveals only the cost of

And that would continue to be true, but it would

be mitigated.
MR. REINHART:

Is it principally, however, in a very

limited area, though, that you are talking about?
MR. GILLETTE:

No, I think w e ’re talking about effects

of a greater or less degree.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think Howie answered that

statement in terms of the other side of the coin this morning.
He indicated that they did an extensive price level adjustment
in his company; and I believe you said that no internal deci
sion would have been changed.
MR. WAGNER:

...would have been made otherwise, in a

different fashion, because of the price level changes that we
have structured into our statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

One more question, Dick, if

you still have one.
DEAN CYERT:

I was interested in your statement here

that financial statements must, to the extent practicable, be
responsive to the equity security investor's interests.

And
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you had three things listed here.

No. 2 was in evaluating

risk factors which may affect future earnings; and I didn’t
see— perhaps I missed it in the statement--any elaboration
of that.
I was interested in knowing how far you would go in
the report in evaluating or giving information that would
help the prospective investor evaluate risk factors.

Would

you compute variances, or beta factors, or what would you do?
MR. HICKS:

Well--I don’t mean this to be flip,

although it may sound flip--I think we'd tend to leave that
to the Standards Board.
But thinking in terms of some things that might ac
complish this objective, the simple matter, for instance, of
concentration of either sales or purchases in a single customer
or supplier is a risk factor.
offhand.

I don’t think of any others just

Perhaps Charlie does; but it’s that kind of thing.
DEAN CYERT:

Would you want to say something about

some measure of the volatility of earnings over time, or earn
ings in particular divisions?
MR. HICKS:

Reasonably so.

I think the line of

business information falls into this category.

There may be

some blurring of lines here between the first and the second
one in this tabulation, but I think, for instance, line of
business information falls probably into the second category.
DEAN CYERT:

Well, if we are going to set that as an

objective, we would need to spell out some guidelines there,
wouldn’t we?

Or else, we are again just in something where it
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depends on particular judgment.
MR. HICKS:

Well, that's a very interesting question,

as to the extent of detail to which the Group would decide that
it wants to go in making its recommendations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I'm not sure it's quite cricket,

but Prank wants to speak to his partners.

And then we will

close this discussion.
MR. WESTON:

Back to the question of the trucking

industry which Sid raised--it was suggested to us this morning
that the reporting by that industry, for example, in total, in
terms of financial reporting and allocation of resources, would
be much more useful to investors, and would result in a better
allocation of resources if the entire industry were reporting
on a replacement cost basis.

Would you have any views on that?

That is, wouldn't it be more useful to have the whole industry
on a sound replacement cost reporting method?
MR. GILLETTE:

Are you an expert on the trucking in

dustry?
MR. HICKS:

No, I'm not.

MR. GILLETTE:

I'm not either, but...

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. GILLETTE:

You’ll have to defer to Sid.

I don't know

the data that was submit

ted to you this morning when I wasn’t here in support of that
proposition, but it would seem to me that franchises are so
important in a major segment of the trucking industry, and the
lives ofits fixed assets are so relatively short, that

account

ing on a replacement cost basis would have a relatively small
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effect as compared to the factors that really make or break a
trucking company.

But I have to again disclaim an in-depth

knowledge of that industry.
MR. WESTON:
try.

Well, it’s not particularly the indus

The franchises also would presumably be on a replace

ment cost basis; the idea being that any industry using re
placement cost does report a more realistic, and therefore
more comparable, and therefore more useful financial presen
tation than one using historic cost.
MR. HICKS:

The industry doesn’t matter basically.

MR. GILLETTE:

When you talk about franchises, our

views on reporting replacement cost--which has to be, I guess,
the equivalent of market value— gets us back into the area we
were talking about earlier, where fair value or replacement
cost is so difficult of determination that we would question
the reliability, and therefore the utility of the results.
And there again, I don’t know whether there is an
open market on truck franchises or not, but I didn't think
there was.

Is there?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much.

We're going to do a bit of rescheduling because of
problems we have tomorrow afternoon, and w e ’re going to call
now on Mr. Koons of Shell Oil.

We will then proceed to the

National Investor Relations Institute, which means that we're
apt to run over a bit, and we may have to cut our questioning
a little, but we would like to make this scheduling change
if i t ’s convenient with Mr. Koons.
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I know you have been here since yesterday morning,
so you know the procedure.
MR. ROBERT L. KOONS: That’s quite all right.
Mr. Trueblood, members of the Accounting Objectives
Study Group:

I'm appearing here today on behalf of Shell

Oil Company, with which I have been associated for twenty
five years.

During this time I have had numerous financial

assignments which in total represent practical working
experience in essentially every aspect of the business.
I ’m presently a consultant accountant to the Company.
I am a CPA, have been for twenty years, and am a member of
many professional organizations, including the American Insti
tute of Certified Public Accountants.
These prepared remarks have the explicit concurrence
and approval of Shell's executive management, and therefore are
to be considered as my Company's recommendations to this
Study Group.
By way of background, Shell Oil Company is an inte
grated oil enterprise which has operated primarily in the Unit
ed States for over fifty years.

Last year our sales and total

assets of $4.6 billion each rank us in size among the top in
dustrial firms.

We have over 33,000 shareholders, and our

stock is listed on the New York Stock Exhange and other ex
changes in the United States and Canada.
With this brief background on Shell Oil I turn now
to the subject of this hearing.

First, I wish to discuss the

objective of general purpose financial statements and, second*
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the broader area of financial accounting.
We and other responsible parties believe that the
objective of general purpose financial statements is to report
to investors on the use of funds invested in the enterprise.
In our opinion, this objective of financial statements is
immutable, and, although some may argue that new developments
may call for modification of standards or of the items to be
disclosed, the main purpose will remain the same.

I question

the wisdom of any drastic changes.
Today there seems to be an increasing tendency to
place a disproportionate interest on ills and problems rather
than achievement and progress.

The daily fare of the news

media is far more concerned with violence, disorder and those
who have violated laws or a sense of fair play than it is
with the common, daily accomplishments of the vast majority
of society.

Similarly, attention is disproportionately focused

upon business ills rather than achievements.

One aspect of this

is a view that financial reports are woefully inadequate and
that a crash program is necessary to reorient the objectives.
We reject this view and quesion the need of changing the ob
jective of financial statements, for it seems that in practice
the present objective has worked very well indeed.
There is always the possibility of abuse or intent
to mislead.

This does not mean that the system is wrong but

merely that the standards are not properly applied.

I do not

believe there is an extension of Gresham’s Law whereby bad
accounting drives out good accounting.

There are in fact very
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significant safeguards for preventing abuse.

First among

these is management's legal responsibility to present finan
cial statements fairly.

Second, the integrity of the indepen

dent accountants' audit and opinion is a most positive safe
guard.

In the rare cases where these fail, punitive action

should be taken.
The importance of public confidence in financial
statements must not be underrated.

It is earned by integrity,

consistent action, comparable treatment and a record of behav
ior that merits faith.

Therefore, in considering something as

significant as a reordering of objectives, it is vital to con
sider what any basic change would do to confidence.

If the

situation were out of control or operating very poorly, then
a change in objectives might be in order.
case.

Such is not the

A high degree of confidence in financial statements

does exist.

To give an example from our own recent experience,

we believe that the facility with which we have successfully
raised over $1 billion by debt and equity offerings in the
last decade was made possible by the widespread confidence
investors have in our financial statements.

I am sure many

others have experienced the same effectiveness of the capital
markets.

The confidence upon which the system works is basic

to our free enterprise economy.

Because a significant change

in the objectives of financial statements, or in the basis of
accounting, has the potential for irreparable harm to investor
confidence, it must be approached with extreme care.
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Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4 states,
"The responsibility for the reliability of an enterprise's
financial statements rests with its management.

This respon

sibility is discharged by applying generally accepted account
ing principles that are appropriate to the enterprise's cir
cumstances, by maintaining effective systems of accounts and
internal control, and by preparing adequate financial state
ments."

We agree with this principle.

We cannot envision

management abdicating responsibility for its reports or stand
ing by and letting a third party assume this responsibility,
particularly in light of the accompanying obligation and
potential liabilities.
Since management is ultimately responsible for re
porting on its stewardship, it must have an important voice
in establishing accounting standards.
precedents to support this opinion.

There are ample legal
A great amount of assis

tance is required from the public accountant both in the
setting of standards and, more importantly, in ascertaining
that they are correctly applied.

However, we feel that those

responsible for financial reports should participate in the
standard setting process at least equally with the public
accountants who express an opinion thereon and with the
investors who use the reports.

In many respects management

is in a unique position to exercise a role of leadership in
considering new standards because of its knowledge of the
business and the accounting system.

Management has an even

greater contribution to make in setting the standards because
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the financial statements should reflect the judgments and the
decisions that management has made.

While Shell results to

date have not been materially affected by Opinions of the
present Accounting Principles Board, we have been active in
the accounting profession's endeavors to establish acceptable
accounting standards.

Assuming the Accounting Principles

Study Group recommendations are accepted, there presumably
will be an opportunity for even greater management participa
tion in the standard setting process.

We expect to contribute

because we believe, as managers, we have something essential
to

offer, and

because in the final analysis the system will

not run very well if we who are responsible for making it
work do not have a strong voice in the design.

It is through

this process of research and collective participation that
further positive improvement of basic financial statements
can be made.
I turn now from responsibility for general purpose
financial statements to the standards followed in their prep
aration.

The more significant accounting standards are his

torical cost, realization, conservatism, and consistency
with prior reporting periods.

We believe any statement on

objectives should include an unequivocal affirmation of these
standards.

They provide the most reliable criteria for meet

ing the seven qualitative objectives of relevance, under
standability, verifiability, neutrality, timeliness, compa
rability and completeness.

While it is difficult to judge

specific standards in such abstract terms, the present stan
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dards have these qualities in greater measure than any alter
native.

Assuredly, historical cost is more understandable,

verifiable, neutral, and timely than, say, a present value
or price level adjusted basis.

Some specialist users of

financial statements may find these other bases relevant
for some purposes, but I do not believe the primary report
users find profit based upon historical cost irrelevant.
Because the present conventions are rooted in recording actu
al transactions, they do not involve the subjectivity of other
bases.

While there are minor conflicts between qualitative

objectives, it seems highly desirable that we retain the
objectivity of historical cost as a benchmark.
There have been a number of proposals to adopt pres
ent value rather than historical cost as the basis for finan
cial statements.

I believe this is impractical.

be the judge of value?

Who should

Different users have a different

time preference for money and different degrees of aversion
to risk.

Any serious attempt to rigorously and systematical

ly obtain the present value of the many varied assets of a
major corporation would involve a significant delay and cost
incommensurate with the subjective results.

While I have

doubts whether a present value basis of accounting will work
in any industry, I know that in the petroleum industry it
presents insurmountable problems.

With respect to undeveloped

properties and unmined reserves, opinions as to the differ
ence between the highest two bids can run into the millions
of dollars.

With the passage of time the property may ulti

mately prove to be worthless or it may be worth many times

4.77

the initial outlay.

The exploration and the development period

could take a decade and require further significant capital out
lays.

The determination of value is hardly easier after initial

development is completed.
for secondary recovery.
science.

Additional capital will be required
Determination of reserves is an inexact

Aside from incomplete geological knowledge, ultimate

recovery is affected by future technology, price and governmental
policy.

Even if unmined reserves could be accurately determined,

value is highly influenced by both rate of production and price.
These are affected by general economic conditions, competitive
action, and governmental controls or restraints.

It is under

standable that investors might desire to know the future in these
respects.

However, any attempt to furnish an estimate of the value

of unmined reserves would not meet a single one of the seven qual
itative criteria.

Any attempt to ascertain short run changes in

value of a petroleum company’s assets would be irrelevant and
misleading.
Once accounting departs from actual transactions and
attempts to measure all changes of value, there are essentially no
constraints upon the subjective nature of reports.

In addition,

the accountants’ attestation role appears quite difficult.

As noted

earlier, investor confidence cannot be earned without disciplines
and controls.

The reservations as to a value basis for accounting

have been well documented in accounting literature.
Any significant change in accounting standards would
create most serious problems and the distortion of many relation
ships and contractual arrangements based upon present standards.
Indenture restrictions, debt-equity ratios, union contracts, and
bonus or incentive formulas could all be significantly affected.
These long standing arrangements were not arrived at capriciously
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without regard to the present accounting standards being used.
For example, a different standard might produce a result that
would either eliminate or double what would otherwise be the
permissible amount of an incentive bonus.

Because of the con

tractual arrangement undoubtedly presumed consistent application
of the existing accounting s t a n d a r d , change would produce an
unjust reduction or a potential windfall.

In other words, changes

in accounting standards can materially affect the substance of
contractual arrangements.

The possibility of producing mul

tiple financial statements in order to adhere to both the
present and a new standard would only create confusion and
loss of confidence.

In addition, the cost of presenting

multiple statements is a clear burden on investors and con
sumers interested in efficiency and cost reduction.
Up to this point my comments have been limited to
general purpose financial statements and have been based on
the following broad principles which we recommend to this
Committee:
1.

General purpose statements are reports to in

vestors of funds invested.
2.

It is management's responsibility to prepare

these reports.
3.

Exercise of this responsibility requires man

agement to use accounting standards compatible with the way
management reaches business decisions.
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4.

The independent accountant’s responsibility

should be clearly defined in order that objectivity and
independence are maintained.
5.

Investor confidence in general purpose state

ments Is vital to our free enterprise economy.

That confi

dence could be irreparably damaged by a radical new basis
of accounting, and, finally; the conventional standards of
historical cost; realization; consistency; and conservatism
are so widely used and proven that they could not be discard
ed without confusion resulting.
This Committee is also concerned with financial
reporting; which of course is a far broader area than general
purpose financial statements.
requests for information of

In Shell Oil we receive many
a financial nature.

Our finan

cial officers; and indeed all senior management; are involved
In the broad area of financial reporting.

While many desires

for data have little; if anything; to do with financial state
ments; they are legitimate requests for information.

When it

is reasonable to do SO, the data are supplied outside the
financial statements.

If request cannot be reasonably met;

valid reasons for not meeting them are normally given.
Because the nature of requests is changing quite
rapidly; it is not possible to state as an objective precise
ly what should be supplied.

It seems obvious that some de

sires are short lived; and new ones constantly arise.

If

this Committee feels it incumbent on them to deal with this
area at all; we suggest that the objective should be to meet
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all reasonable requests for financial information outside the
general purpose financial statements.

Such disclosure might

include price level adjustments and other objective data that
a reasonably prudent investor could utilize in making his eval
uations.
There have been various proposals that financial
statements should include forecasts or predictions of future
results.

We oppose this view.

We believe that investors are

better served if they are provided past results and information
on firm decisions that affect the future, so that each can form
his own judgment as to how the future may unfold.

The obvious

objection to presenting either a specific or a generalized fore
cast is that the forecast is subject to being proven wrong, to
the detriment of the reader who may have relied upon it.

By

way of illustration, oil industry profits are quite sensitive
to price, and gasoline prices are subject to frequent wide
fluctuations.
oline.

Last year we sold over 9 billion gallons of gas

A change of one cent per gallon in the price amounts

to $90 million.

After taxes that one penny a gallon in price

amounts to about 20% of net income.

I am sure you as a motor

ist are aware that prices fluctuate more than a penny a gallon.
Would you care to forecast net income?
opinion on a forecast be unqualified?

As an auditor, can an
The addition of premises,

strategies and a basis for a forecast might place it in a better
perspective.

However, premature publicity and disclosure could

be detrimental to investors because competitor action would
virtually guarantee specific plans could not be carried out.
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Aside from the practical problems inherent in fore
casting, there is a potential liability that could arise if an
investor is injured because he accepted a forecast to his detri
ment that had been proven to be in error.

Accordingly, it should

not be an objective of financial accounting to publish either a
specific or a generalized profit forecast.

Each investor is

placed on an even basis when he is given factual information
and left to form his own judgment as to the future.

Factual

information might include, in addition to general purpose fi
nancial statements, an approved capital expenditure budget,
order backlogs, news of firm decision to build a major new
facility, or a major new contract.
A recurrent theme has been that financial statements
should be in tune with the way business operates and reaches
major decisions.

In that connection, income from operations

is one of the most useful performance indicators that can be
easily disclosed, but is not now generally given sufficient
prominence in financial statements.

In general terms, income

from operations means gross revenue minus all costs except
property provisions or depreciation and deferred taxes.

In

theory, interest, expensed research, and expensed exploration
costs might also be added back or, if you will, not deducted
along with the operating costs.

Income from operations is

widely used internally for project evaluation in discounted rate
of return or present value computations.

Because shareholders

and creditors should likewise find this indicator of performance
or investment worth useful, it could be given greater prominence
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in financial reports by setting it out in the income statement
and in per share data.
Gentlemen, I thank you for your patience and consid
eration and the opportunity to appear.

The basic message I

wish to convey is that management is responsible for account
ing to investors for its stewardship.

Exercise of this impor

tant responsibility requires consistent application of factual
financial accounting.

The present basis has been proven to

be capable of working very well.

The remedy for prevention

of abuse is management acceptance of its responsibility, dis
closure, and competent independent audit.

A d d i tionally,
we

favor research and review directed towards continuing the
evolutionary improvement of financial statements.

Both the

marketplace and the courts will punish those few who abuse
their trust or perform carelessly.
or reaffirm objectives.

It is desirable to codify

Such process does not encompass any

major reordering of objectives, as such a radical step could
impair investor confidence.

To the extent that the financial

reporting process can be improved within this framework, we of
fer our knowledge and experience.

This is important because

we in management believe we have a vital stake in establish
ing sound accounting principles.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much, Mr. Koons.

We have heard directly from only two representatives of industry
Mr. Walter yesterday, who represents an industry that might be
regarded as somewhat evolving in terms of accounting concepts.
Yours is a unique industry, but not a new or evolving one.
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MR. KOONS:

We feel on the firing line.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have a question which I think

particularly relates to your situation, in the sense that we
must consistently consider cost-benefit ratios; that is, we
must he very concerned about additional data if it requires
additional cost.
But one of the questions I have about your presenta
tion is that it seems to me that all the data you are saying
should not be disclosed must be available internally, so I do
not understand the additional cost.
MR. KOONS:

Which data are you talking about?

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
. MR. KOONS:

The data on reserves.

Well, we disclose our data on reserves

and the percent to which it's developed, so I still don't un
derstand.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. KOONS:

But not in dollars.

Well, I deny that we have that data in

ternally, that we use it for anything, or that it has any
relevance.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

If we have inventory on hand,

and it is widgets, there is a way of pricing it, and we do
price it in a manufacturing concern.

Now, what is the vast

difference?
MR. KOONS:

Well, I recited in my prepared text the

problem in estimating the quantity of unmined reserves, the
very long gestation period, the difficulty in estimating the
volume.

Even more important than the volume is the price.
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These reserves may last many years.

W e ’re producing

oil fields now that were discovered back in 1920 .
What is relevant is:
today worth?

What is what we are producing

But that ties in with realization.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well am I hung up on the question

of precision or parameters of approximation?

As you know, I

fully admit that there can be nothing precise about this kind
of valuation, but in broad parameters, or reasonable approxima
tions, is it not possible to state known reserves in terms of
approximate dollar values?
MR. KOONS:

Mr. Trueblood, I have spent quite a num

ber of years working in this area.
Federal Power Commission.
give you an example.

I have testified before the

I'm quite knowledgeable.

Let me just

This goes back to studies over twenty

years.
First, the estimate of unmined reserves on a new
field ultimately turns out to be roughly nine times the in
itial estimate.

That's just in terms of the sheer physical

volume.
Second, it takes quite a long period of time to pro
duce.

The decline pattern--the value depends on when you get

it; and obviously something received tomorrow is worth more
than something received in twenty years.
The rate of production is influenced by the geological
conditions, politics--both international and national, and the
price.
covered.

Oil was worth 10¢ a barrel when some of these were dis
Maybe we won't see that again, but price is a two-way
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street, and we aren't always climbing uphill.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. KOONS:

I understand...

I can go on.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

...not completely, but I think

maybe Reed can help clarify the problem here.
MR. PARKER:

I had some other questions, Bob, but I

think that on your point the time factor, it seems to me, is one
of the most important, because this oil sits down there.

Sup

pose there are ten barrels down at the bottom of the hole, but
just one way or another, by practicality, one barrel is available
this year, one next year, one the next year.

And you can state

its present value, but there's no way that the company can ever
sell all of it at one time, and when it does sell it, it sells
what it can sell at the prices it can sell it for, with the
costs of distribution that then exist.
MR. KOONS:
Mr. Trueblood.

There's one other important point on this,

I think the industry averages are that some

thing on the order of 20 or 25% of the oil that is found is
ultimately produced.

What is produced is a function of the

price.
Now, if because of demand, the international situa
tion, the military situation, or what have you, the price were
to be 10¢ or a dollar a barrel more, most assuredly we could
produce much more.

So when you say the volume, I must ask,

the volume at what price?

And if the market is willing to pay

a higher price, more could be forthcoming.
MR. PARKER:

At what price and what cost levels?
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You can’t have one change without the other changing.
MR. KOONS:
in price.

That is correct.

I mean, a real increase

But when do you abandon a well?

You abandon it

when the cost of lifting it exceeds what you can get for it
today.

If you could get another 25¢, you might postpone the

abandonment for another year.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

But doesn't the investor have to go

through these calculations too, in deciding whether he wants
to buy Shell?

And would not he be helped by yours?

Admit

tedly, your estimates are imperfect, but would they be worse
than those arrived at by someone who doesn’t know as much
about it?
MR. KOONS:

I think the investors are all placed on

an even basis when they are all provided the volume of reserves,
to the extent that they are developed, what our plans are for
expenditure, or development— all of which we disclose.

But

these I would put in the realm of factual, solid, hard, trans
action type data.
I think when you get down to value, each investor is
going to have his own judgment or feel for value; and he should
make that judgment, not the management— and least of all, its
auditor.
MR. PARKER:

You mentioned earlier in your comments

that you don’t really believe in a Gresham's Law for account
ing.

And I think rather than talking about good accounting

or bad accounting, usually when people talk about the idea of
Gresham's Law of accounting, it’s accounting that realizes
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income sooner rather than later; and it seems to me we have an
awful lot of evidence that suggests that there is such a law.
If we take depreciation accounting, the shift in re
porting to stockholders from accelerated to straight line; if
we take the idea of interest charged to construction, it used
to he used only in the utility industry, and now moves to other
industries; if we take the installment method of reporting for
installment sales type of things, and shift over to recognizing
all the profit at the time the sale takes place; if we take
shifts from LIFO to FIFO inventory accounting; if we take
shifts from chargeoffs of research and development to capital
izing; if we take the investment tax credit--on every single
one of these there have been numbers and numbers of shifts in
accounting policy by companies from one to the other, almost
invariably from the one that realizes the income later to the
one that records it sooner.
Some of these have been stopped by the Accounting
Principles Board Opinions, but unless and until the Opinion
comes along, this phenomenon seems to take place predominantly
in the same direction, and I think that's what most people are
thinking about when they state a Gresham’s Law of accounting.
Would you really disagree that such a thing exists?
MR. KOONS:

Well, I presume first, that you are

innocent until proven guilty; but let me say this— that Shell
Oil Company has not made any changes in accounting whatsoever,
and as stated in our audited and certified financial state
ments—
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MR. PARKER:

Well, I gathered your opinion applied

to all industry and not just to Shell.
MR. KOONS:

Well, by the same token, I gather when

you say people use these--maybe you didn’t use the word "gim
micks", but changes, or shifts, or adjustments--that you were
applying that to all; and I ’m saying it doesn’t apply to all,
and I think w e ’re not the only company who takes very seriously
their responsibility to consistently and fairly report their
results.
MR. PARKER:
MR. KOONS:

Well, I don’t question that.
Okay.

Well, I think the only point is,

if the bad drove out the good, why have we not changed?
why have not many other companies?
MR. PARKER:

Or

It is not us alone.

Another question— you rather suggest

that forecasting, or public forecasting by the company--and
particularly, in this case, for Shell--is difficult because
of the sizable changes that take place in gasoline prices at
the pump.

I don't have a perfect memory on this, but how many

times over the past twenty years, let's say, has Shell Oil’s
net earnings changed by as much as 10% in a given year, and
how many times over the past twenty years has there been a
decline rather than an increase?
MR. KOONS:

Well, in two out of the last three years

there has been a decline of over 10% .
MR. PARKER:

How many times over twenty years?

MR. KOONS:

Well, the figures are stated in our

annual report, but I would say— just to venture a guess— at
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least half.

I know they were either up or down over 10% in

probably eight out of the last ten years.
MR. WESTON:

One more brief point on reserves.

I

guess we all appreciate the difficulty of estimating them,
but isn’t it true that the American Petroleum Institute defin
ition, which I believe the industry uses, of proven reserves
for depletion computations encompasses those reserves which are
economically producible under today’s conditions, so that each
company presumably makes an economic computation to determine
the depletion base for its accounting?
Why shouldn’t that be made a part of the public rec
ord in terms of the valuation of those reserves?
MR. KOONS:

Well, you don’t need the valuation of the

reserves to make a depletion computation, and we do make the
physical volume a part of the public record.
MR. WESTON:

No, but you do make an economic compu

tation which shows lifting costs and sales prices, to determine
the reserves which can be economically produced.
MR. KOONS:
MR. WESTON:

No, we do not.
Well, that’s my understanding of the

definition--you must make a computation of those reserves which
can be economically produced.

That is the definition of proven

reserves, and all companies--as I understand it— make that com
putation, because if you can’t produce them economically, they
are not part of the depletion computation.
Therefore I wonder why that information at least,
which as I understand it--is computed by most companies,
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shouldn't be made a part of the record in terms of the valua
tion of reserves which can economically be produced.
MR. KOONS:

You say "economically produced."

The

amount of reserves that we are going to produce is anything
for which the cost will not exceed the current selling price.
MR. WESTON: That's right.
MR. KOONS: Now, if these reserves are going to be
produced a way down the road, you get involved in when they
are going to be produced, and then you get the question of
discounting.
MR. WESTON:

That's right.

MR. KOONS:

But you don't have to compute the dollar

value of the reserves.
MR. WESTON:
computation.

But I understand you do, to make this

You get the dollar value by computing the lift

ing cost and the sales price, present valued, in order to de
termine what reserves are economically producible for deple
tion purposes.
This is from the API literature describing how
depletion is computed, and it's my understanding all the com
panies follow this.

My question then is, why should not that

element of value at least be disclosed?
MR. KOONS:

Because we do not, and I do not believe

that any other companies make such a computation.
MR. WESTON:

Then we should change the API's public

information, because they imply otherwise.
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MR. KOONS:
difference there.

I don't think there is a fundamental

I think it is a matter of a play on words,

or of understanding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much.

We will

now hear from National Investor Relations Institute.
MR. ARTHUR R. ROALMAN:

By way of introduction, I'm

Arthur Roalman, and to my left is Marvin Chatinover, and to
his left is Gerald Parsons.
By way of precision, I would just like to mention
that Mr. Parsons' company is no longer U. S. Plywood-Champion
Papers, but it is now--as of last Thursday and by action of
their Board of Directors— Champion International Corporation;
additionally, he's a member of the Executive Committee of the
Investor Relations Association of New York.
With those two corrections in the presentation, I
would spend just a few moments here attempting to underscore
a few points in the presentation.

We're here to talk about

the practical problems involved in transmitting financial in
formation developed by accountants.

We're concerned with

clarity, and we would hope that material that is scheduled
for, or intended for, broad scale distribution might be jour
nalistically sound.
I think that's the sense of our presentation here.
It should be understandable.

I'm sure you are all aware of

the problems of trying to make complex information understand
able and meaningful to large numbers of people.
We think this is going to apply more and more to
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news releases, annual reports, and proxy statements.

All of

our conversations with the SEC suggest that those are a thing
of the past.
Two points that I would mention, in addition to
what's in the presentation here:

I think there is an oppor

tunity and a need for more aggressive information exchange
between accountants and what I would call the mass media.
Peat Marwick, to cite one, is embarking on a series of seminars
with the Financial Writers Association.
be commended for that.

I think they are to

I think there’s an appetite on the

part of the Financial Writers Association for the information
that they obtain from those meetings.
There's another organization— Irving Trust--which
for years has been holding seminars for financial officers,
and recently began including the financial editors of large
newspapers.

As a member of NIRI, I participated in those

meetings, and was enlightened, to put it mildly, to see the
interest on the part of the financial press, and also the
appetite for knowledge that they had in the areas that the
Irving Trust people were talking about.
We would like to underscore the importance of contin
uity and the ready availability of information.

We think those

are fundamental to any information program of any corporation,
and we think that there is a substantial need, particularly in
the communications process, for integrity, about which, as
many of you who have been reading the financial press know,
some of the people who are communicating financial information
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have placed themselves in a questionable position.

We

think that's a subject that needs deep and intensive ex
exploration and concern.
That highlights most of the points that I would
try to underscore except that I would hope that someone
around the table here might ask us about p r e d i c t i o n s ,
because
it's a subject that we think has very practical problems, and
I think w e ’re in a

position to address ourselves to.

With

that I ’ll stop.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
individually at this point?

Do your peers wish to speak
(There was no response.)

On this business of financial seminars, there has
been a rather long history directed directly to the financial
press, as distinguished from public relations people within
corporations.

They go back as much as five or six years.

I ’m sure more could be done, but the Institute
itself has run seminars running for two to three days in
all sections of the country with all major media.
Now it may be time to recycle that process.
MR. ROALMAN:

I might add, incidentally, if you

would be interested in seminars in which the investor rela
tions people might participate, I think we could be active
in encouraging your participation in those seminars.

There

might be values in that.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
Institute's current program.
into it.

I ’m just not certain of the
Maybe, Paul, you might check

I have a feeling that it peaked, and most regions
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and most major media were hit, and that now we probably have
a new crop, and we should be doing it again.
I would say that this public hearing is our last
major formal input, but we have been working closely with the
media, and we intend, in this process to interview major
media on a group basis, for which we have their commitment.
I did not catch, or did not understand, one allusion
or reference you made to integrity— was it of information,
or of the presenters of financial information?

Just what did

you mean by that?
MR. ROALMAN:

Not of the information itself, but of

people who are transmitting the information.

I think it’s in

the information process.
There have been a certain number of celebrated cases
recently in which people transmitting information have been
accused by the SEC or others of not being precise, to put
it mildly.

I think it's a matter of serious concern, both to

you and to us.

I think the subject of confidence on the part

of the investor is at stake in that particular situation, and
I think that both of us need to be seriously concerned about
furthering the subject of integrity.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Here we have a channels problem

as it were, in that— given the affairs of a client, or the
results of his affairs--we do not participate--and may not
participate--in the communication of that data.
Now, are you suggesting that there is something that
we could do?
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MR. ROALMAN:

No.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. ROALMAN:

No.
Except to exhort our clientele?

No, I would not suggest that you would

have a piece in that process, no.

I ’m just saying that it's

a matter of concern, in the sense that, to the degree the
process of transmitting of information is undermined, I think
that you do have a concern there.
MR. GELLEIN:

That's all.

Is it possible that we do have an

educational task to perform, though?

I mean, maybe that's

our responsibility.
MR. ROALMAN:

Marvin, would you care to comment on

that?
MR. MARVIN CHATINOVER:

Yes, I would like to ad

dress myself to that among other things, and I have a particu
lar concern here.

I edit a publication known as The Investor

Relations Newsletter.

I also teach investment analysis, and

I'm extremely concerned about meaningful communication of
accounting data.

I attended one of these seminars this morn

ing, attended by Peat Marwick, and I believe that one of the
things the accounting profession has to be terribly concerned
about is the fact that the nature of the accountants' letter
in an annual report is, I think, basically misunderstood, and
by and large, a great deal more imputed liability may be
attached to that than should be.
Now, I think that's part of an overall problem that
concerns you.

I understand the nature of these forms, and I

think you are going to lose something in the process.

I know
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that you have to pay very clear attention to the formulation
and review of accounting principles, hut I think that you
have to he terribly concerned as to how these are viewed in
the public eye, and particularly in the investor eye.
While you may not have, for example, particular and
direct responsibility for the contents of the President's let
ter in an annual report, I know that very frequently in per
sonal contact I have found the cooperation of professional
accounting personnel to be a very valuable weapon in hitting
management over the head and saying:

Now, look here!I

It is

one thing to have meaningful communication of data qua data.
In other words, many of the pieces of literature here have
said the numbers are the important thing.
Gentlemen, I agree with you that this is a first
professional obligation.

I suggest to you that there is

another very significant corollary that you may not be direct
ly engaged in, but in which you have a vital personal and
professional as well as public interest; and that is that the
public understand what the meaning of the data is.
I am considerably disturbed by comments I hear to
the effect that:
matters.

Baloney.

Well, they won’t understand the complicated
That is usually an excuse which means,

(1) I as a professional communicator am too lazy, or have
not the capacity to understand it; and (2)

I do not have

the self-discipline to sit down and put it into a meaningful
and interesting form.
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I suggest that much can and has been done in this
field.

I ’d like to cite one example I gave this morning in

discussion over at Peat Marwick.
The 1955 Annual Report of General Electric— and this
year progress certainly was one of their most important prod
ucts--had a five paragraph discussion in English--not simply
in numbers--as to the difference between LIFO and FIFO, the
fact that the Company was changing their accounting method
of inventory valuation, and what that meant.

It was equally

meaningful to a sophisticated investor, a professional se
curity analyst and any layman who had had a high school educa
tion.
It's that sort of thing that I think we together,
as professional men and women, have to strive to work for,
because I think we all have a vital interest in that--a
sense of public integrity, and awareness of it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I couldn't agree with you

more, and I happened to read just last evening a speech by
Mr. Casey which hits upon this point.
saw it or not.

I don’t know if you

It's right off the press.

He is saying in effect that we have had forty
years of too much legal haggling over weasel words.

It’s

now time to start saying what people can understand.

So

w e ’re certainly with you.
MR. PARKER:

I don't know whether this is a fair

question to put to you, but we have had some discussion earli
er in the hearings and in the papers that have been submitted
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to us about the auditors’ certificate and whether perhaps it
should be revised to say that the statements are a fair pre
sentation of the transactions they record, rather than a fair
presentation in line with generally accepted accounting prin
ciples.
Would any of you have a comment to make on that sub
ject?
MR. CHATINOVER:
see any need for a change.

I would answer to this.

I don’t

I think there is a definite need

for communication as to what GAAP is and what the nature and
limitations of accounting statements are.
I want to say that here again, I must address my
self to substance rather than form.

I listened very closely

to the discussions today on present value auditing of fore
casts, historical costs versus present values, current values,
et cetera.

I appreciate all of the difficulties involved in

the formulation and resolution of these problems.
But again I ’m suggesting that, underlying this, I
felt a sense of:

But you’ll deceive people.

You know, it's very interesting that the SEC has
all of a sudden awakened this past year and is ahead of all
of us, because all of a sudden Alan Levenson in three speeches
has indicated that the SEC is now sensitized to the criticism
that heretofore their administration of the disclosure provi
sions of the '33 Act has been more negative than positive;
that it would appear to be that the administrative intent has
been:

Guard the average, unsophisticated investor against
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his or her speculative proclivities; do not allow him to he
unduly titillated by information which they definitely want
at certain times, like, what is the company going to earn
when you are putting out a new issue?
In England they told me:

My God!

We have been

doing this for years.
Now, I suggest that you have got to give them the
information that they need.

By all means qualify it.

there are legal liability questions.

Yes,

The SEC has also said:

We recognize this, and we're going to work toward it.
I say that now is the time to look forward rather
than backward, and I'm going to suggest to you that there are
many dangers— many dangers indeed!--but I think now is the
time to make open book, because I ’m going to suggest that
your profession is on the pan.
I think also that the legal profession is on the
pan.

As I am reading securities decisions of the courts

lately I can see they are really going to be on the pan.
And we, as you know, go on the basis of the Pig'n'Whistle
pan.

Our responsibility is now increasing at an exponential

rate, and I'm for it, but what I am demanding is:

I want

the commensurate authority.
And I will work with you, with attorneys, and with
financial executives; but I am suggesting that it will be
very dangerous for you--not as a matter of my professional
pride--but to call me in as the skilled communicator after
the important decisions have been made or, as the language

4 .100

of the trade goes, to "polish up" the message.
MR. PARKER:

You are using "you" to mean the ac

counting profession?
MR. CHATINOVER:
al.

The investor relations profession

Also you.
MR. ROALMAN:

I think, when he was referring to

coming in and cleaning up, he was referring to the investor
relations professional.
MR. CHATINOVER:

To the investor relations profes

sional, hut we have-MR. PARKER:

But not the accounting profession.

MR. CHATINOVER:
profession.

Well, no— not just the accounting

But very often we are confronted with situations

where we will he called in after all decisions have been
made.

We will not he asked for an opinion as to whether

the matter will he easy to communicate, what the public
relations implications are.

I ’m not suggesting to you that

I or anybody in my field is professionally qualified to
give an accounting judgment as to what a decision should
have been.

But I am professionally qualified to indicate

what the public relations implication of an accounting de
cision may be.

And in that case, I think I can be of con

structive help.
MR. GERALD A. PARSONS:

Could I speak to Reed’s

question?
In answer to your specific question, Reed, it seems
to me that I agree basically with what Mr. Koons of Shell
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said, and that is:

It’s management's job to communicate with

shareholders, the public, and so forth.

It's the auditors'

job to certify that everything is done according to Hoyle.
It's not the auditors' job to do management's job, which is
to put additional values and judgment values on that informa
tion.
I don't think I have anything more to say.
MR. ROALMAN:

Reed, referring to your point, re

cently an analyst was in visiting with the president of a
relatively small corporation, and picked up what he con
sidered material information.

He was concerned because he

possessed it, that he alone had it, considering it was
something that just happened to be dropped in the conversa
tion.

So he asked if the company would issue a news release.
What they put together was confusing.

It was dif

ficult, and it would just not be acceptable to any respect
able publication.
body.

It was not used, was not picked up by any

And he continued to be very seriously concerned that

he was walking around with information that had not been
adequately communicated.
I think that's a kind of problem that may be in
existence.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
you?

Dick?

Reed, does that take care of

Oscar?

MR. GELLEIN:

I have nothing more.

MR. ROALMAN:

May I make a comment on the practical

problems of communicating forecasts?
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. ROALMAN:

Yes, go ahead.

That is, simply, we have had--as you

have had, I 'm sure— a number of conversations with representa
tives of the SEC on this point, trying to get at what, really,
they hope to see produced.

And what we sense is that they are

looking for gross volume; they are looking for profits; and they
are looking for per-share earnings.
W e ' r e

dreadfully concerned with the practical prob

lems in communicating that to large numbers of people.
do it in the annual report?

Do you

Because if you do, I think you have

substantial problems of secrecy.

That's going to be a much

sought after number.
If you do it in a news release, I doubt in practical
terms that the news media are going to use it--anything but
the per-share earnings; and they are not going to use all the
assumptions that go into that per-share earnings figure.

I

think it could be grossly misleading to a number of people.
I don't say that we shouldn't use projections, but
I think these are practical problems that ought to be looked
at.

How do you communicate this information to large numbers

of people, and not give them a very, very small piece of the
iceberg, in the hope that they are going to make a rational
investment decision on the basis of that very, very small piece
of the iceberg?
MR. PARKER:
portant problem.

Mr. Roalman, I think that's a very im

It seems as though there has got to be some

way out from under the problem as it now exists, where the
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sophisticated analyst does communicate with management represen
tatives about this, and to greater or lesser extent, ideas that
are in the form of forecasts and assumptions that support them
are communicated orally.
Looking at a lot of the material in our shop with my
brothers, who then, report in writing what they have heard--al
most invariably this can be squeezed into a paragraph or two
that, at least on the surface, looks to be representative of the
basic points that were discussed, and it's certainly an amount
of material that could be included easily in almost any quart
erly report to shareholders that I have seen.
And I just wonder if it wouldn't make it easier, both
as regards the legal liabilities of the company and for the
analysts involved, and for the general commonweal,

if this

kind of material couldn't be presented.
I think I would be one who would argue that elaborate
rules for presenting it should not be prepared, but it should
just be attacked from the point of view of the management who
does feel it wants to communicate something and wants to com
municate it in a fair and complete fashion to all comers.

Isn’t

there some way that your communicating art can do that, and get
it in the quarterly report?
MR. ROALMAN:

I would suggest that you may be asking

the impossible there, from a very practical standpoint.

I

think it is dangerous to give away a little bit of information
and hide a lot of it; and, I think, unless you are going to...
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MR. PARKER:
give a little.

But usually the management only wants to

For example, a company may be willing to say to

an analyst who calls:

Yes, we feel the odds are that our re

venues will in fact rise this year eight to ten percent, and
as long as three or four things that can be said in five or
six words each don’t happen, we would expect the natural result
of this would be for our earnings to rise from ten to fifteen
percent.
At other times you get down to the end, and they
say:

Well, we do not forecast earnings, but our reasonable

feelings about what normal, ballpark estimates would be is
for earnings to be up ten or fifteen percent.
It seems to me there's no great difficulty in com
municating that, in writing...
MR. ROALMAN:

To whom, however?

Are you suggesting

that each time there is a material change in the earnings fore
cast, there b e a comprehensive mailing to each shareholder?

How

about those people who are potential shareholders?
MR. PARKER:

I don't know that there would be anything

drastically wrong with doing it once a quarter, and not more
often.
MR. ROALMAN:
MR. PARKER:

To each shareholder?
Well, with his quarterly shareholders,

communication that you already mail to him.
MR. CHATINOVER:
here.

I wonder if I might add a note

I know the pratical problem you are citing, and I wonder,

though, if it's any worse than what we live with right now as
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professional communicators.
One of our great problems--and we have discussed this
with the SEC— is the absolute shortage of media space in getting
material news out.

It's almost an irony, and I don't blame the

media for this, but maximum news space is allocated to those
corporations which obviously have the greatest number of share
holders, and which generally are in the highest public view.
And that's understandable from a news standpoint.
I don't think there is any answer to that, whether
we are dealing with earnings predictions or any other corporate
matter, but on the subject of earnings predictions per se, I
think there is a qualitative

area in which we can do some very,

very responsible baselining.Whether we ever get

to codified

standards of audited forecasting— and I don't know how soon we
are going to get there--I do

have the feeling, and Igarner

from the remarks of SEC officials

on this subject in the past

few months, that what they are really telling us quite explicit
ly is:

We'd like to see you do what you are doing anyway, in a

slightly more responsible fashion— specifically an allusion to
the ballpark remark.
And I think that one of the things I'm forcing down
clients' throats in news releases, for example, is non-quantita
tive material--in other words, an explanation of why the earnings
are going to be what we think they are going to be, even if we
don't use a prediction.
I had this just yesterday:

Because the company is

going to have larger earnings this year due to acquisitions
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made on a proper accounting basis last September, nevertheless
it should be realized that most of the profit realization--be
cause of the nature of the operations--is going to be shifted
to the last half of the fiscal year.
It's rather important that that be put down in writing.
I don’t know how much space it's going to get in the newspapers.
There is that problem.

I think we have it with all news.

But I think that we should start indicating to people
what the trends are that affect earnings, whether we are dealing
with numbers or not.
are one thing.

In other words, again I say:

The numbers

But understanding how the numbers get there is

the most important thing that you and I have to be concerned
with ultimately, because it’s upon that that we are going to be
judged by the public, justifiably or otherwise.
Pete poses an absolute dilemma but I think it’s one
w e ’ve got to wrestle with anyway.
MR. PARSONS:

We do

I want to give an example in our company.

just about follow the concept that Reed suggested in our

quarterly statements; but as an example, last summer our Chair
man spoke before the Los Angeles Society of Security Analysts,
and he talked about 1972 possibly being a record year.

He

reiterated this in the quarterly for the third quarter.
In the month of December we realized that one segment
of our business— namely, the paper business— had fallen out of
bed in November.

It was completely unforeseen.

We knew

it

was bad, but we didn’t think it was going to get any worse.
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We got out a news release to this effect.
price was adversely affected.

Our stock

We had to conduct a communica

tions campaign to get people to begin to estimate lower earn
ings for 1972.

They overcorrected.

Now we're in a position where we have seen a turn
around in the paper business, and we're faced with the dilemma
of:

How good is it going to be?

And we do our forecasting on

a monthly basis.
I have a feeling that our company does a fairly good
job of measuring and forecasting, but we don't know the future.
I work for a multi-billion dollar company that is par excellence
in professional management.

The executive office had a pool

on the earnings, and the Chairman, the President, the Treasurer,
and the Comptroller never won it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I want to ask one more question

which may help us in terms of our ultimate objectives.
I think you alluded to the problem— listening to
some of the mass of jargon on our technical issues about:

We

can't do it because we can't achieve precision.
Now, when we get to our overall objectives, I think
we are going to have to come to some statement about:

The

accounting process can yield only certain approximations.
And, whether we turn statistical on this, or whether
we do it by an educational process, I do not know.

But do

you not agree that we ourselves have a significant communica
tion

problem in terms of our entire audience?
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MR. PARSONS:

I neglected to mention one thing, which

I believe is the basic concept of our organization— that is, the
National Investor Relations Institute--that it is in the best
interests of the company and the public investors in general, to
have a good understanding of what's going on in any given business
in which they may wish to invest, and that is our job to communi
cate the kind of information that will give them a good, balanced
judgment on what the outlook is for our respective companies.
And that's the business w e ’re in, day in and day out.
W e ’re trying to do the best job we can with the tools we have at
hand.

W e 'd like to see the tools improve, and we would like to

have a better flow of information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But even amongst ourselves you

would agree that a deterrent to evolution— not revolution--is a
preoccupation with precision which does not really exist.
MR. PARSONS:

I agree.

MR. ROALMAN:

But I think what is being offered to

investors as a potential is being held up to investors as some
thing that might be made available to them.

And, Reed, I think

that’s the thing that we would be very much concerned about.

We

would be very much interested in making available the assumption
that the agency investors make their decisions solely on the
basis of earnings per share.
MR. CHATINOVER:

Can I offer a note?

It may not

be much solace, but we all have a shared problem.
Your specific question really addresses itself to a
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problem that a lot of us face.

Unfortunately, we live in a

socioeconomic climate in which everybody, for reasons we don’t
have to discuss, is reaching for certitude whenever or wherever
he or she can find it, and you happen to be suffering in that
it's at a particularly inopportune time.
The rash of court suits leveled at accounting firms...
we know the public relations implications of this, but I think
you are going to have to tell the public in your own way what
the SEC is finally admitting in their own way, that the ’33
Act was not an insurance policy, but a disclosure act that would
give everybody a fair chance, but they could still strike out
themselves.
You are going to have to say accounting is very im
portant— and, indeed, it is--but is like so many other things
in life.

It cannot be all things to all men and women.

It’s

a limited tool, and it's a very valuable one, and I can only
tell you what I ’m going to tell my students in about fifteen
minutes.

There is no one answer.

There are a lot of things

that determine the multiple, and don’t ask me how to get to
it, because that’s what you are supposed to spend fifteen weeks
in here trying to find out how to do, all by yourself.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much.

(The session adjourned at five twenty o ’clock.)
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WEDNESDAY MORNING SESSION
May 17, 1972
The meeting reconvened In the Imperial Ballroom
at nine-twenty o'clock, Chairman Trueblood presiding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We will continue to follow

our operating plan of the past two days with questions to
come to the table from the floor.
We found yesterday that a full 45 minutes was not
required in each case, possibly in large part because w e ’re
getting to some point of redundancy on the questioning; and
so we are going to try to reschedule today just a little
bit, if it is convenient with Price Waterhouse and the
Technical Audit Associates.

W e ’re going to hold each seg

ment down to 40 minutes and run through until one o ’clock,
with no scheduled afternoon session, if it all works out.
We have not yet been able to reach Price Waterhouse.
They have been in the meetings every day, and I ’m sure
they'll be around and be available.

W e ’re not certain about

Mr. Jewett of Technical Audit Associates but w e ’ll try to get
that settled.
So tentatively, we will run to conclusion this
morning which we expect will be about one o ’clock, and then
the Study Group will meet in a contemplated session immedi
ately after lunch.

But so far as the public hearings are

concerned, w e ’re anticipating ending them without the
scheduled twelve-thirty break.
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First on the schedule, the New York Stock Exchange
— we have Mr. Wick and Mr. Foster.
MR. WILLIAM FOSTER:

Thank you, Mr. Trueblood.

The New York Stock Exchange is pleased to partici
pate in the deliberations of the Accounting Objectives Study
Group.

We wish to commend the American Institute of Certi

fied Public Accountants for rising to the challenge, forming
the two Study Groups, and attacking the credibility gap head
on.
We had communicated our grave concern about the
credibility gap to the American Institute for a number of
years.

The gap was manifested overtly by the increasing

legal involvement and court involvement of the accounting
profession.

It was also, from our perspective, manifested—

perhaps subtly— in the relative lack of participation of
the individual investor in the securities markets.
Len Savoie characterized the problem as one of a
craving for credibility.

Now, however, a superior process

for developing standards has been set forth by the Wheat
Study Group.
We endorse the Wheat Study Group recommendations.
We will do all in our power to aid the Financial Accounting
Standards Board in its work.
With this as an introduction, we can now turn to
the second half of the problem, namely, the objectives of
financial statements.
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We believe that the primary objective of financial
statements has not changed since the l860’s.

In 1860 the

New York Stock Exchange first sought publication of certain
financial information from its listed companies.

In 1890

its persistence was rewarded by the appearance of a balance
sheet in an original listing application.
In 1909 the annual report became a requirement. In
1933 the New York Stock Exchange and the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants hammered out the current,
standard short-form auditors’ report.

The New York Stock

Exchange was the first to suggest— and later to require-quarterly reporting, consolidated financial statements, and
comparative financial statements.
Drawing upon our historical experience, it is our
conclusion that the primary objective of financial statements
is to inform investors fully and fairly.
"all investors."

We emphasize

We reject the notion--that the financial

statements should be geared to only certain investors, like
financial analysts and institutions.
We hark back to the original purpose of the annual
report, which was in essence to inform all investors fully
and fairly.
In order to fulfill the objective of informing all
investors fully and fairly, it is necessary to achieve cer
tain specific objectives.

The specific objectives I have

in mind are somewhat as follows.

There is a great need to
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define materiality.

What transpires under the banner of

immateriality is a source of great concern to us at the New
York Stock Exchange.
There is a great need to improve product line
reporting.

We believe that financial management can do

better in this area.
There is a great need to resolve the deferred
charge issue.

We believe the public is tired of the huge

writeoffs that seem to be reported daily in the Wall Street
Journal and other publications.

As a matter of fact, we be

lieve this has contributed significantly to the growing credi
bility gap.
We believe it is
items.

necessary to

define extraordinary

We believe it is necessary to divorce financial re

porting from political and other pressures.

We believe there

is a great need to improve quarterly reporting. Finally, it
would seem that it is well within the province of the account
ants and management to provide simpler footnotes.
The topic of fair value accounting has occupied the
minds of accountants in recent months and years.

We believe,

however, that more heat than light has been shed on the sub
ject.

Fair value accounting does not seem to us to be a

panacea.

It does not seem to be the solution to all the prob

lems of the accounting profession.

In this area we would

counsel the profession to make haste slowly.
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This is probably the last opportunity to keep the
formulation of standards and objectives in the private sec
tor.

It is our earnest hope that management and the account

ing profession will work together better in the future than
they have in the past.
Given superior standards, which we believe will
be forthcoming as a result of the labors of the Wheat Commit
tee and the Financial Accounting Standards

Board, and superior

objectives which we believe will be forthcoming as a result of
the labors of the Trueblood Committee, we believe there is one
problem--one grave problem— that still needs to be resolved
and to which neither Committee has really addressed itself
fully.

The need that we see is for superior enforcement to go

along with superior standards and superior objectives.
We believe that all will be lost if superior stan
dards and objectives are formulated and they are not imple
mented and enforced.
To discuss this topic more fully, I ’ll turn the
microphone over to Merle Wick, Vice President of the New York
Stock Exchange.
MR. MERLE WICK:

Well I certainly think that Bill’s

characterization of the progress that has been made thus far
and seems to be en route is an accurate one, and w e ’re delight
ed to see these things going on.
I guess that the essence of our strongest recommen
dation today is that a new, third committee is probably indi
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cated, a committee on enforcement; and this committee natu
rally needs to he somewhat broader than just the profession
because the profession cannot be blamed for all of the prob
lems that we find in the financial reporting area.
On the other hand, certainly enforcement has to
start with the profession, and there is certainly a grave de
ficiency in its performance in this area at the present time.
As a matter of fact, there is almost no performance within the
profession in this area, to the best of our knowledge.
Actually, we don’t think that accounting principles
are as bad as the principles of the accountants and some of
the other users of these so-called accounting principles. I
guess that maybe the profession needs to move the same way
that the Stock Exchange has, in terms of setting up a staff
group that has the power to conduct hearings, assess fines,
and mete out discipline, and give publicity thereto.

For it

to be handled by a committee of practictioners is likely not
to lead to any better results in this area than it has in other
areas.
As a matter of fact, in some ways the profession
seems to be following the precedent of the Exchange.

The

Exchange used to operate, basically, under the direction of
committees of the Board of Governors which were composed of
members of the business and members of the Exchange, just
as the Institute has operated in the past, basically, with
the authority vested in Institute committees.
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In times gone by perhaps one could depend on the
puritanical morality and the relatively conservative viewpoint
of management, but if this hasn't disappeared, it has become
a relatively rare characteristic these days.
road seems to be:

The rule of the

If you can get it by your accountants; if

you can get it by the SEC; if you can get It by the stock ex
changes; and I suppose, in the final analysis, if you can get
it by the stockholders, why, anything that goes is fair.

It's

someone else's responsibility, not management's.
I was particularly struck by Jim Needham's comments
when he was addressing the Financial Executives Institute. He
said:

If you keep up your pressure the way you did with the

investment credit, I guarantee you that you will have a feder
al agency writing the rules.
One of the comments— analysis of what has been hap
pening in the profession— is that there was a gradual change
in the composition of the APB from the managing partners tothe
policy partners composing the Board; and I suppose there's no
question but that this brought a greater technical knowledge
to the deliberations of the Board.

The question is whether it

didn't at the same time undercut somewhat its support within
the profession.

At times, in our experience, it seems like

some of the policy partners are like voices crying in the wil
derness within their own firm.

And so maybe they are prophets

without honor in their own city.
But, on the other hand, certainly, we can't make this
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a one-way criticism of the accounting profession, and I
thought that the quote in the Robert Morris paper to the ef
fect that "It is our opinion that the selection of the best
and most appropriate general accounting principles to be used
ought to be determined by the independent auditor" was an in
teresting one.

They went on to say:

"In our opinion, there

can be and often is an inherent conflict between the execu
tive’s role as a manager and the task of measuring his own
performance."

And most of the cries that have arisen about

the rules and policies of the APB from the public sector have
been about those which would restrict the reporting of higher
profits.

I don’t recall any great issue being raised on some

thing that would allow higher profits to be reported.
Now, to go from the formal financial statements to
another area which also needs attention by our suggested Com
mittee No. 3, there is the question of the accounting princi
ples used in the financial statements being largely disregard
ed in the historical summaries and the President’s letter.

I

suppose that the worst examples involve the use of unusual and
nonrecurring charges, to which Bill has previously made refer
ence and I think it well could be that 1972 might be the last
year that private industry is going to have an opportunity to
redeem itself in this area.

When one looks at the reporting

of a lot of companies in the nature of the items included in
unusual, extraordinary, nonrecurring, nonoperational charges,
one gets the impression that anything that represents progress

5.9

--that is, new products, improved efficiency, better plant
operation— anything of that nature must necessarily be regard
ed as unexpected, unusual, and nonrecurring.

And so maybe,

unlike GE, progress is an unexpected quality or product of
many of these companies, if you are judging it on the basis of
the financial reports and the President's or Chairman's com
ments thereon.
With a few companies, whose names will go unmention
ed, the one certainty is that each year will see another un
usual, nonrecurring charge occupying a prominent place at the
bottom of the income account.
Just a little over a month ago the SEC made a re
lease which suggested greater diligence in the release of quar
terly and annual results, and pointed particularly to the area
of unusual, nonrecurring, after-operations-level charges.

And

I might remind the accountants that as far as listed companies
are concerned there is a requirement in the listing agreement
with the Stock Exchange that these items be reported and given
some prominence in the reports to shareholders in quarterly
releases; also that one of the actions that we found necessary
to take with respect to financial reporting resulted in the
president spending some time in jail.
Now I have been making some rather broad accusations
here.

It's clear that the comments that I have relate to a

relatively small percentage of both the accountants and the
companies— relatively small, to be sure.

I don’t know what it
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is— 10% , 20% .

On the other hand, I 'm sure that the percentage

is far too big to he acceptable to the public, and thus the
results of these two committees are going to be weighed in
the scale of public opinion.
One of the approaches to give greater independence
to the accountants might be the endorsement of the idea of
audit committees, to which the accountants would report, those
committees to be comprised exclusively of outside directors
of the corporation.

I think that it might be appropriate to

point out that not all of the top management people are the
kind of sophisticated financial executives that people often
say are necessary— that that kind of knowledge is necessary
to have in order to be able to interpret financial statements
properly— and there has been more than one management that has
been led down the primrose path into disaster by virtue of its
lack of understanding of the financial results being reported
to it by its own internal accounting people with the blessing
of its outside auditors.

So it's not just the public that

gets involved; it's the internal management of at least some
companies.
Also in the area which is somewhat outside the scope
of influence of the profession, although we obviously have
something to say about it, is the question of product line re
porting;

Bill made reference to that previously.

I think

that the recommendation of the Financial Executives Institute
in this respect was made in good faith.

I think that the re

sults, though, of the reporting— particularly by some of the
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conglomerates--has been worse than useless.
sisted the use of the word "misleading."

I 've always re

I think it’s one of

the most misused words that one hears with respect to finan
cial reporting and accounting.

It's often used to dismiss any

kind of an argument that the speaker doesn't particularly take
kindly to.

But if there is one area where I see some mislead

ing information being perpetrated on the public, I think that
last year's and some of what we see this year of product line
reporting is a good example.
I think Bill and I both felt that coming down to the
operating level represented a good solution originally, be
cause there are obvious problems in allocating a lot of the
expenses below that line.

But what has been done with these

above-the-line figures is something that I don’t see how we
can continue to countenance.

I don't see how the SEC can con

tinue to countenance it, and it looks like the only answer is
to come right down to a net income figure across the board,
with all of the caveats that have to be expressed as to how
certain of the nonoperating figures are arrived at.
And the last point is that something needs to be done
about forecasts, future plans.

Just what can be accomplished

in this area is a little bit difficult to pin down, but cer
tainly investors make their decisions based more on what is
anticipated for the future than what has been accomplished in
the past and some method needs to be developed to get this
word to the public.
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There's no question but that it's used any time
there is an offering of securities.
be furnished with the information.

The underwriters have to
Any time there is a borrow

ing from a bank or insurance company, or something like that,
those people insist on the information, find it useful and
necessary in arriving at their decision; and while we recog
nize the problem that exists, a way has got to be found to
meet it.
Now I could go on, obviously, for a long period dis
cussing alot more of these specific things, but the purpose of
this study is neither to exhaust the subject nor the partici
pants, and so I want to conclude at this point with the state
ment that, as far as we're concerned at the Stock Exchange, we
intend to take a more active role in the future than we have
in the past.

Our management has just authorized some addi

tional help in terms of staff to make it possible for us to do
this and instructed us that they want it done, and so we in
tend to do our part and to support in the future as we have in
the past the efforts of the Institute and of these fine com
mittees that have been working so hard.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
Bill.

We certainly

Thank you very much, Merle and

do appreciate not only your appearance

here this morning, but also the several meetings that you have had
with us, and we appreciate very much, professionally, the shar
ing of our common problems over the past.
It's unfortunate that we haven't done better with
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them but I am hopeful, as you are, that maybe we are getting
with it and will move a little bit faster from here on in.
We, I ’m sure, on the Study Group share your hopes
for the FASB recommended by the Wheat Committee when it be
comes operational.
The enforcement concern you have continuously had.
In my personal view, it's completely correct.

One step has

been taken, of which you may or may not be aware:

The re

stated Code of Ethics, which will go to the membership this
fall, now incorporates explicitly a requirement for conformity
and application of all technical standards, however developed.
I think there is another important forward step in
which we can jointly take part.

I see much more activation of

research and study and discussion of problems like forecasting,
interim reports, and so on, by other groups, particularly FEI
and NAA, than I have been aware of in the past; and I think
that the interfeeding in that coordination is good; it may well
help us in getting to solutions faster than we did in the past.
But it is painfully slow.
I think many of the things you suggest, current val
ue, for example, has been clearly a matter of concern without
agreement for the past two days, with much discussion in much
depth.

I don’t think there is going to be any immediate adop

tion of it.

It must be looked at very carefully, and the im

plementation problems are extreme.
But we look forward hopefully, to coming out with
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some overriding structure into which some of these day-to-day
problems may be more easily fitted than they have in the past.
Whether we will be successful, I don’t know.

With your help

and the help of all of the others who have participated, maybe
w e ’ll make it.

We can hope.

MR. PARKER:

Merle, in your statement you mentioned

that you have some criticism for radical departures from the
cash basis in the name of accrual accounting.

I wonder if you

could expand on that point a little bit.
MR. WICK:

Well, I guess this comes back to a point

that I made about the little objection to anything that would
permit the reporting of higher profits.

All of the push at

the corporate level seems to have been in this line, and the
industries that have gotten into serious trouble over the years
have most frequently been those where reported income got sub
stantially ahead of cash income.

Accrual income got ahead of

cash income substantially.
And w e ’re seeing it right now, for example, in some
of the real estate fields, in the computer field.

It certain

ly occured some years back in the real estate syndications.
I suppose that it has been the single most damaging
problem as far as investors have been concerned in the last 10
or 20 years, and that’s just why we react to it, because too
many investors have been taken to the cleaners as a result of
it .
We have a pretty good batting average in terms of
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the companies which we approve for listing not getting into
financial earnings problems later on.

In the last 15 years we

have listed about a thousand new companies.

I think that it's

fair to say that less than 20 of those have gotten into finan
cial difficulties that resulted in their falling below our
delisting criteria.

Most of the problems that we have run in

to have been either in the area of deferred charges which even
tually came to create a liquidity problem, or this advanced
recognition of income in advance of the cash receipt thereof.
MR. PARKER:

Thank you.

MR. WESTON:

I expect your staff probably see and re

view more financial statements than any other group.

I wonder

if you could be helpful to us in terms of refining the objec
tives of accounting a little more— maybe on a second level
from your broad statement that statements should be useful to
investors--and taking the area of deferred charges, and if you
will, property, plant, and equipment, could you give us some
idea of what you believe the objectives of accounting should be
in that area?
That is, how can the objectives be phrased in de
ferred charges, property, plant, and equipment, the computer
field, real estate--whatever you want to call it--to be more
useful to investors, both the buying investor and the selling
investor?
What could the objective be, or what should the ob
jective be?
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MR. WICK:

Well, in the deferred charge area, as far

as established companies are concerned, I think that there is
only one answer and that is that they ought to be eliminated.
We have for a number of years now suggested to each one of the
major accounting firms that if they would take a look at the
experience of their own attesting experience with deferred
charges, we feel sure that they would adopt an internal pri
ciple which would outlaw them within their own firm.
There are some problems as far as companies in the
development stage which are somewhat different.

But if we had

to put it in the balance, we would say the abolition of the
deferred charge concept would probably be a significant serv
ice to investors, because it has been the subject of extensive
abuse.
MR. WESTON:

Would that move in the computer field

in terms of equipment as well?
jective there?

That is, what would be the ob

Not to show anything as an asseet as to which

there is any doubt of recovering?
I'm trying to find an objective that would obtain
that result without being unfair to a present holder of securi
ties.
MR. WICK:

Well I suppose that you can't be that dog

matic; but certainly, a much more rigorous test than has ever
been applied in the past is clearly indicated by the experi
ence.
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MR. WESTON:

But how would you phrase such a test?

The possibility of recovery?
What I'm getting at is that much of this is based
on judgment, and if we have an arbitrary rule that all of these
debits must be written off, then that result would be less
useful to investors than an objective which would, say, try
to describe the inherent value in these various projects the
best way you can.
Now I think part of the problem is that this does
involve judgment and some of these writeoffs happen because
people made judgments which turned out to be wrong.
other hand, many of them turned out to be right.

On the

And still on

the other hand, many of the items that were written off--color
television, for example--turned out to be tremendously valuable
items, and those costs were never properly deferred and account
ed for, in the view of many.
So what I'm trying to find is an objective which will
handle a very difficult discretionary area without being arbi
trary and penalizing the good with the bad, I guess.

Is there

any way we can phrase an objective that will reach that goal?
MR. WICK:

Well, I guess that what is needed is great

er assurance as to the future recovery of those costs than has
been available— than has been called for in the past.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
Frank?

Are you finished on that point,

Howie Wagner?
MR. WAGNER:

Well, I'm not a financial analyst, nor
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am I an attester, but my concern about financial statements is
in terms of being a preparer.
I gather from your paper that your feeling is that
financial statements ought to be set up in such a way as to be
understandable to what we commonly refer to as the "Aunt Janes"
in our country.

We have had lots of discussion about this over

the past few days, and many people have expressed the view that
financial statements cannot be directed to the "Aunt Janes" in
our country, despite the fact that they are shareholders in
our economy.
Many companies’ annual reports contain--generally on
the inside front cover, or right at the very outset--a very
condensed statistical summary called "Highlights of the Year"
or "Results in Brief."

This has the purpose of making a very

quick summary available for the one who doesn’t go beyond page
1 of the annual report, but also to make it simple for the
"Aunt Janes" to grasp what we think are the key numbers which
she might be interested in.
My first question, therefore, is:

Is this the kind

of information, or is information presented in this fashion,
in this abbreviated form, what you would feel would appeal to
the unsophisticated investor, the one who doesn’t understand
the details of financial statements?
And then the second question relates to page 4 of
your presentation, where you explain that the quality and in
formation content of quarterly reports must be examined and
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improved.

I would appreciate it if you could amplify to some

extent this summary statement also.
MR. WICK:

Well, as to your first question, so far

as the formal financial statements are concerned, we feel that
they should he addressed to the intelligent investor, not nec
essarily to the "Aunt Jane.” This doesn’t mean that the investor
needs to he a sophisticated accountant.

That’s not the level.

But it obviously cannot he so simplified that it loses content.
But there is the opportunity for management to pre
sent in the highlights a condensed portrayal of what actually
happened, and many managements do this very well, and that's
the point at which the Aunt Janes can he addressed along with
the sophisticated investors as well, because what needs to he
said and portrayed is basic enough that everybody ought to be
interested in it.
Our main problem with those highlights has been the
tendency on the part of a few companies to ignore those things
which reflected somewhat unfavorably on their performance.

But

the highlights and the President’s letter, properly prepared,
is a valuable addition to the formal financial statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Do you want to proceed with a

comment about your intention on the quarterly statement?
MR. WICK:

Oh, yes.

Well the requirements that we presently have are lim
ited to quarterly reporting of profits before and after taxes.
We've also for a long time recommended the reporting of sales

5.20

volume. The new SEC forms call for more information than that
in the quarterly reports.

And so the question comes as to how

much should be given.
Here, once again, we get back to these unusual, non
recurring charges, changes in accounting, and things like that
occur during the interim period, which often are ignored in the
release.

There’s a limited amount of space available in the

newspaper for these quarterly reports.

Smaller companies have

difficulty getting even their summary figures reported.

And

it could very well be that the time is coming when quarterly
reports in greater detail need to be mailed to shareholders,
in order to keep them informed.
MR. REINHART:

Merle, I hate to go back to an earlier

point, but just one quick question:

Would your

proposal to

eliminate deferred charges extend to goodwill?
MR. WICK:

Andy knows that’s a tough one.

Well now, as to the future, goodwill is under some
sort of control.

The question is what to do with all of the

goodwill of the past.
Some of the goodwill figures that are vigorously de
fended as being very valuable are in areas where more stable
companies with equally goodwill assets have written them off
when it was convenient for them to do so, for various reasons.
I don’t have a good answer to that one.

If I were

operating as a security analyst, recommending things to people,
I would take a very hard look at those goodwill figures, and
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either eliminate them or put my own valuation on them.

I have

a great deal of difficulty with some of the companies report
ing some of the results that they do and they and their ac
countants agreeing that there has been no diminution in the
value of that goodwill.

I find the logic to that kind of po

sition very elusive.
MR. POSTER:

I think, Mr. Reinhart, if you’re wor

ried about what to do with goodwill, you could write off re
troactively over forty years.
MR. REINHART:
MR. FOSTER:

That might be a good solution.

Retroactively over forty years?
That's right.

Any goodwill that was

acquired prior to 10 / 31 /7 0 .
MR. REINHART:

I ’d be happy to write off anything

retroactively.
MR. POSTER:

That's been one of our problems too.

Also, in the annual report area, I think that one
point we made was simpler footnotes, and I think this might
even help the intelligent Aunt Janes.

I think the management

and officers can write simpler footnotes, and I think, upon
occasion, an effort is made to write them particularly complex
and long so that the reader will only spend fifteen minutes.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
table?

(There were none.)

Any other questions around the

Thank you

very, very

much.

May I ask again if Frank Jewett, of Technical Audit
Associates is in the room, or any representative of that group?
(No one responded.)
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We'll move

then to MAPI's presentation.

MR. GELLEIN:

(Temporarily taking the Chair.)

Would

you introduce yourselves, please?
MR. CHARLES I. DERR:
MR. GELLEIN:
MR. DERR:
Objectives:

Mr. Chairman, shall I proceed?

Yes, please.

Members of the Study Group on Accounting

My name is Charles Derr.

I'm

Senior Vice Presi

dent of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute.

My asso

ciate at the witness table is Mr. Prank C. Roberts, Vice Presi
dent and Controller of the Eaton

Corporation.

With your permission, I should like to tell you very
briefly something of the Machinery and Allied Products Insti
tute— that is, MAPI--and of its interest in the very important
work of this Committee.

MAPI is a national

organization of

capital goods and allied industrial product manufacturers. The
output of such companies consists for the most part of highly
engineered, high-technology products ranging from off-the-shelf
consumables to entire manufacturing plants, such as steel mills,
petroleum refineries, or chemical plants with a very long pro
duction or construction cycle.
As will be apparent to the members of this Committee,
this means that our membership includes both high volume, mass
production companies and low-unit-volume-job shop operations
with all that

that range implies for differences in accounting

practice.
The Institute and its members have long participated
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in the consultative process of the Accounting Principles Board
and to the extent that the Securities and Exchange Commission
has chosen to exercise its authority for the prescription of
financial accounting and reporting procedures, we have also
reviewed and commented on proposed regulations of that agency.
In view of all this, MAPI welcomed the initiative of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in es
tablishing the Wheat Committee to conduct a study on establish
ment of accounting principles, and this, the so-called Trueblood Committee, to undertake a study of accounting objectives.
In our judgment, the stakes are very high.

The failure of re

forms sought to be obtained by these two studies could well
lead to increasing governmental intervention, with disastrous
results on the necessarily evolutionary character of

account

ing principles and practices.
Such a result, with all that it would likely involve
in the loss of managerial discretion, would be equally calami
tous from the standpoint of industrial management. The creation
by federal statute of a cost accounting standards board to pre
scribe and enforce cost accounting standards for application
to the bulk of negotiated government contracts suggests to us
that this is not an empty threat.
The Wheat Committee has completed its study and has
published its report and its recommendations. We have general
ly endorsed the Wheat Committee’s report in a recent letter to the
President of AICPA.

Because of our deep interest in both of

these studies, and because of the inescapable interrelation-
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ship between the two, I now ask leave of the Chair to file a
copy of that letter, along with our other testimony, as part
of the Committee’s record of this hearing.
(Mr. Gellein nodded his head to indicate acceptance.)
MR. DERR:

Thank you, sir.

As you know, MAPI responded to this, the Trueblood
Committee’s invitation for comments, by filing a written state
ment of our views on the subject, under date of January 28,
1972.

My oral comments today will be very brief, with the

bulk of our testimony presented by Mr. Roberts.
Our earlier written statement emphasized our view
that the principal purpose of the corporate financial state
ments is, and should be, to report clear and reliable finan
cial information to the shareholders concerning the results of
the corporation’s operations, its financial position, and its
prospects.

I want to reemphasize that central point and add

very briefly to it.
The need for reemphasis is suggested in part by one
central proposition in an otherwise excellent and most useful
statement to this Committee by the Financial Analysts Feder
ation.

That proposition holds:

"The objective of accounting

and financial statements should be to serve the needs of equity
investors, actual and potential."

In a limited sense this is,

of course, true, but we do not believe that potential investors
do, or should have, the same standing as actual investors. As
Ernst & Ernst has said in its written statement to this Com-
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mittee:

"The requirements of potential or only possible in

terests must be regarded as secondary."

There may, in fact,

be a genuine conflict of interest that must, in our judgment,
be resolved in favor of the actual investor; the present share
holder, one of the owners of the company, has his investment
at risk.
Reporting disclosures of the type sought by non
shareholding users of financial statements— product line re
porting is a good example— may adversely affect the competi
tive position of the company, and by that very fact discourage
investment by the potential investor or by the financial anal
yst who acts as his servant.

We believe the principle should

be clearly adopted that regular financial reports of a cor
poration ?re designed primarily for stockholders, and seconda
rily for bankers, security analysts, and others.
Adoption of that guiding principle at once suggests
a need for brevity, simplicity, and clarity in the basic fi
nancial reports, with supplementary detail and analysis of the
type sought by other users of corporate financial statements
relegated to appendices and supporting schedules but not in
cluded in the regular financial reports.
In his remarks at the Annual Meeting of AICPA last
October, the distinguished Chairman of this Committee said:
"So far we have formally invited each state society, over fifty
governmental and professional organizations, 100 international
accounting organizations, 100 institute member firms, all com
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panies listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges,
and scores of universities to participate in our work."

This

is an impressive roster of participants, and characteristic of
the painstaking care which the Committee has approached its
most important assignment.
But there appears to us to he one significant omis
sion:

the common garden variety of shareholder, the man who

has put up his money to finance the enterprise.

We think the

Committee should consider questioning, by interview or ques
tionnaire or both; a cross section of stockholders, in order
to see what it is that they desire in financial reports.
In that same progress report to AICPA last October,
the Chairman of the Committee indicated, among other things,
that the Study Group was considering objectives that might
sanction "disclosure of the impact of social costs and social
benefits in financial statements.” We would oppose the en
graftation of any such disclosure requirement on the establish
ed pattern of financial reporting.

The impact of such costs

and benefits is necessarily conjectural, and therefore not sus
ceptible to measurement in financial terms.
If need for the reporting of such matters can be
justified--and, frankly, we see no justification for it--then
such reporting should be excluded from the principal financial
statements and included only

as a supplement to such state

ments.
Similarly, we oppose the Inclusion of forecasts and
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budgets in basic financial statements, a suggestion to which
our next witness will devote principal attention.

As I said

before, our next witness is Mr. Frank C. Roberts, Vice-Presi
dent and Controller of the Eaton Corporation

whO, incident

ally played a major role in the preparation of our earlier
written statement.

It will be his purpose to extend and elab

orate upon certain of the points made in that earlier state
ment.

As I have suggested; he intends to emphasize and to re

late to the study of accounting objectives his company's work
in forecasting, budgeting, and in the use of financial controls
as an example of how such matters are dealt with in a typical
capital goods manufacturing company.
MR. FRANK C. ROBERTS:

If you please; Frank.

Thank you, Charlie.

Good morning; gentlemen.

Preceding the comments I

am about to make, I would like to make clear that I am not an
accounting professional in the public accounting area.

I am

not a CPA; nor do I have any public accounting experience.
When I need this type of guidance; I contact our independent
accountants and rely upon their advice.

I am here today be

cause I am concerned about some of the changes being considered
in the information normally included in published statements and
the potential impact these changes could have on

Eaton Corpo

ration.
I ask that you accept that I am not opposed to change
or innovation as such.

Change is a way of life in our company;

and since we are well aware of the necessity for providing ade
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quate, understandable information in our published reports, we
welcome any constructive suggestions which will help us achieve
this objective.
While most of what I have to say may appear nega
tive--and I realize this is not helpful to your Committee as
it will not help develop a positive response to your commit
ments--I feel strongly enough about certain of the proposals
that I am willing to appear here today and discuss the subject.
For a number of years, Eaton has prepared forecasts
as a means of ensuring that the various segments of the busi
ness prepare detailed operating plans and use such plans as
an operating tool.

We feel that this practice has given us a

reasonably good capability to recognize the strengths and weak
nesses of forecasting techniques.
To develop our forecasts, we draw upon the expertise
of our customers, our outside professionals, and internal ex
perts.

It is our considered opinion that forecasting, properly

used, is an excellent operating control.

Our experience also

leads us to believe that inclusion of forecasting in the ac
counting statements issued to shareholders and the public may
not only

be inadvertently misleading, but actually can provide

the vehicle through which overly optimistic opportunists can
reach the investor when they feel that the recorded historical
performance is not sufficient to maintain the investor’s inter
est at the desired level.
To illustrate my point, I will give a brief descrip
tion of the forecasting techniques used by Eaton, and review
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the degree of accuracy which we have been able to attain while
using this information as internal control.

Since this inform

ation has been regarded as strictly confidential by management,
it has not been influenced by any

consideration which might

have crept into it if it had been subject to public disclosure.
Obviously, the more accurate such a planning and con
trol tool can be made, the more useful it will be to management.
Our forecasting starts with a five year forecast which
is prepared in the spring of each year.
ed procedure on how

that is to be accomplished by each operat

ing division or subsidiary.
of the business.

We have quite a detail

This plan encompasses all aspects

The plan is evaluated by applying values to

each element of the plan, but the true emphasis of this program
is placed on the planning of strategies.
These plans are first reviewed at a meeting of the
group vice president with the general manager and the general
manager’s staff; so it does get into some degree of depth with
in the organization.

If it’s acceptable to the group vice-

president, a second critical review meeting is held which in
cludes the corporate Executive Policy Committee and appropri
ate members of the corporate staff.
The second major step in our procedure is the develop
ment of a one year profit plan, which is prepared in the fall
of the following year, or covering about a six months’ span.
And here again we have quite a detailed, elaborate procedure
that goes out to each operation.

If these would be helpful, we
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can leave them for the record.
MR. GELLEIN:

Yes, they would.

Would you, please.

MR. ROBERTS:

The emphasis here in the one year plan

is on the financial results, with assurance that the underly
ing strategies developed in the five year plan are being im
plemented.

This one year plan is compared with the previous

forecast for the same period as included in the five year plan,
and deviations must be explained.

As a part

of this plan, we include what we refer to

as turnaround plans.

Now if we were dead certain that we could

set up a plan that was truly going to hold throughout the com
ing year, there would be no need for such a thing as a turn
around plan.

This type of plan, again, is formalized, with

specific instructions as to what is to be developed.

It out

lines specific actions which are to be taken in the event that
the actual economic conditions differ from the planned level.
Generally, the program provides for about a 7½ and a

15% increase and decrease from the planned level, so we are
considering a possible

30% range

of deviation.

Occasionally,

a special turnaround plan must be prepared for a division or
subsidiary which falls outside of this range.
Using the financial data developed for these five
levels of activity, we develop break-even charts which can be
used to measure the anticipated profit at any sales volume.
Deviations from the profit level are explained in a monthly
analysis report submitted by each operation.

Each volume lev

el of the plan is subdivided into a monthly schedule, so as to
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permit monitoring the monthly results.
The third step in our forecasting procedure involves
what we refer to as a monthly rolling forecast.

I have samples

of those particular forms here for that subject.
This consists of a four month projection by month
of sales, profits, and inventory levels.

It also includes our

current projections for the full calendar year.

It shows vari

ance from plan and from the previous year’s actual for both the
full year and the current year to date through the period includ
ed in the four month projection.

For the full year, it shows

the variance from the prior month’s projection, and notes and
comments are required for significant changes.
A comparison is made of the three months previously
reported in prior months, as a means of ascertaining the trend
and whether the reporting operation is consistently optimistic
or pessimistic about the future.

We do run credibility checks

on the figures that are submitted.
Explanations and comments for any significant devi
ation from prior forecasts and plans are again required.
The last step in our forecasting procedures is re
ferred to as an interim forecast.
sales, profits, and inventory
vision and subsidiary.

Three times during the

month,

levels are projected for each di

The first forecast is due at World Head

quarters on the fifth working day of the month, the second on
the sixteenth, coinciding with the rolling forecast, and the fi
nal on the fourth working day of the following month.
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This final forecast is expected to he very close to
the actual hook results which will he reported later in the
month.

Again, pertinent comments on deviations are a part of

the information submitted.
I believe the comments I have just made indicate
that we have a rather thorough approach, and do not take the
subject of forecasting lightly.

Now let’s examine how well we

have been able to meet the forecasting objectives.
You will recall that I mentioned that the prepara
tion of our five year forecast took place in the spring, and a
closer look at the next year was taken in the fall of the same
year, or about six months later.

I have here some charts.

might be helpful if you had these as I talk.

It

(Papers were dis

tributed to the Study Group.)
This first chart shows the deviation from the follow
ing year’s forecast, as prepared first in the spring of the pre
ceding year, and then in the fall of the preceding year.

To

illustrate, in the 1970 year sales actually were projected to
be a little higher in the second forecasting, but profits were
quite a bit lower.
In 1971 we were off roughly 8% in sales in that peri
od, and about 19% in profits.
I have also charted our actual performance
the one year plan for the period 1967 through 1971.

against
I believe

the results are indicative of the difficulty and potential mis
understanding which could result from disclosure of the forecast
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figures.

In 1967 sales were off about 16% , and profits were off

something in excess of 40% .

Our

profit leverage to sales is

quite extensive.
Another interesting chart indicates the trend follow
ed by our monthly rolling forecast, which indicates an updated
forecast of the annual results as it is viewed each month.

In

other words, we have updated our annual forecast and matched
that against our original profit plans.

On the third chart we

have a profit plan which said that we thought our sales were go
ing to be $1,155,000,000.

As of February, that had declined

3%.

These figures do not show on your chart; they were an after
thought on my way down here.
In March they had declined by 5% ; in April, by about

MR. GELLEIN:

I think we can see it here.

MR. ROBERTS:

O.K.

In any event, w e ’re off 10% when

we get down to the bottom.
Looking at the next chart, we see what happened to
the profits during the same period, and again it was much more
pronounced.

Profits were off about 26% when we finally came

down to a realistic level.
One of the interesting things in looking at this par
ticular chart is that once we had recognized a downward trend,
we didn’t stop till we went completely under what we finally ac
tually attained.
MR. GELLEIN:

Mr. Roberts, I don’t want to cut it off,
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but thinking of our schedule, could you some way kind of bring
it down to...
MR. ROBERTS:

Yes.

O.K.

MR. GELLEIN:

...perhaps highlights?

MR. ROBERTS:

Based on the information available dur

ing the development of some of these figures, I don’t believe
independent auditors would have revised the forecasted figures.
And yet, look at what happened.
In our reporting we have at times attempted to satis
fy the need for forecasted information by including in the re
ports a simple statement as to the anticipated business trends.
Following are some typical examples of comments made and a com
parison of the implications of the comments with the results
later obtained.
Back in 1965 the annual report noted that the back
log of unfilled orders on December 31, 1965 was at record levels,
and 40% greater than the total of 1964.

The 1966 actual results

did include an increase of 13% in sales, and 17% in profits.
In the 1966 annual report you will find the comment:
"Although sales are favorable for 1967 to date, profits have de
clined in part due" — ■ etc.

"For these reasons, as well as the

possibility of a higher tax rate, we cannot accurately predict
what 1967 will bring for your Company."

The actual results for

1967 were a 6$ decline in sales and a 38% decline in profits
We have similar statements in our interim and annual
reports of subsequent years.

Our current first quarter for ’72
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contains a statement that we think business looks much better
this year.
Statements such as those quoted indicate that, de
spite our best efforts, we cannot predict the future with any
great degree of reliability, but an honest effort is made to in
dicate the economic trend, as it affects Eaton.

Any require

ment to make such statements more precise and to express such
observations in specific economic values can only lead to a
growing credibility gap between business and the investing com
munity.
I have a couple of comments that I'd like to make
on fair-value

accounting, although I must confess that at this

point I'm thoroughly confused.
MR. GELLEIN:

About how much time do you think you'd

need for this, now, Mr. Roberts?
MR. ROBERTS:

A minute or so.

MR. GELLEIN:

Oh, fine.

MR. ROBERTS:

With the variety of current value con

cepts from which to choose, it is apparent that no one presen
tation is going to satisfy all the users of accounting state
ment.

In fact, it appears that none of the restatement of value

plans has any great number of converts.

There are apparently few

users of accounting reports that feel handicapped by the lack
of a restatement of historical values.

I find it especially

difficult to understand the need for a more precise measurement,
when the fixed assets -- which in many instances constitute a major
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portion of any such adjustment —

are appropriately depreciated

using a wide range of rates and methods. While a depreciation
charge against operations may be proper under those circumstances,
it does not necessarily follow that the residual net book value
is in any way typical of the market value of the fixed assets
involved.
Under these circumstances, the use of a conversion
factor to determine the fair value will not bring the net book
value back to market value, and any attempt to adjust to market
on a specific appraisal basis will defeat the original intent
of charging cost with what was deemed to be an appropriate de
preciation cost.
All of the revaluation methods have a specific pur
pose, and are used in various types of special studies.
doubtful that the cost of making such conversions on a

It is
continu

ing basis can be justified through practical application.

Most

of us are not in the business of going out of business.
While a case can be made that cost in an inflation
ary economy may be understated in terms of current value, the
gradual adjustments of selling prices over the period do reflect
the cost imposed by normal equipment replacement.

Admittedly,

this is not a timely cost-price relationship, but it has been a
reasonably constant relationship and as such has influenced the
profit margins required for a satisfactory performance.
Eaton’s capital expenditures in the last ten years
equal about 70% of our fixed asset value.

If we are truly con-
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cerned about a continuing inflationary impact, then it would
appear that our attention should be focused on tomorrow's costs,
and even current values would not be an appropriate measure for
guiding the investor.
I wonder if we are not overreacting to criticisms
which really should be directed at specific instances of faulty
and misleading reporting.
I'll chop it off there.
MR. GELLEIN:

Thank you, Mr. Derr and Mr. Roberts.

We especially appreciate your well-prepared paper that you put
into the record, and the case study that you presented will be
helpful.

Reed?
MR. PARKER:

I noticed you indicated that one of the

primary purposes of statements ought to be to clarify and sim
plify financial information for the unsophisticated primary user;
and yet in another part of the statement you seem somewhat sensi
tive on the idea of further improvement in the comparability of
accounting data from one company to another.

And yet, perhaps,

the primary objective for the investor is to be able to compare
one company with another, and it rather suggests to me that,
rather than trying to be of maximum help to the unsophisticated
holder, you would rather like to leave more advantage with the
sophisticated financial analyst on this score.
Could you comment on that?
MR. DERR:

Do I detect that you are accusing us of

inconsistency, Mr. Parker?
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Well, perhaps it is inconsistent, because life is
inconsistent.
No, I think I would answer this in this fashion that
we have some very serious doubts as to how much real compara
bility can be achieved without straightjacketing management by
prescribed, unvarying, inflexible accounting rules and proce
dures.

This, we think, in the larger scheme of things is proba

bly undesirable.

Certainly it is necessary to achieve compara

bility, but as I understand it— and I am not an accountant—
there are two kinds of comparability.
as between Company A and Company B.

There is comparability
There is comparability with

in Company A as between Accounting Period A and Accounting Peri
od B and Accounting Period C.
It is my impression that the accounting profession
has sought thus far to achieve the latter form of comparabili
ty, and achieve so far as possible the first form.

This is not,

perhaps, a very good answer, but I think this is what you were
getting at.
MR. PARKER:

Well, I ’m not an accountant either, so

we can talk on equal terms.

But in areas like depreciation, in

stallment sales, inventory accounting, and investment-tax credit,
consolidation, the present status of generally accepted account
ing principles allows a very considerable degree of latitude,
and it seems difficult, I think, especially for the unsophisti
cated investor, to understand why one company can use a thusand-so kind of depreciation method, and another one another,
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when they have relatively similar kinds of assets.
It’s this kind of problem that we're facing, and it
has become a fairly serious one for the investor trying to com
pare across company lines, and one wonders what the usefulness
of this extreme amount of flexibility is to management, especial
ly if the management finally wants to compete in the capital mar
kets and wants to have the confidence and the understanding of
both the unsophisticated investor and those of us who can be
hired by institutional people and take care of all this complex
ity and undo it for them.
MR. DERR:
Mr. Chairman.

Let me add one further comment, if I may,

As most of the people on this Committee undoubt

edly do, I own a few shares of stock, and on occasion I receive
these annual reports of corporations.

I am probably an unsophis

ticated investor, so I qualify for the character that we are
talking about.
It seems to me that most of the annual reports I re
ceive exhaust me before I exhaust them.

I wonder, really, if

the typical unsophisticated investor is really capable of making
the comparisons. I would prefer to have a sophisticated finan
cial officer comment.
Frank, have you a comment on this question?
MR. ROBERTS:

An unsophisticated one.

I think the study of depreciation, of course, is a
problem all unto itself.

Over the years nobody has satisfacto

rily come to grips with it.

There are certain times when de-
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predating an item at an accelerated basis is more than justi
fied.

If you have a product line that appears could become

obsolete, but you don’t definitely know that it’s going to be
come obsolete, you are confronted with a judgment problem as to
how fast you write off that particular investment.
I don’t think these cases are unusual in our busi
ness, and I doubt if they are unusual in many businesses.
MR. PARKER:

It was pretty unusual, though, to have

large numbers of businesses shift from accelerated methods to
straight line methods in a single year when there wasn’t a great
deal of change in the economy or in the status of technology.
MR. ROBERTS:

I agree.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Frank, you had a question, I be

lieve.
MR. WESTON:

Well, I was interested in a comment in

your written paper that the rights of the shareholder--the exist
ing shareholder— take precedence over those of any other claimant
to the use of corporate financial information.

Many people in

talking to our Group have observed that once a corporation lists
its securities and goes public, in a sense, potential investors
have as much right to that type of information as existing in
vestors, and there is a section of the Securities and Exchange
Act which many lawyers say also contains the thought.
Do you believe that the present shareholder should in
effect get information that others do not receive?

5 of your paper.

It’s on page
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MR. ROBERTS:

I believe that any information which

is made public must be made public in a way that it's available
to all people who are interested.

Any time that we issue any

information in our discussions with security analysts, for ex
ample — we will say nothing that we are not willing to quote to
the Wall Street Journal.
MR. WESTON:

What do you mean on page 5 in your paper

when you say that the rights of the shareholder take precedence
over those of any other claimants to the use of corporate finan
cial information?
MR. ROBERTS:

We're talking specifically about the

design of the statement itself, and this would mean that in cer
tain instances we think the shareholder can be injured by the
publication of given information in situations where it might
aid a competitor of the company or put us in an awkward

posi

tion with our customers. And we think those interests come
first before any others, and therefore we wouldn't expect to
publish that information in a statement.
MR. WESTON:

Even though a potential investor should

be alerted to this adverse type of situation?
MR. ROBERTS:

The existing investor is not alerted

to it.
MR. WESTON:

You do on that page, just to take one

more second on that particular issue, recommend the use of a
rule of reason to decide what sort of information shall be made
public and what is detrimental.

Who, in your view, would be
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the arbiter for determining such a rule of reason?

Who would

make that decision?
MR. ROBERTS:

I think it’s a management decision that

would have to be concurred in by the independent accountants.
MR. WESTON:

Do you think both of those parties are

capable of making those decisions today?
MR. ROBERTS:

I have never encountered a case where

I didn't feel that was so.
MR. WESTON:
MR. DERR:

In the public interest, I'm saying.
Could I comment further on that, Mr.

Weston?
I think, unquestionably, the ultimate responsibility
for the determination of accounting principles and practices
has to rest with the professional accounting societies, the
American Institute, and so forth.

I think what we were suggest

ing here with reference to a rule of reason was addressed pri
marily to the accounting profession, suggesting that the pri
mary purpose of financial statements, in our opinion, is to re
port to the share owners.

Obviously, there is no intent to ex

clude appropriate disclosure to everyone else in the public who
may be entitled to it.

Certainly bankers, creditors, govern

ment agencies by law, potential investors, and what have you,
as Mr. Roberts said— if any public disclosure of a fact is made,
it ought to be available to everyone.
But the guiding principle that we were suggesting,
and the step toward the rule of reason, which we leave to you
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to devise, is that primarily financial statements are for the
share owner.

In our judgment he is the person first to be

served— let me put it that way.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We will take one more question.

Andy?
MR. REINHART:

I was curious, Mr. Roberts— when you

deal with security analysts, all of whom generally would make
forecasts with regard to what your company will earn, how do
you deal with their forecasts?
I mean, we all have this problem.

They will come in

and say "I ’m going to forecast that you will make X dollars."
Do you say
tle low"?

"Gee, that’s a little high," or "gee, that's a lit
How do you react to forecasts that they make?
MR. ROBERTS:

Generally, if we find an analyst whose

forecast we think is way out of the ballpark, compared to the
things that we are looking at, we will ask him to give us his
reasons for arriving at such a forecast.
If he has things in mind which we think are based on
misconceptions, we may discuss the misconceptions, but we leave
the arriving at the final forecast to him.

And if he wants to

put out a forecast that we would not put out, and he has good
reason for doing so, we think that's up to the financial analyst.
MR. GELLEIN:

Mr. Roberts, it's clear that your ex

perience in forecasting is extensive, and I'm sure that the mem
bers of the panel would like to ask further questions.

I would

like to hope that we might come back to you after we look at
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this material, in the event we would want to talk with you about
certain aspects of it.
MR. ROBERTS:

Peel free at any time.

MR. GELLEIN:

Thank you very much.

MR. DERR:

Thank you kindly.

MR. GELLEIN:

Mr. Borst, of Inland Steel Corporation.

MR. DUANE R. BORST:
self.

Gentlemen, let me introduce my

I'm Duane Borst, Comptroller of Inland Steel.

prefer to call me Dewey.

My friends

And generally, when they are friendly,

they call me Dewey; when they are hostile, they call me Duane.
Perhaps I'll get an indication in the response to my comments.
Now, my company is— and I personally am--very pleased
to be invited here today and have the opportunity to comment
further on the current status and the future course of corporate
financial reporting.

Considering all the confusion and contro

versy surrounding financial reporting today, we were delighted
with the bold step taken by the AICPA last year in establishing
the Wheat Committee and the Trueblood Committee.
In passing, we would like to express our strong sup
port for the recommendations of the Wheat Committee, as it has
in our opinion successfully accomplished a very difficult task.
The proposed structure for establishing accounting principals,
or standards —

if you like —

is a, good plan.

It achieves balance

among all of the concerned groups, and should work well..
We, like many of our associates in the non-CPA field,
felt the previous Board was too heavily weighted with the CPA
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profession.

They are pleased that the AICPA has now approved

this proposal— as I understand, just last week— because it can
prove to those not directly involved that the accounting pro
fession can develop a system of self-policing that will serve
the public interest.

We hope the new Standards Board will re

ceive strong support from all quarters of our society.
And I'm delighted to inform you that our Chairman,
Mr. Fred Jaicks, has publicly pledged financial support of our
company to the new Board in a speech he made to the FEI group
just last week.
Now I'd like to turn to this Committee's task of es
tablishing the objectives of financial reporting.

We submitted

a brief position paper, and we deliberately made it brief; but
I would like, in turn, as background, just to brief that brief
report, covering simply some of the conclusions that we arrived
at, without going through all the rationale.
First, we feel that the basic goal of reporting is
communication between management and the various publics it
serves.

It seems from the testimony I have heard and the other

position papers that there is considerable unanimity on this
point, with the possible exception of the points raised in their
previous discussion.
Second, since communication is directed to diverse
interests in these various publics, we have come to the con
clusion, as preparers of reports, that no single one type of re
porting is appropriate for all these needs.

Therefore, we think
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management has a primary responsibility to its owners, both
present and prospective; and perhaps I disagree with my col
leagues in MAPI in this respect.
Third, reporting should realistically reflect manage
ment’s actions, plans, and performance, and we think some of the
things that have happened in the past few years are departing
from that trend -- which I will comment on later.
Fourth, the concept of value, we think, is funda
mental for your Study Group.

Should value be based on actual,

or historical cost, or on some theoretical or economic value.
We have concluded from our studies that a departure from his
torical cost, at this time at least, is fraught with more pro
blems than it would solve.
mony of the MAPI people.

Here I would agree with the testi
More research is needed before the

profession should move in the direction of current value account
ing.
Fifth, the philosophy of conservatism should be re
examined and evaluated.

We support the continuation of the con

servative convention which our company has historically always
supported.

However, in reading over the papers, I think it was

one of the Big Eight firms that made the point of objectiveness
rather than conservatism, and I rather liked that.

As another

devotee of profit planning and budgeting who has spent many years
in this field, I have always answered the question of the users
of our system, "Which way should we lean in the forecast?" by
saying:" Call it what you really think it’s going to be, as
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close as you can do it.

Don't lean to one side or the other.”

However, we do lean in the direction of booking losses
as soon as we see any trouble up ahead, and not of anticipating
profits.

We have followed that, and continue to believe that

is the valid approach.
Sixth, the role of social costs, which is a hot sub
ject today, should be evaluated in terms of its relevance to
financial reporting objectives.

We are very concerned with the

whole social area in our company, and have been for many years,
but we don't see at this point that financial reporting is a
proper place for this to be included.

However, we would recom

mend major research of this issue be completed before anything
is done adopting this as a requirement in corporate reporting.
Further, we don't believe accountants, particularly,
are qualified to make the measurements of this social cost area.
An article just out in the Conference Board by George
Steiner, at UCLA, on social audits is interesting.

He doesn't

even include accountants at all in his list of people who have
the expertise to do this job.

And I think accountants should

have a place in the setup, but I don't think it should be a pre
dominant role.
The role of flexibility must be examined.

This has

bothered our friends in the Financial Analysts Federation, and the pub
lic at large, and I think with good reason in some cases.

But,

perhaps to the point of considering a different approach to pub
lic accountants' attestation function, we are particularly in-
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trigued by the proposal made by Mr

Tietjen, of Price Waterhouse,

in his recent paper in the January issue of Price Waterhouse Re
view, in which he stakes out a different posture for the CPA. I
think that’s really for the Committee’s investigation.
Now, we also recognize the need for narrower limits
in accounting standards. We agree there is far too much lati
tude in current practice, but experience within our own family
of companies— and this may surprise many of you, that our com
pany, along with most of the other major steel companies are
now becoming more conglomerates than they are steel companies.
It’s just that the steel companies are still an overwhelmingly
large part of the total numbers.

W e ’re everything from housing,

and the whole spectrum of housing and mobile homes, to large
condominium and apartment-type projects, w e ’re in the machinetool business in a small way, in service centers and warehouses,
as well as basic steel and mining.
In all these there are tremendously different ac
counting problems, and we have had very little luck in trying
to get uniformity even within our own accounting structure in
the family of companies.
I find very hard to refute the argument for report
ing earnings forecsts.

Especially, as some of my friends who

are in this audience are aware, I was espousing this in the
very early days, along with Dave Green and Sid Davidson of the
University of Chicago.
However, I have had a change of heart since assum
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ing my present position, where I feel the weight of responsi
bility as the chief accounting officer of my company, not as
just the budget director, and, particularly, I look at the law
suits, both litigated and those that have been threatened, and
this gives me great pause, for reasons that were pointed out in
the previous testimony by the MAPI people.

At this stage of the

game, until we can solve the potential liability problem, we
better be careful because the best of us are going to miss our
forecasts by a wide margin in some years.
Therefore I 'd recommend additional research and a
great effort in public education, at least to the investing pub
lic, before we adopt this risky step.
All of these points were discussed in our position
paper, and we urge that the Committee consider them most care
fully.
Now I ’d like to turn to one particular point touched
on in our paper, and elaborate on it what I call the role of
management in financial reporting.
I believe management's primary responsibility is to
utilize the resources entrusted to it by its stockholders in the
most effective and efficient manner possible, in order to pro
duce the best possible return on the investment of the owners.
Now, I deliberately eliminated the words "maximize" or "optimize,
because in our company we recognize our social and public respon
sibilities, which are constraints on maximization; but our em
phasis is still there.
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If. this were not true, we feel there would be no
corporation, because -- after all -- profits are the engine that
drives the economy, and without them we couldn't do all these
nice things for the community and the public at large.
Of course, we recognize secondary responsibility to
the other publics, including the employees and their labor unions
which represent them, our customers, the communities in which our
Corporation operates, and the public at large.

Responsibility

to these groups may require reporting, as I have commented, on
social costs in particular, but not necessarily financial reporting.
We don't think financial reporting is the appropriate vehicle for
dealing with the social costs that are coming up out of society.
We think such an application would cloud and distort the basic
purpose of financial reporting.

Therefore in our minds, this

leads logically to the statement that financial reporting should
be oriented toward management's primary responsibility —

its

stewardship.
The value of the investment to the investor, poten
tial or present, lies primarily in management's skills and ex
pertise and the company's future earning potential.

Therefore,

the reporting should first be relevant and, second, a reflec
tion of reality, and not some what-may-be, what-might-have-been
situation.
As one illustration of a lack of realism, I'd like
to cite the experience at our company and another one -- a neighbor
of ours —

and what's happened with the allocation of taxes, or de

ferred tax liabilities, on the timing differences of taxable
and book items —

the principal one being depreciation, of course.
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You are all familiar with that technique.
Now, we believe that those items with a timing pro
blem, relatively short run items — say, one to five years— that
this makes sense, and we don't quarrel with that logic.

A good

example of that is the now defunct treatment of production, pay
ments, or so-called carved out mineral properties which most
steel companies and petroleum companies have engaged in over
the years.

It is now outlawed by the Treasury.
But for other items, and particularly depreciation,

the difference between accelerated and book depreciation, where
you are using the two different methods, has created, I think,
just a disastrous situation.

This creates a growing mountain

of liability in the blance sheet that is meaningless in an on
going business.

As long as the business continues to prosper,

investments in new plant and facilities will continue to be
made in an amount that will grow.
Our company, like MAPI cited, or the Eaton Corpo
ration, has had a similar experience.

We have

replaced about

75% of our assets in the past decade, spent over a billion dol
lars in capital expenditures on gross values of $1.5 billion.
So we think that minimized that problem.
Reflecting this accounting opinion, we now have a
liability on our balance sheet at 12/31/71 of $65 million, and
we project it will reach $100 million by 1974 or 1975.

This is

becoming a very significant liability, and, in our minds, will
never be paid, and is completely meaningless.
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Sears Roebuck, a neighbor of

ours, one

of Sid David

son’s favorite citations on this subject, had $680 million at
1/31/72, the end of its fiscal year.

I don’t know about their

forecasts, but certainly they are going to reach a billion-dol
lar level by the end of this decade.

Again I ask:

"Is this

meaningful or realistic information?"
Now, you might ask:

What happens if the capital in

puts decline— actually slow down or decline?

Well, my observa

tion of the business world in the past 25 years is that compa
nies either grow or they die, and I think all you have got to
do is look at some of the companies that have gone under in the
past few years, and you will see what I ’m talking about.

Before

that liability would ever become due, the company is going to
be running large losses— taxable losses--that will more than
offset potential liability.

So here is one of these "what if"

things that I think are not defensible.
The result is that annual profits are understated.
We have all been concerned by overstatement.

Here’s a classic

case of understatement, and management reporting on its steward
ship— is required to state that it is doing a poorer job than it
realistically thinks it’s doing.
Is this a proper objective of financial reporting?
We don't think so.
Another example of this sort of thing came up in the
Price Waterhouse paper, which I would like to quote, because it
also confirms our own experience in our housing business.
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One of the anomalies of the business world that is
a source for mistrust of the accounting process is the wide dis
crepancy between the considerations that enter into decisions
to commit corporate resources to a project and the accounting
conventions that measure its results.

The manner in which the

most successful real estate investments regularly report a loss
in an accounting report is a scandal.
That's a strong statement, but one of the problems
we're wrestling with is that very one.

We run financial models

for potential investors which show the tremendous economic ad
vantage to them and to us, and yet we have great difficulty re
porting book income on these large syndications.
My next point is that financial reporting should
measure management performance.
ment on that in the papers.
do the measuring?

There seems to be general agree

The only question is:

Who should

We feel that this is management's primary

job, although we do not object to other people stating their own
opinions, much as a critic does of a play, or other composition.
Regarding earnings performance, I have said earlier
that this is a most important consideration, in our view, that
the investor takes into account in making his investment deci
sion.

In this context, the valuations on the balance sheet are

basically irrelevant to an evaluation of how well the business
is being operated.
Now, I was troubled with this statement, and I got
some help just last night when I caught up with an article that
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my friend, George Sorter; wrote in a recent issue of Journal of
Business, and I have been trying to come to grips with the same
kind of idea that he is--that of some way reflecting the change
in economic value; if you are going to go that way, as separate
from measuring the earnings performance of the enterprise for
the year.

Perhaps that’s an avenue for further research.
The objective of financial reporting should be to

provide the most realistic report possible on the operation of
the business.

My particular pet peeve; if I may say SO, in my

advocacy today, is the lack of recognition of the tremendously
growing use in American business of what I will call manageri
al accounting.
I don’t want to get into a hassle on direct costing
versus full costing.

We have been arguing this for 20 years;

and we aren't going to argue about inventory valuation when
that’s irrelevant to my point.

My point is that today our com

pany; for instance— and it has occured in the past decade--has
swung almost completely away from a management of the old style.
We came up the hard way.

Now something like 80 to 85% of the

top 400 managers in our company are MBA’s or MBA equivalents;
and they think in these terms.
way, and their decisions.

They make their analyses this

We run our accounting reports entire

ly in this fashion; and we measure the results in this fashion.
Now, what do I mean by managerial accounting?

Some

of the most central things are the recognition of fixed and
variable costs.

In filling this in for the P&L statement; I
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think it would he a great help to the analyst in particular to
separate these, and not lump everything into a typical 10-K
format, as we tend to do.
Then the use of marginal profit concepts, incremen
tal value, contribution markets, and return on invested capi
tal— these are the tools and the criteria that managements are
using more and more.
I have observed that many analysts— and I will edi
torially say the good analysts— attempt to recast our state
ments in this format, and I have one particular favorite that
I won’t name who is a steel analyst, who does this, and he comes
amazingly close to our criteria.

Many analysts are now attempt

ing to recast their analysis information from the published
statements into managerial accounting format, in trying to fore
cast earnings based on their own forecasts of what’s going to
happen.

And one or two of these fellows have been amazingly

close to our own internal forecasts and to our own results.
Therefore, this encourages me to believe that the
use of the managerial accounting approach would serve the needs
not only of management but of the primary users; that is, the
owners, the investors, the investment analysts who help the in
vestors, and even lenders.
To illustrate some of the distortions that occur un
der present day accounting, I will say I ’m much dismayed by the
direction that the APB, the SEC and the Treasury are going in
this direction.

They are moving more toward full costing, rather
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than direct costing.
As you know, absorption costing includes fixed costs
in manufacturing overhead in the inventory value.

There's an

argument on the inventory valuation side that I won't go into
here, but my point is that from a managerial standpoint and
from an analyst's standpoint in periods of low sales volume
management can make its earnings look better by running high
production and gambling on building inventory, because these
credit costs are being capitalized into the inventory account.
But an even more serious problem is the misleading
nature of total unit costs on management's strategies and al
ternatives.

Accountants are telling the manager that under full

costing his prices are too low, at the very time that he should
be cutting prices because the market demand is soft, and vice
versa.
Of course, direct costing avoids this problem by not
capitalizing fixed costs as inventory.

Thus in a period of low

sales volume the fixed costs fall down to the bottom line of the
earnings statement, and in my opinion reflect what's really hap
pening.
Therefore, following this through, the valuation of
inventory and what I call opportunity costs--or the marginal
costs of production— would fit the managerial accounting struc
ture of the income statement.

I believe this approach would pro

vide more relevant data for economists, analysts, and even the
government agencies interested in tracking the movements
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of the total economy.
In conclusion, I'd like to say that in our brief pre
sentation today we have tried to point out that management's
primary responsibility is to produce superior earnings commen
surate with risk.

The objectives of corporate financial re

porting should be to report on how well management is doing that
job.

Financial reporting must be relevant and realistic to pro

vide interested users with appropriate information for their
own investment decisions.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
MR. GELLEIN:

Thank you, Mr. Borst.

Thank you for a

well-written paper, and for a very fine and clear presentation.
I found it quite stimulating.
I know we don't propose to debate— and I know you
don't want to debate— Opinion 11, and tax allocation, but I want
to use your illustration to pose my first question.
You referred to these so-called liabilities— I'll
call them balance-sheet credits--as being unreal, and to the
fact that the growing magnitude of them was an indication of the
lack of reality.

You know, what seems to be real unreal so often

seems to rest in the eyes of the beholder.

Some say they are

real, and some say they are unreal.
So my question really is this.

We here, of course,

are concerned with the development, the statement, the articu
lation of the objectives which in turn, we assume, would lead
to reality in accounting.

Using tax allocation as an illustra
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tion, would you have any comments on how we might state an ob
jective of accounting which would eliminate the unreality to
which you referred?
MR. BORST:
MR. GELLEIN:

I can only...
By the way, if you can answer that one,

we've got our report written.
MR. BORST:

Well, one way of looking at it that I

thought of, kind of inspired by George Sorter's approach to the
thing, is that if you use the discounted-value concept— and I'm
talking about going concerns--nowadays large corporations are
virtually immortal, as someone said— even if you agreed that
that liability would occur some time in the future the discount
ed value is so far out that its present value would be practical
ly zero.
MR. PARKER:

On this question of deferred items on

the balance sheet-— if I remember correctly, following the pas
sage of the Revenue Act of 1954, the Inland Steel Management
felt that the accelerated method of depreciation was the prop
er way to report income to its stockholders.

And after the rev

enue Act of 1962 , when guidelines were established, that indi
cated going to the shorter guidelines as an appropriate way,
and that it was appropriate to spread the investment-tax credit.
In 1988 , as I remember,the management decided that straight-line
depreciation was right for the stockholder, and that it was now
right to flow through the investment-tax credit.
Do I understand now that you feel that even the other
half of the difference between what you report on your tax books

5.59

as depreciation and what you report to your stock-holders should
also flowed through to income?

Do your ideas about the econo

mics of the business, or the rate at which assets depreciate,
change that much over less than ten years' time?

And how is

this to be helpful to the stockholder-to make your method of com
puting depreciation more and more different from, say, competi
tors for the investors’ dollar, such as Caterpillar and General
Motors, who still report to their stockholders the same way they
always have, using the accelerated method of depreciation?

And

how do we frame an objective that makes things fair in this area
for the stockholder, who, I gather you feel, is the primary per
son who is supposed to be helped by this reporting?
MR. BORST:
tion.

Right.

Well, that’s an excellent ques

In fact, our Chairman dealt with this very question brief

ly in his speech last week, and the Chicago newsmen devoted two
columns of a four-column story to a two sentence statement, and
reopened this whole issue; so I welcome the opportunity to talk
about it.
The answer is:
what is valid depreciation.

Yes, we did change our minds about
As you pointed out, in 1954 we felt

that we were getting less of tax-deductible depreciation than
was warranted from a competitive standpoint, and of course this
situation was worsened in the international steel market, as you
know.
MR. PARKER:

As I remember, the reference also was

not only not enough for tax purposes, but not enough to reflect
the economic facts of life either.
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MR. BORST:

Yes.

Let me get to that.

You remember in 1954 we were still using, up till then,
Bulletin F lives, which were relatively long.

As time has march

ed on though, the lives have been cut, including the new ADR,
which is helping to correct the original situation.
At the time we did feel that accelerated depreciation
would be a better economic measure in 1954, but in the experi
ence that I just described, where we invested a billion dollars
in capital goods and equipment in the past decade— as we tracked
this experience, we found that we were pyramiding our costs— not
just depreciation- v e r y heavily in the short run, and we thought
this was distortive in the matching concept of costs and revenues.
For one, we found start-up costs were very, very much
more expensive than we expected, and this has been noted in the
press.

And, reflecting our conservatism--and I think the whole

industry does this--these were all expensed.

So you not only

have the heavy costs, but you have the low-volume production,
because you couldn’t get the unit up to speed, which raised the
unit cost once again.
So we charted these things, and we saw tremendous bal
loons of cost in these early years.

Also, even though we know

from experience that obsolescence is a technical factor and an
economic factor, in reality our blast furnaces are over 40 years old.
Our newest one was built during World War II.

We have increas

ed the productivity of those blast furnaces about 300% in the
last decade.
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Should we say that that should have all been accel
erated-written off in its early years--when it’s still perform
ing the function now?

Is this the total matching-of-costs-and-

dividends concept that I have described?
It’s true that our move was triggered by the actions
of the marketplace, particularly when other steel companies were
moving in this direction.

I don’t know their reasons, but we

wound up with only one other company in our whole industry that
was filing accelerated depreciation and amortizing the invest
ment credit.

We felt that this was not being properly evaluated

in the marketplace, and therefore as responsible managers to our
stockholders, we felt that we had to become comparable.
This led to the study which in turn, in my mind, con
vinced me that it was right on its own, on economic terms as well,
and I still feel that way.
MR. GELLEIN:
question.

I wonder if we could turn to another

Frank?
MR. WESTON:

In connection with the development of

managerial accounting and, as you indicate, the use of discount
ed cash-flow techniques, opportunity costs, and so on, could you
tell us whether your MBA group and your younger managerial ac
counting types do use any indication of rate of return on value
and opportunity costs in connection with the operation of the
company?
MR. BORST:
MR. WESTON:

Yes.

We use these extensively.

We have been told generally in our in

terviews that management does not use opportunity cost and dis

5 .6 2

counted cash-flow and current values in determining the rate of
return on investment, but that they always use historical cost.
My question is: Do the new techniques pay more attention to al
ternative investments, opportunity costs, and annual return on
what you might call closer relative values?
MR. BORST:

Let me distinguish that.

At this point

in time we are heavily using these techniques for new decisions,
both short run and long run.

When we are looking at a strategy

for the next six months, we look at the opportunity costs.
MR. WESTON:
ing non-decisions?

But do you use that to evaluate exist

In other words, a decision not to...

MR. BORST:

No, we have not got to the point yet.

MR. WESTON:

Why not?

Why has that happened?

I don't

understand why that would be true.
MR.

BORST:

We have not got to the point yet in meas

uring internal rate of return as a measure of profitability with
in the Corporation.
MR. WESTON:

You use this for new decisions, but not

for hold and don't-sell decisions?
MR. BORST:

We just haven't evolved that far yet.

If

we were smart enought to know how to do that in the total group,
we would do it; but we are moving strongly in that direction.
MR. GELLEIN:
MR. REINHART:
the use of direct costing.

We could take one more question.
I was curious about your proposal on
Would that indicate that your concern

is more toward the income statement than it is to the balance
sheet, since direct costing tends to undervalue inventories on
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the balance sheet?
MR. BORST:

I ’m not sure if I understood your ques

tion, but let me restate the point I was making.
MR. REINHART:

Well, what I was saying was:

If you

follow the direct costing principle, I understand the advantages
of that with regard to present earnings, I guess, because
earnings react much more...
MR. BORST:

Dynamically.

MR. REINHART:

They are much more reactive to it.

But would that indicate that you would state your inventories
on the balance sheet on a direct cost basis, and therefore gen
erally understate them, as to their value— which would indicate
to me that you think the income statement is more important than
the balance sheet?
MR. BORST:

Yes.

That’s why I referred to George

Sorter’s monograph here, because that problem distresses me too.
When you turn to the balance sheet side, for other users--lend
ers, and so forth— who are interested in the value of your assets,
then I think we have got a problem.
Now, I might also say that no matter what method we
use in industry to value inventory, it does not reflect its in
surable value.

It doesn’t reflect liquidation value.

think it’s an irrelevant question anyway.

So I

That’s why it doesn't

really disturb me as much.
MR. REINHART:

Although there are some relationships

between the valuation of cost of sales, if you still have that
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in the income statement

and inventory terms— I mean, on a di

rect cost, understated inventory basis--it would appear, looking
at a statement like that,that your inventory turnover was very
rapid, and I think it can also be misleading to the investor as
to how much inventory you actually are sitting with, if it isn't
related to the cost of sales number.
MR. BORST:

True, I don’t have answers to all those

problems, but let me ask you in turn:

How does the investor

handle the same question with companies like ours that are on
the LIFO method, where the balance sheet figure is substantially
below current costs, even on an absorption basis, much less any
concept of current value?

I'm not trying to use another negative

to upset your point.
MR. REINHART:

I'm supposed to have an open mind on

this committee, but I would rule out all inventory valuation ex
cept FIFO.
MR. GELLEIN:

Mr. Borst, thank you very much for your

contribution to our efforts.
The National

Society of Public Accountants.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Would you introduce yourself,

Mr. Passero?
MR. RUDOLPH J. PASSERO:

Yes.

My name is Rudolph

Passero, and I'm presently serving as the President of the Na
tional Society of Public Accountants.
Miss Phyllis Borghese.
tional Society.

Accompanying me today is

She's Director of Education for our Na
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I believe you all received our statement, possibly
a little late.

We tried to arrange it so that it would be here

in time for your hearings, this past Monday morning.
By way of introduction, I'd like to make mention that
the National Society is an organization of over 13,000 practicing
accountants located throughout the country.

There is a public

accountants’ association in each state affiliated with the Na
tional Society.
The members of the Society of course are, for the
most part, either sole practitioners or partners in moderatelysized public accounting firms.

NSPA members provide--as do

members of the Institute--accounting, auditing, tax preparation,
tax planning and management advisory services to individuals
and to small to medium-sized business concerns.
Members of the Society are pledged to a strict code
of professional ethics and rules of professional conduct, and
we believe that they are no less stringent than those applicable
to CPAs under the rules of the American Institute of CPAs.
In the important area of technical competence, the
Society--in order to promote a uniform application of profession
al standards— has adopted with the Institute's permission the
AICPA's auditing standards and procedures for its members.

All

NSPA members are duty-bound to adhere to these generally ac
cepted procedures for financial reporting.

Also, various Ameri

can Institute literature is made available to our members through
our Society as new material is issued by the Institute.

5.66

It is our belief that these comments being presented
today reflect the views of an overwhelming number of accountants,
including many thousands of other public accountants and local
CPAs not affiliated with national firms, who provide virtually
the same services through the work that they do and the audits
that they perform, although the purposes for their development
of reports may vary slightly.
For purposes of this group of small and medium-sized
practitioners, then, management and enterprise owners and lend
ing institutions constitute the primary users of financial state
ments which form the basis for financial business decisions.

It

should be noted that often the owners, who may include sole pro
prietors, members of family held partnerships or of closely held
corporations, may also be the management.
For a long time, reference to financial

reporting

has been limited for the most part to reporting for large, com
plex firms.

It must be recognized, however, that there are pro

blems peculiar to reporting for small firms.
In the average business situation where we render serv
ices, the business enterprise is too small to require or justify
the number of persons needed to be involved to achieve good in
ternal controls in the accounting function.
be economical for the client.

It simply would not

Or, if the system has been ideal

ly designed, in the closely held businesses there may be devi
ations such as shortcuts

from authorized procedures.

Contrary

being an ideal situation, it does not necessarily mean, however,
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that such occurrences are unsatisfactory either.

In the case

of the small enterprise, when actions are initiated by the top
echelon of management, such persons are also the controlling or
sole members of the small business.

Therefore, the reasons for

such conduct is merely for expediting matters.

Besides, in the

smaller concern management is in a position to more closely super
vise operations, though perhaps lacking conventional internal
control.

In the small firm, internal control is basically a

tool for exercising managerial control, whereby in the larger
entity it is used to test the effectiveness of management.

It

should be stressed that there is a fundamental difference as to
the purpose of financial statements of the smaller client.
Characteristically, in the small-scale unit, the ac
countant is reporting to management, which often is the control
ling stockholder, and to creditors--more often bankers.

This is

distinguished from the usual purpose of the large audit of major
companies, when the accountant is reporting not to management,
but about management and management’s achievements, to share
holders and creditors.
While large or publicly held corporations maintain a
staff of accountants, the smaller firms with which local account
ing practitioners deal often lack this ability internally.

Thus,

the accountant who fills this gap in his client's organization
provides an additional valuable service.
As an outsider, the relatively small accountant in
public practice has, we believe, greater objectivity and also
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is more tuned in to the specific needs of his client.
With his broad background resulting from a combina
tion of education and experience with clients in varied business
es, he can offer alternative recommendations from which the cli
ent can select a course of action.
The main third-party user also includes the credit
grantor.

Increasingly, the lending institutions play a part in

commercial ventures.
During the past years of inflation and increasing in
come taxes on small business enterprises, it has become more and
more difficult for an owner of a small business to retain profits
which might increase his net worth or capital.

Each year it

takes more capital to support a growing sales volume, to pur
chase inventory, to give pay raises and benefits to employees,
and to keep up with other operating expenses.

Inflation, as we

all know, has added greatly to the cost of doing business; so,
when a suitable profit is realized at the end of the year, the
income and other taxes siphon off a chunk of that profit which
otherwise might have been kept in the business to increase capi
tal.

Consequently, the small businessman has become more and

more reliant on bank loans to supplement his own capital.
In order to respond to the needs of these three prime
groups of users of financial statements, financial reporting
should reflect information expressed in monetary terms. General
ly speaking, financial reporting should be based on historical
cost and completed transactions.
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Besides the prevailing view of the accounting pro
fession and various government agencies such as the SEC; there
is an important factor supporting this basis.

Attempting to

measure values on the basis of forecasts of earnings and of capi
tal appreciation most decidedly introduces an element of uncer
tainty.

Therefore, such estimates are better expressed in sup

plemental disclosures. The inclusion of budgets and forecasts
should not be part of the basic financial statements, but rather,
they should be presented separately in order to distinguish these
items from the historical financial statements which provide a
better basis, financially speaking.
Indeed, it may be appropriate to furnish this infor
mation not only to management but also to credit grantors, as
such forecasts or projections are beneficial to those who need
such information for decision making.

Management, owners, and

bankers are as interested in such supplementary disclosures fo
cusing on what is expected to be accomplished as in what did
happen.
Financial statements are more effective when com
parative information covering several dates and accounting per
iods is given.

Analyzing monthly statements can disclose the

effects of seasonal fluctuations, and so forth.

Inclusion of

statements for several years can reveal whether the entity is
expanding or declining or has reached a pleateau, or if perhaps
the business is subject to erratic changes from time to time.
To be useful; financial statements should be ana-
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lyzed and interpreted, for the results can be indeed revealing
for the necessary decisions to be made.
Comparative figures and key business ratios provide
vital data for the banker who is naturally concerned with re
covering the funds loaned or to be loaned with minimal risk.

Be

sides indicating the ability of the borrower to repay in the
case of the lender, such information is invaluable to the entre
preneur.
After all, in most circumstances, the basic purpose
or objective of organizing and operating a business is to achieve
satisfactory profits.

While the income statement shows how suc

cessful management has been in attaining this goal, the analysis
becomes more meaningful when net income is related to sales, net
worth, prior years' earnings, and so on.

Prom the balance sheet

can be determined if the business is solvent, and how solvent, in
addition to the likelihood it will remain in that state for a given
period.

The significant test consists of the ability of the en

terprise to pay its liabilities as they become due rather than
merely having more assets than liabilities.

To measure the

adequacy of working capital it is necessary to indicate fair market
values of assets, maturity dates or payment terms of obligations,
and similar information as part of the statements.
Since being able to assess the customer's liquidity
is an important objective of those who grant credit, making a
vailable to them cash flow information along with sources and
uses of working capital as part of the basic financial state
ments will certainly be of assistance in providing the primary
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basis for such determination.

Such additional information is

useful to management and others too, of course.

The various

funds statements complement the conventional statements by re
porting changes not otherwise readily discernible relating to
financial activities of the business.
Whereas the long form audit report is rendered pre
dominately to large clients, it is appropriate, if not more ap
propriate, for the smaller client to have this service.

Various

analyses, comments, ratios and additional statements would pro
vide the smaller entity with a better understanding of the finan
cial data.

However, ironically, the client who could perhaps

benefit greater from the long form report often is the smaller
client who cannot always afford this type of service.
Much that has been said about big business is pre
sumed to apply to smaller enterprises as well.

On the contrary,

the small and medium sized businesses which are so fundamental
to our economy have their own problems and peculiarities which
must be handled in ways distinctively applicable to them.
For example, just recently, it was announced that
small business firms— by definition, they were taken to mean
those which have fewer than 60 employees--with certain limita
tions, are now exempt from the wage-and-price regulations.

Sig

nificantly, this exemption affects five million small businesses
which account for approximately $500 billion in total annual
sales, or 28% of all sales.
Accordingly, we must not lose sight of the fact that
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we serve the small businessman, and therefore consideration
should be given to the role or function of the accountant in
public practice who has a different audience and which may per
haps result in a major difference in the purpose of financial
statements.
The National Society shares a great many interests
with the American Institute, and we feel this is an important
first step today.

It demonstrates the great common area of in

terest between our two organizations.
This kind invitation to participate in these hearings
is a big step forward and this presentation of our views today
shows one area where working together has made a significant con
tribution, particularly from the viewpoint of those professionals
who provide financial statements and reports for small and medi
um-size clients.

Of course, there are other areas--the ethical

standards, professional development, accounting principles, au
diting procedures and standards, community services, aid to
small businesses, and assistance to minority groups.

These and

yet other important areas are indicative of our many common goals.
Miss Borghese and I sincerely appreciate the oppor
tunity today to express our views to this important Study Group
and to promote a closer liaison betweeen our two organizations.
We hope that you will feel free to call on us at any time if we
may be of some assistance.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
for a very nice presentation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Passero,
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I gather that in many respects, apart from our com
monality of interest on the broader objectives, you are making
some considerable plea for an expansion of information to small
er business community, which may even be in the subjective area,
but should be supplemental as distinguished from required, and
an integral part of statements as such.

Do I understand correct

ly?
MR. PASSERO:

That’s a fair statement, yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Anybody on the panel who wishes

to... ?
MR. GELLEIN:

Just a general question.

You referred on page 3 to the fact that there is a
fundamental difference as to the purpose of financial statements
of the smaller client.

Now, granted, you might say the funda

mental difference runs to the number of users and the classes

MR. PASSERO:

Yes, sir.

MR. GELLEIN:

And do you think that difference in the

users and the classes of users calls for different objectives,
and therefore different basic considerations in the preparation
of the financial statements themselves?
termination of income, for example.

I ’m thinking of the de

Does it run to that, or

does it simply run to the way in which the other information is
disclosed?

That’s what I'm trying to get at.
MR. PASSERO:

I think more along the lines of the

methods that are used to bring supplemental or additional in
formation to the attention of the management of small business
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users.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Just to make me perfectly clear

on that--inventory valuation, for example, in the sense of prin
ciples, objectives, disclosures, and so on, would be commonly
treated, as between...
MR. PASSERO:

We would not advocate a change in that

procedure.
MR. PARKER:

I noticed your reference that in some

of these reports there ought to be preparation by the account
ant of some relevant ratios. Would you have any feeling that
that ought to be included as a part of some kind of subset of
general objectives for financial statements?
MR. PASSERO:

Well, I believe it's probably desir

able, to the extent that it can be brought into the basic fi
nancial statements, to represent them along with the basic fi
nancial statements. It it is not appropriate to work them in as
part of the basic statements, then of course it ought to be laid
out in the form of supplemental information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

In addition to ratios and that

sort of thing, I belive you put some emphasis on cash analyses
and flows, and so forth. Picking up Reed’s question about ratios
and my observation about the cash status, would you feel that
your members should generally attest to those supplemental data
or merely supply them?
MR. PASSERO:

Well, we would be treading on thin

ground here, indeed, when we talk about attestation of some of
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the supplemental information.

I can envision some instances

where attestation would be appropriate;

in others, frankly, it

would not.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But the attestation form, I sup

pose, might take a somewhat different form than the standard
ones we use?
MR. PASSERO:

Depending upon the information, yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Any other questions from the

panel?
MR. WESTON:

I have a brief one.

We have had a bit of discussion over the last three
days about the use of fair values in financial statements, and
I wonder whether the type of statement that you describe in your
paper would fit their usages, whether fair values have entered
into any of those determinations.
MR. PASSERO:

Well, certainly fair values ought to

be brought into play in the financial presentation.

I think

w e ’re all probably pretty well convinced of the need for pre
sentation of fair value.
of financial data.
arily

It has its place in the presentation

Again, I don't mean to infer that it neces

ought to be carried as part of the balance sheet, but

rather to be supplied in some form of supplemental data.
its

place.

It has

I think it's important.
Mr. Block, from the floor, points out that on page 5

you take the position that financial reporting should be based
on historical cost.

On page 7 you say that in order to measure
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the adequacy of working capital it’s necessary to indicate the
fair market value of the assets.
Now, may I rightly assume, or would the correct an
swer be, that this fair-market-value indication is also sup
plemental data, so it can be worked in but not become a part of
the statements?
MR. PASSERO:
form.

Yes, it needs to be worked in, in some

It’s too important to leave out.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But as a principle, you stand

by your page 5 statement?
MR. PASSERO:

Yes, to stay with historical cost.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
(There were none.)

Any other questions?

All right, if there is nothing else coming

from the floor, thank you very much.
MR. PASSERO:

Thank you, gentlemen, again.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We appreciate your coming, and

we agree completely with you on the desirability of our cooper
ation and our commonality of interests.
Mr. Jewett of Technical Audit Associates will be next.
MR. FRANK B. JEWETT, JR.:
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Is this the hot seat?

That's the hot seat, Mr. Jewett.

I'm sorry to inconvenience you with respect to our rescheduling,
but we appreciate very much your making yourself available.
I think it might be helpful, particularly in this case
if you would explain just very briefly the nature and purpose of
your organization.

Some of that is included in the paper, but

maybe just a little prelude on that, before your summary of the
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paper, would be helpful.
MR. JEWETT:

Yes, sir.

I have spent my whole life at the interface between
technology and its applications, including several years as
President of Vitro Corporation, which had major systems-engineer
ing responsibilities for programs like the Polaris, the Poseidon
program, and so forth.
After a merger, where they didn’t need two presidents,
I had a sabbatical year to contemplate the forest instead of the
trees, and during this period I began to see what I thought was
an answer to some of the problems that were emerging in the man
agement and control, and assessment of major development programs—
the kinds of things that have led to all of Senator Proxmire’s
very great furor.
It became increasingly apparent to me that one of the
problems lay in the management structure under which these pro
grams were run, which was something that worked pretty well twen
ty years ago, but where a number of changes in the technical en
vironment had changed the ground rules of the ball game, and
essentially reduced the effectiveness of the decision maker by
limiting his knowledge of what was really going on in his program.
This resulted from a number of identifiable changes—
increase in size, increase in the pace of technological develop
ment, increasing complexity of programs.

Just to give you an

order of magnitude, on the Polaris program there were somewhere
between 10,000 and 20,000 suppliers.

There were 67,000 people
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in many thousands of different organizations involved in the
development team.

This all had to be integrated, information

had to pass, and just very simply— actually one morning while
shaving--I thought:

Well, by God, the decision maker has only

one channel of information coming to him, and the things have
gotten so complicated that he is no longer like the old director
of a laboratory where he knew everything that was going on, and
knew as much or more about all of the technical decisions as all
of his people.

Now you have people reading reports with recom

mendations that are made by some other organization, people they
don't even know, and about subjects in which they are not nec
essarily completely competent.
The problem of the decision maker is that he is no
longer in a position where he is a good judge of the validity
of the information that he is getting or he may not be getting.
And if he is not qualified to judge the reliability of this in
formation, he is neither in a position to ask the right questions
nor to interpret the answers properly when he's asked them.
Again I go back to the fact that he tends to be de
pendent on a single line of communication.
So it seemed to me that technology had come to need
a function which was somewhat analogue to the function of public
accounting— a competent, redundant line of communication that
would either validate the information that the decision maker
was receiving, by saying:
want;

Go ahead. Make whatever decision you

what you are getting is complete, it's objective, it's
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good.

Or it would say to him:

Watch out, because there are

areas here that have not been included in the information that’s
getting to you, or the test data has not been properly evaluated.
In other words, it would give him a warning that would enable
him to focus his attention on potential troubles early in the
game.
I have had a lot of good ideas in my life— ideas that
I felt were good— and usually I found they weren't much good, for a
couple of basic reasons.

Either somebody else had already undertaken

them, and it was too late, or they were no good for some reasons
that weren't very obvious to me.
So I started a procedure of trying to get shot down
early with these smart ideas that I would have, and I started
talking with a large number of people who were eminent and ex
pert in the various areas of technical management— not just tech
nology, but also the other things--financial management and the
other aspects that go with it.

And instead of getting shot down,

I found that more and more people agreed with me that this sound
ed like a sensible approach to improve the management processes
in technology.
But if you stop and think of this process, it becomes
clear that it extends to a lot of areas.

It extends to the kind

or the quality of information that goes into prospectuses, and to
whether you can escape trying to evaluate technical matters by
just declaring with a caveat that there’s lots of risk in every
thing, and so forth, and duck the issue.

This is an area that

I think demands attention, because I think there is a better way
of doing it.
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Now, that’s a long preamble to answer your question
as to what I ’m doing.

What I have done is to organize a small

firm, and you’re looking essentially at it--although I do have
quite a few associates in the thing in a rather informal kind
of way— called Technical Audit Associates— to try and practice
what I was preaching.

And in my view, if I am right, I am go

ing to try and be a pioneer and forerunner of what I believe may
develop in some form, somewhat related to what I see as the first
of a new profession of independent technical auditors.
That is the background.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. JEWETT:

Thank you very much.

Now, would you like...?

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Yes, if you would proceed to sum

marize your paper; it has been made available to the members of
the Study Group.
MR. JEWETT:

Mr. Trueblood and members of the Account

ing Objectives Study Group:
ing before you.
it are available.

I appreciate the privilege of appear

My prepared statement is brief, and copies of
I will be glad to respond to any questions

you may have at the end of my presentation.
It is recognized that you are addressing a broad spec
trum of subjects having to do with the objectives of financial
statements and the relation of the public accountant’s opinion
to them.

My focus is on one restricted but important area with

in your total context; namely, the impact of technology on the
assessment and reporting of business activities.
The process of applying technology to the production
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of new products has undergone dramatic change during the past
twenty years.
erated.

The rate of technological development has accel

Increasing size and complexity have intensified the

problems of integrating more diverse sciences.
terval of development processes has lengthened.

The time in
These circum

stances are at the root of much which is going wrong with the
management, control, and assessment of technology today.
problems are fundamental.

The

They cannot be ignored nor can they

be cured by tinkering with procurement policies or other modi
fications of surface phenomena.

The difficulties lie in the

very structure and system of technical management.

The end re

sult is that in many companies, the decision makers have been
overwhelmed by the existing processes for assessment and manage
ment of changing technology.

No cure will be effective unless

it recognizes the nature and addresses the fundamentals of the
changes that have occured.
From the public accountant’s standpoint, the nub of
the problem is that technology can make financial statements
grossly misleading.

Technology has placed the public account

ant on the horns of a dilemma.

Long-term, technically based en

deavor has become so important in many business situations that
technical considerations may dominate all others; yet the public
accountant has no basis for expressing an independent opinion
on these matters.

He must rely on management’s judgment, and

management’s self-assessment of technical matters can be faulty.
For example, when a company is building a major pro
cessing plant or a C-5A airplane— projects that may take several
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years to complete— the capitalized values appearing in its fi
nancial statements during the intervening years can become cru
cial.

In its 1968 Annual Report, Lockheed reported inventories

of $775 million applicable to the development, production, and
testing of the C-5A.

Total shareholders’ equity amounted to

$371 million, so the C-5A work-in-process inventory alone re
presented more than twice the shareholders’ equity.

These in

ventories presumably were valued at the lower of cost or market.
By hindsight, we now know that they were greatly in excess of
market.

This fact was far more important than any other con

sideration used by the auditors in examining the Lockheed state
ment.

The inventory in question was not, however, a normal man

ufacturing inventory, because the C-5A project involved substan
tial development, and the verification of the development values
in the work-in-process inventory dollars was a matter of vital
importance.
As I see it, the problem for the public accountant
is that, except for management opinions, he has no way of judg
ing the value of the assets such companies are creating.

In

these instances, his opinion on financial statements may cover
everything but the most important factor in that particular busi
ness situation.
less.

This fact makes his opinion relatively meaning

The public accountant may be able to avoid legal responsi

bility by properly claiming no expertise in technology, and pass
ing the buck to management.

When management is wrong, however,

the public accountant cannot avoid the stigma of the ensuing dis-
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aster.
If you think I am stirring up a tempest in a teapot,
consider for a moment some of the recent catastrophies that have
involved applications of technology.

Military programs galore

have resulted in vast cost overruns, some measured in billions
of dollars, late deliveries, sometimes years behind schedule or
faulty equipment, sometimes so bad that projects have been aban
doned after millions have been spent.

Other examples, in ad

dition to the C-5A, are the F-111, the Cheyenne Helicopter, the
Mark-48 Torpedo, the Main Battle Tank, numerous shipbuilding
programs, and so on.

Also consider the bankruptcies of Rolls-

Royce and Viatron, the insolvency of Cogar Corporation and the
near insolvency of Lockheed, the demise of RCA’s computer busi
ness, the problems of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System, and so
forth.
The various managements did not intentionally create
these situations, but the calamities did occur.
the public accountant seems clear.

The message for

First, technical matters

have achieved an order of importance in business that the public
accountant cannot ignore.

Second, continued reliance primarily

on management’s judgment in lieu of independent technical veri
fication is no longer a tenable policy.
I do not mean to imply that management has suddenly
lost either its intelligence or its integrity.

Rather, what I

see is the evolution of a new set of conditions that have made the
existing systems and procedures for the management of technology
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unreliable.

These are the changes in the environment of tech

nology which were referred to earlier.
It is necessary to recognize and understand the
changes that have taken place in the application of technology
in order to cope intelligently with the results. Technical in
formation flows along organizational lines, and the decision
maker, increasingly remote from the action as programs have
grown in size and complexity, finds himself on the receiving
end of a single channel of information.

Remoteness and the

broadening span of technology have eroded the decision maker's
competence to evaluate or question intelligently the information
he receives.

As a result, the self-assessments of the doers

have assumed increasing dominance in the ultimate appraisals and
decisions.

The proliferation of documentation abets the process

by submerging all along the line with more than they can digest,
and the accelerating pace of technical development exposes the
whole procedure to a kaleidoscope of ever-changing options that
frequently introduce serious financial consequences.

To top it

all, the information that flows up the lines of a technical de
velopment organization to the decision maker tends to become
biased by parochial interests that are difficult for a technical
ly unsophisticated manager to detect.
This system tends to bury its faults as long as pos
ible.

It tends to make top management the last party to know

the truth about the program for which it is responsible, and
most likely to live the longest with euphoric beliefs about them.
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Finally, it tends to deny management timely information about
problem areas, which would enable it to focus its attention on
potential troubles while time and money still remain for cor
rective action to be taken, and be effective.
For a vivid account of this phenomenon at work, I re
fer you to "The Aircraft Brake Scandal", Harper's, April 1972.
The importance of this article is not the specifics of the break
down at B.F. Goodrich, but its exposure of a management system
that can fail for similar reasons anywhere.
Having spent my career at the interface between tech
nology and its applications, and having contended with the pro
blems that technical management creates for the chief executive,
I feel more than minimally qualified to propose an answer which
in structure and philosophy goes to the heart of the difficulty.
I propose that a new professional responsibility is needed that
will independently and competently evaluate the technical aspects
of a program.

Its function with respect to management would be

either to validate the line generated information and assessments
or to give management substantive reasons for questioning the in
formation it receives.

For the public accountant, the existence

of such a body of responsible independent technical opinion would
represent a source for independent appraisals of technical matters,
a condition which I believe would markedly improve the meaning
and reliability of audited financial statements.
It is my opinion that it will be necessary to create
a new professional function--independent technical auditing— to
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accomplish what I have in mind, and I believe such a function
is practical.

In fact, to my engineering-management-oriented

mind, financial and technical auditing must eventually come to
gether, if financial statements are to have dependable validity.
It is, however, premature to decide whether technical auditing
should forever remain a separate function or coalesce into the
overall scope of the public accountant’s function.

Independent

technical auditing will of course have to be carefully controlled
in its ethics, policies, and standards, and those will have to be
thoughtfully evolved.

Disaster will occur if technical auditing

becomes the happy hunting ground for any firm seeking business
for a few spare engineers.
Many of my friends in public accounting have taken me
to task in the mistaken impression that I am proposing a super
human function for the prediction of the outcome of technical en
deavor.

This would of course be just as improper and impossible

for a technical auditor as it is for his financial counterpart.
There are in technical management, however, a myriad
of matters that are subject to qualified independent appraisal,
and that are indicative of the condition of a development pro
gram.

By validation or exposing deficiencies in what has been

done, the technical auditor restricts his opinion to past actions,
the only things which can be subject to audit.

His assessments

would be against what might be defined as "acceptable standards
of good technical-management practice."

It would be up to the

management or the investor to project the meaning of a technical
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auditor’s opinion into the future.
It is my assertion that factors exist in technology
that are just as measurable and meaningful to persons skilled in
technology as are the different factors that a public accountant
inspects in reaching his opinion.

What I refer to are such things

as the thoroughness with which technical risk has been assessed;
whether all alternative solutions have been considered and ob
jectively evaluated; whether the development plan recognizes the
risks and available alternatives; whether "milestones" and tests
to prove their accomplishment are significant; whether the spec
ifications on either side of an interface are compatible;

wheth

er change-order procedures and the justifications and approvals
necessary to initiate a change are clear and being followed;
whether progress to date has met its schedule when measured in
terms of technical tests; and so forth.
It is possible for qualified people to assess a tech
nical program in terms as I have outlined above, and the find
ings independently arrived at would provide a good measure of
the healthiness or sickness of a program long before the condi
tion would be disclosed by the income statement.
This is not the time to

go into the details of how

an independent technical audit should be accomplished, but two
cardinal aspects are worth mentioning.
First, three types of expertise are required:
(a)

Mature persons with experience in the area of

technology in q u e s t i o n ,
to provide reliable, subjective judg
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ments and the recognized expertise to make them credible.

They

would be equivalent to the senior partners in a law or public
accounting firm.
(b)

Persons who are fully conversant with what is

happening at the forefront of science, again in the particular
technologies critical to the project at hand.

These technical

specialists would have a knowledge of the state of the art that
must be available to ensure that the technical audit opinion is
based on current technology.
(c)

A supporting staff that would look much like a

miniature systems-engineering organization, to do the data gather
ing, analysis work, preparation of position summaries, and so
forth, so as to minimize the time required of the more senior
people.

Just as systems-coordination engineers develop the spe

cial skills, attitudes, and procedures to execute their unique
responsibility effectively, it can be presumed that a technical
audit staff will develop a special expertise of its own.
Second, it is imperative to match critical technical
areas with expertise in those specific aspects of technology.
If this is not done, the technical auditor will not be able to
probe intelligently for and detect flaws in the underlying tech
nical detail.

If he cannot do this with razor-sharp acuteness,

his opinion will either be in danger of grass roots error, or
it will become too general to be very useful.
Because the spectrum of scientific and engineering
specialties is so much broader than the variations in accounting
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specialization from industry to industry, it is in this latter
area that the structuring of technical auditing differs most
from public accounting.
The objective of a balance sheet, as I see it, is to
present a fair picture of the condition of a business.

The con

dition of technical aspects which may dominate all other consid
erations is, I believe, not dependably disclosed by the existing
procedures for reporting and auditing.
What I believe is necessary, and what I believe pub
lic accountants should insist upon, is a competent, independent
verification of technical assessments and progress wherever and
whenever this subject has significance for the condition of a
business enterprise.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, Mr. Jewett.

As I read your paper this morning, and as I hear you
talk now, it appears what you are really saying is that this in
creasing technological complexity of business is producing an
other degree of uncertainty, or a problem of imprecision, which
becomes increasingly difficult to measure.

I presume that would

be a fair summary.
Now, is there anything in your proposal that requires
a separation of the functions between technical audits and the
financial audits, considering that there are indeed, internally
to the public accounting firms and internally to business, avail
able technical resources for analyses of this kind, which I be
lieve are used by us presently— consultants or otherwise?
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MR. JEWETT:

If I understand your question, I think

you are asking if I feel that this has to he a separate function.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. JEWETT:

That's right.

The answer to that is: No, it does not

have to be a separate function; and I realize that there is a
large gray area, but I am proposing a function that goes much
farther than, let's say, the somewhat similar function that is
accomplished by research institutes like the Stanford Research
Institute, or Arthur D. Little, by some management consulting
firms, by feasibility studies of architect-engineers and engi
neering firms, by ad hoc committees of the National Academy of
Sciences, and so forth.
There are a lot of bits and pieces that lead in this
direction, but I think there are faults with these things.
For instance, in the sense that I see the need for it,
I don't believe that a technical audit can really be undertaken
effectively by an organization that does it as a sideline, which
is essentially what a research institute does.

And let me talk

for a minute about that.
A research institute is in business primarily to do
development work, and they find themselves with all kinds of in
ternal conflicts when they start, as Standard Research did when
starting to audit a part of the Cheyenne Helicopter program.
Then they find that they have placed off limits a whole area of
work for the major part of their organization.
This type of organization also tends to do the job with
the people they have on their staff, and that does not necessar
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ily mean they get the right people on the job.
ular area, matching of expertise is critical.

In this partic
It's like making

a key that will turn a lock; you have whatever you call the nubs
on a key, which are like the expertise.

They have to push the

tumblers very exactly, and if those nubs are displaced just a
little bit, the key either sticks or it won't turn the lock at
all.
MR. WESTON:

Reading through your paper, I note in the

beginning you cite a number of financial disasters, and there is
an inference through there that if a technical audit had been
made back in those years, somehow these disasters would have been
avoided, or at least would have been brought forward.

But on

page 7, when you describe the technical auditor's report, you
say he restricts his opinion to past actions, and will only as
sess them against acceptable standards of technical management
practice.
I find a conflict, really, in the paper in that area,
and I wonder if you could tell us, first, how you would visual
ize the technical auditor would face up to the early stages of
a very complicated contract, when the future change orders and
cost overruns and other problems are unknown to everyone.
second, what language would your audit report use?

And

Would you be

responsible for saying that these inventories are at cost or mar
ket?
MR. JEWETT:

Well, you have asked several questions.

Let me try to address your first one, and I'll try to do it with
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an example.
Let me take the case of the Rolls-Royce RB-211 engine,
which led to the bankruptcy of Rolls-Royce.

Now obviously, I'm

on the outside, and I can only know what I read in the paper
about the thing, but in citing this example, I bring to your at
tention that in this particular case, inadvertently, a little bit
of a technical audit was made, which was quite informal and un
expected, and it confirms what I'm saying.
I think that the problem in the Rolls-Royce case was
that in the attempt to develop successful crescent filament blades
for the compressor, while the very high risk was recognized, it
wasn't recognized as thoroughly as it should have been; or per
haps it wasn't properly recognized by the top management.
So what I'm saying is that the past action that a techauditor would have looked at would be the fact that this program
involved a very high risk, and he could flag this for proper ac
tion.

He wouldn't have said it can't be done, but if the high

risk had been properly recognized--and I think this is a defin
able thing— a number of other actions different from what took
place would have ensured.
MR. WESTON:

But how would the accounting or the fi

nancial statements differ, based on an evaluation of more or less
risk?

In other words, how would the inventory have been carried,

if the risk were twice what someone thought it would be?
That's our problem today, the objectives of accounting.
In stating these inventories in an area in which you say there
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is great risk,

how would the inventories he changed?

It seems to me there might be more disclosure, that
would say:
whelming.

These are the costs to date, and the risks are over
But as you say, no one can say what the outcome will

be, and I'm wondering what your opinion would say on that kind
of an inventory.
MR. JEWETT:

Well, now I've got to hypothesize here,

but I can imagine a situation where in the case of Rolls-Royce's
statement, the technical auditor would have said, to whomever he
says this, that he finds the development plan for the RB-211 en
gine deficient.
MR. WESTON:

And what does he expect they will do with

that information?
MR. JEWETT:

Well, I expect that the sequence of events

might have been that this would have caused considerable commo
tion in Lockheed, or with the banks that were financing the air
planes, and that

that would have resulted in the development of

a plan for the RB-211 engine and its subsequent financing on an
alternative course, which they would eventually have followed,
with a quicker cutover to it.
MR. WESTON:

But you're implying that this risk wasn't

known by these people, and I think that may be an unfair infer
ence.
MR. JEWETT:

I'm not saying that it wasn't known.

I ’m

saying that I'm sure it was known, but I don’t think it was re
cognized with the degree of force that was necessary to cause the
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proper actions to be taken.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
ing, Frank?

Does that complete your question

Anybody else around the table?

(No one responded.)

Thank you very, very much, Mr. Jewett.

This is a pro

blem that is of increasing concern--you're extremely correct-and we're each trying to cope with it in our own way.

Thank you.

Next, and our final presenter, Price Waterhouse & Co.
Good morning, Henry.

I again apologize for rescheduling your

day of meetings, but it's delightful that you can be with us at
this time.
MR. HENRY P. HILL:

I suppose I should start off by

saying I'm Henry P. Hill, a partner in Price Waterhouse, occupy
ing the position of National Director of Accounting and Auditing
Services.

With me is Bob Liptak of our staff, who has accumu

lated a number of papers while helping me, and he has very strict
instructions to rustle those papers like mad if the questions get
too hot.
May I start off by expressing our appreciation for the
opportunity to be heard by the Study Group.
stage I'm appreciative.

At least, at this

I know more than half of you from other

contacts, and I know how penetrating your questions can be, and
perhaps 45 minutes from now I will not be quite so appreciative.
I have noted from the experience of observing other
panels conducting hearings like this that a tendency develops for
the later arrivals to address themselves to the particular ques
tions of interest that came up in earlier discussions.

Well, I

haven't attended the hearings prior to this morning, and although
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I have read all the papers submitted in advance that I could get
my hands on, I'm not aware of the issues that have come up in the
discussion.

So perhaps what we lose in repetition we might gain

in freshness.

If it results in repetition, I apologize.

You have all received a paper from my firm.
stand it was the first one submitted.

I under

I hope it's not an indi

cation of fair value that the first paper submitted results in
the last appearance before the Board.
In any case, it may be helpful if I draw attention to
the two principal points made in our paper.
The first point had to do with the purpose of the Study
Group.

This is the kind of issue that could have emotional over

tones, but our objective in raising it was at the other end of
the scale.

This Group was originally called upon to examine the

objectives of corporate financial statements.

My source for this

statement is the ARA Newsletter of August 16, 1971, which I may
say corresponds to my recollection of the proceedings at the
Sterling Institute that gave rise to the Group.

Somehow or other,

by October it had become the Accounting Objectives Study Group.
This change in wording could, I believe, signal a major
change in direction which would expand the work of the Study
Group enormously and could at the same time lead it off in the
wrong direction.

Expansion per se is no cause of dismay to me.

The fact that the Study Group is willing to take on a larger role
is a cause for congratulations as to its energy and sense of ob
ligations, assuming of course— as I am--that no unnecessary delay
results, and provided it does not result in the fulfillment of
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that direful prediction by your Chairman, who was reported in
the New York Times to have said that the task of the Study Group
is a terrifying one that may come to zero.
But the point is, the need now is for a statement of
purpose of financial statements.

I cannot say it any better

than Bill Werntz did in the very quotation you used in your own
October 1971 progress report.

You said he— and I quote you— em

phasized the overriding need for an explicit statement of frame
of reference within which to argue the acceptability of a par
ticular practice, and a set of criteria by which to test proposed
solutions.
The words "frame of reference" are the key words.
The end product of financial reporting is financial statements,
and it is these statements that need a frame of reference.

If

they ever had a clear one, it's been lost in the effort to deal
with the complexities and pressures, both internal and external,
to which financial accounting has been subjected in the past 15
years.
In my opinion, this has resulted from a situation where
by each accountant has a slightly different perception of the fi
nancial reporting process, and perceives the solutions to par
ticular problems differently in the light of his previously form
ed mental image.

Let me give you an example Mr. Reinhart has

heard before.
There are two major classes of institutions in this
country that marshal the savings of individuals and put them to
productive use.

They are banks and insurance companies.

Ten
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years ago, neither was influenced much by accounting theory, their
primary reporting concern being the requirements of the states.
The accounting profession became interested in this situation,
and perceiving that it could not last indefinitely, set about to
deal with some of the problems of applying GAAP to these indus
tries.

Special committees of the AICPA were organized.
Because they have related functions, the two types of

institutions had a related accounting problem:
marketable securities.

what to do with

The Banks Committee concluded that banks

had an amount invested in securities that had lower limits, and
to a large degree funds from securities sold were reinvested in
similar securities.

To the Banks Committee, this was just trad

ing paper, and they proposed a deferred recognition of profit and
loss on sales.
The Insurance Committee noted that the necessity for a
sale to establish a profit on a good investment had elements of
artificiality about it, and by a majority vote proposed that
some method be devised to record profit on securities on an an
nual yield basis that would take into account quoted values.
So there you have it.

The insurance companies would

show a profit without any sale, but the banks would not show a
profit even after a sale.
The important thing is, despite their superficial con
flicting conclusions, both proposals make sense.

They make sense

only because their proponents start off at different places.

But

what is also important to recognize is that the APB bought nei
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ther view.
Accounting is a conventional practice.

It has been

devised by human beings to deal with a specific objective--the
choice of deployment of financial resources in our economy.
Change the economy, or eliminate the choice, and you change the
thrust of accounting.
But accounting is a discipline that covers a lot of
territory, much of which is not being severely criticized at the
present time.

Though there are always those who would make changes

in the management aspects of accounting, the primary criticism at
the moment is in the public summaries we call financial statements.
And so I urge the Committee to give us a frame of reference for
the preparation of those statements so that those who compile
them, those who read them, and those who analyze them have the
same understanding.
The second point made in our paper is an exhibition of
what in our judgment the frame of reference should be.
to miss that conclusion.

It's hard

We followed the instructions of the

country preacher in preparing a sermon, and we put it in three
times in these words:

General purpose financial statements are

designed to report to investors on the use of funds they have in
vested in their enterprise, in such a way as to facilitate their
investment decisions of the future.
Some of the key words emphasized in this simple state
ment are:

"general purpose," meaning— as they used to say on

railroad bills of lading--NOIBN, not otherwise indicated by name;
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"investors" - -which eliminates employees, creditors, estates, and
others as the primary viewpoint.

It tells us that if you use

general purpose statements for rate making, taxation, economic
forecasting, or most of the other purposes for which they have
not been devised— you are, in the words of G.L. May, eating peas
with your knife;

"funds," which emphasizes money as against val

ue; "investment decisions of the future," emphasizing the con
tinuity and the potential for short term action.
I could go on, but you have read our paper, and I
should like to wind up with a quotation.

It's from a letter to

the Editor of Business Week that appeared in the January 8, 1972
issue.

I have no idea who the writer is.

He may not be one of

the quotable accounting greats, but h e 's got something for us to
think about.
"As a major stockholder, director, and employee of a
small manufacturing business, I have more recently come to a
deeper understanding of the term 'profit' and its vagaries.

A

mong even our handful of more or less equal principles, not all
of whom are number-minded, the term incites argument, suspicion,
and misunderstanding.

Everyone still likes to peek into a cash

drawer."
Arch R. Newton
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, Henry. Your superbly

done paper was indeed received first— not to suggest that we now
have a new terminology called first in, last out— FILO.
I would respond to the Accounting Study Group termi-
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nology.

Frankly, we found ourselves, in our early meetings,

using the words "financial statements." “financial accounting,"
and “accounting" almost interchangeably.

It was not nearly the

deliberate decision that you may think it to be, and we do
not intend it to change our charter or objective or our role in
any way.
You start out your paper by being very startling, and
continue in a very lucid, clear fashion, page by page and sen
tence by sentence, contending that this is a conservative paper.
Is it really that conservative?
For example, you move over somewhere along the line in
to a rather strong emphasis on cash presentations which are not
typical,which are new, and which are one of the subjects some of
our members are significantly interested in.

And you also talk

in some places about prospective results and analyses, as well
as retrospective results and analyses.
Would you care to comment about your initial sentence,
in relation to what you believe the general tone of your paper
to be?
MR. HILL:
of the paper.

Well, I thought it characterized the tone

"Conservative” means you save what you have, or

preserve what you have.

I don't visualize if the recommendations

in our paper were followed that accounting would instantaneously
change substantially, and that's really what I meant by the use
of the word "conservative."
Beyond that, I guess it's in your own mind what is
conservative and what is not.

I view this as a paper of the
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right rather than a paper of the left.

I would view the left as

being a fair value paper, or something like that.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

One more question, and then I ’ll

ask Oscar to proceed.
In this very simple and well written sentence on the
first page which you quoted "General purpose financial statements
are designed to report to the investor”--I presume you mean the
actual investor as well as the potential investor; that is, the
public in the large sense.
MR. HILL:

Yes, I do.

I intended to cover the invest

ing function.
MR. GELLEIN:

Henry, my first question really relates

to what is at the bottom of page 13 and at the top of page 14,
and I ’m really asking for a little elaboration, if you don't
mind.

I was kind of fascinated by this.

It's the emphasis on

the short term decisions that underly the investor's action.
Then you refer to some things not based on the account
ing for money.

I don't know— maybe that’s my term— but you con

clude by saying that if accounting is to depart from the cash
basis, the burden of proof is on those who justify the departure
from the cash basis--and I think I see what you mean.
Then you talk about pension costs, accounting for
deferred taxes, and the like.

I know, for instance, as to ac

counting for pension costs, some actuaries said at the time Opin
ion 8 was written that if you went to the maximum, and you fund
ed that amount, you'd be putting cash into a fund that you would
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never have to pay out, and that sort of thing.
On the other hand, you see, to me that may mean that
maybe we measured it wrong.

I'm going to ask you a question in

a minute, when I get through here.
When you come to deferred taxes, you again say, or you
imply, it will never be paid.
wrong.

Well, again, maybe we measured it

Maybe we should have been on the liability approach, and

maybe we should have had a present value number on it, or what
ever it may be.
But my real question, then, is this.

If all of this

derives from the emphasis on the short range decision, which I
read into this as a key part of what you deem to be objectives
relating to investors, then why do we record depreciation on a
50-year asset?

How do you conclude that you don’t account for

deferred taxes, based on this objective in relation to a taxbook difference on a 50 -year asset, in accounting for the de
preciation itself?
I don't mean to argue the technical matter.
MR. HILL:

Well, if I may, Oscar— we don’t mean to

say that you should not record any deferred tax.

If that comes

through, that’s the problem.
MR. GELLEIN:

No, I was trying to get away from a tech

nical point to a philosophical point.
MR. HILL:

But I think I can address it in philosoph

ical terms.
I believe the real necessity for accounting for de-
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ferred taxes is a short term one.

I think it's significant that

you account for deferred taxes in a case where the expense may
he in next year's profit-and-loss statement, and the deduction
may be in this year’s tax return.

In that case, it’s quite sim

ple to flip from one year to another the profit that results
from the tax saving.
On the other hand, when you get this enormous pool of
deferred taxes, as you get down to the bottom of the pool the
probabilities of their being paid get lower and lower.

And what’s

really indicated, it seems to me, is some kind of a probability
analysis at the bottom of that pool.
MR. GELLEIN:

But aren’t you really saying, then, Henry,

that in that regard we came up with the wrong answer?

That we

had the right objective— purpose— but we came up with the wrong
answer?
MR. HILL:

To some degree I think we did, yes.

Not

completely.
MR. GELLEIN:

So I was really trying to explore wheth

er there was some other objective in here that cuts

across more

broadly.
MR. HILL:

No, I think we came up with the wrong answer,

and you can say the same thing about pensions. The bottom of
this pool will never be paid, because if the company stays alive
it won’t need to be,et cetera, et cetera, as we say in the paper.
MR. WESTON:

Henry, at the bottom of page 7 there's a

comment which other speakers have quoted here at our session.
This is the statement that the manner in which the most success
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ful real estate investments regularly report a loss is an ac
counting scandal.
I wonder if you could enlarge on that, and tell us how
we could phrase an objective of accounting which would overcome
that.

And particularly with respect to real estate, my impres

sion is that, in addition to the timing of depreciation, which
may he the reason for this loss which you say is a scandal, pos
sibly the value increment in real estate is where the problem
and the scandalous accounting is, in terms of nonrecognition.
Would you care to comment on that particular sentence?
Because it is a rather strong sentence in an otherwise conserva
tive paper.
MR. HILL:

Well, it has been noted by several people.

I saw it in the press somewhere.

It’s a bit of hyperbole that

perhaps we shouldn’t have indulged in.
We have a situation now where, if you try to find fi
nancial statements of real estate syndicates— I ’m speaking now
of the small groups who combine to engage in real estate trans
actions --you find that they almost never prepare a statement,
even under GAAP.

They prepare a tax statement and a cash flow

statement, and stop there.

I can give you numerous quotes.

I

sent you some, which I assume you circulated to the Group, from
annual reports which say, in effect:
statements, but don't look at them.

Here are our financial
They don't mean very much.

I believe it’s pretty well acknowledged that financial
statements of real estate transactions under GAAP are not used
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by real estate people.
MR. WESTON:

How could we improve them?

What would

be the objective that would improve them?
MR. HILL:

Well, I didn’t intend to solve all the real

estate problems, which are pretty tough problems, and I don’t
think that this Group can come up with the answers to all pro
blems.

It seems to me that if we can set the frame of reference,

we can then devote ourselves to the problems individually within
that frame.

I believe there’d be a heavy emphasis on cash flow.

I believe there'd be a reexamination of depreciation under real
estate accounting.

As you know full well, at least two of the

National Institutes--the Canadian and the Australian--have been
reexamining whether they should take depreciation on real prop
erty under conventional methods.

We have proposals that depre

ciation be taken on an inclining basis in real estate in order
to counteract the declining interest, and come up with a kind of
level cash, or level profit reporting.
MR. WESTON:
dications

But isn’t the thrust of many of these syn

the fact that the value of the land is increasing con

siderably at the same time depreciation is being accelerated, so
we have a compounding of reality, in a sense?
I ’m really trying to find out whether an objective in
real estate might not be phrased in an investment environment;
say, real estate syndication--where value is really the economic
reality of the situation, and an objective of accounting should
be to reflect that, rather than historical cost and depreciation
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accounting.
MR. HILL:

Well, if I could focus on the word "value",

except for that one word I think you would he right.

It may be

that it's the implied diminution of value in depreciation that's
wrong, and the diminution of value as measured by original cost.
We have in downtown New York several buildings that
were built in the '20s that are practically prime buildings, and
I don't know how many times they have been depreciated, but they
stand alongside new buildings as prime rental properties.
MR. GELLEIN:

Henry, could I turn to the thing you

said three times— and put it in italics three times?
I'm looking at the last page, or you can look at the
first page.

It's both places.

MR. REINHART:
MR. GELLEIN:

Page l4 too.
Taking the illustration that you used,

Henry, of the banks and the insurance companies and marketable
securities, do you see this frame of reference, as stated here-that its application by people expert in its application within
that frame would result in a unique answer in the treatment of
marketable securities in the financial statements of banks and
insurance companies?
In other words, will this once and for all lead us to
a unique answer?
MR. HILL:

Well, what do you mean by unique?

sure I know what you mean by unique.
MR. GELLEIN:

I mean a common answer.

I'm not
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MR. HILL:

You mean unique to banks or...?

MR. GELLEIN:

No, unique to the circumstances, what

ever they are.
MR. HILL:

Yes, I do.

I feel, for example, that you

would take into account the fact that banks invest in debt se
curities.

At one time they had a very high tax advantage, which

encouraged them to trade artificially.

There were cases, and I

know of them in fact, where three banks sat around the table,
and A sold to B and B sold to C and C sold to A, just to estab
lish profits and losses.
I believe within this you would say;

Well, having in

vested the bank’s funds in securities, we are locked into this
kind of security until we decide to get rid

of the total port

folio, and therefore you would then structure a kind of yield
approach, and a deferred approach, which the Committee came up
with.
MR. GELLEIN:

Do you think it would lead to a yield

approach?
MR. HILL:

Yes, I do.

MR. GELLEIN:

The direct application of this stated

objective?
MR. HILL:
DEAN CYERT:

Yes, I do.
I was interested in the fact that you

seemed to restrict the actual users of financial statements in
this definition that we are talking about.

We have been concern

ed on the Committee with looking at the number of users.

I would

be interested in your rationale for restricting other users than
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the investor.

And I assume from what you have said, you would

think of creditors as being also included in the investor group-or not?
MR. HILL:

Well, that’s a two part question.

DEAN CYERT: Yes.
MR. HILL:

When we speak of establishing a frame of

reference, w e ’re asking for the rules of the game w e ’re playing.
We could play golf with a croquet ball.

I ’ve never tried it.

I

have a pretty good understanding that it wouldn’t work very well,
because a golf course wasn’t designed for playing golf with a
croquet ball.
All I'm saying is that it doesn't restrict their use
by establishing a frame of reference that says these statements
were prepared with the investor in mind.

It means that you,

other than investors, who use them know that we prepared them
with the investor in mind, and if you use them for some other
purpose, you should make the appropriate adjustments.
If you are a bank, for example, and you're lending,
you're not interested in the depreciated value of, let's say,
vessels of a shipping company.

You’re interested in what the

vessels are, what models they are.
tions.

You ask certain kinds of ques

You start off knowing that the number on the balance sheet

isn’t put there for your purpose.
Now, this doesn't restrict you.

It simply establishes

the rules under which we prepare these statements.
DEAN CYERT:

So you are sort of saying,then, that his

torically, that really has been the purpose of financial state-
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merits, and we should make it more explicit and clear?
MR. HILL:

That's why I used the word "conservative,"

to get hack to the first question.
DEAN CYERT:

The second part of your definition says

that we should report in such a way as to facilitate investment deci
sions of the future.

To me this implies to some extent that we

should know more about that investment decision process; that
we should in fact, know the kinds of information that investors
do try to use; that we should really have some sort of a model
of that process, and then try to develop as much as possible of
the information consistent with that broad model.
Would this be consistent with what you are thinking
of there, or are you thinking more in the line of— well, let's
do a little introspection about how we would make a decision,
and try to provide the information needed?

Would you talk about

that aspect?
MR. HILL:

Well, I think you are leading into a dis

cussion of whether investments are made on a rational basis.
DEAN CYERT:

I think that's one element of it. Another

is: Shall we facilitate the way they should make decisions, or
the way they do make decisions, if there is a difference?
MR. HILL:

All right.

I think it has to be "do".

don't think it has to be "should".

I

I don't think we can ride

herd on the intellectual processes, or selling process, or what
ever we are talking about in the investment decision making.
DEAN CYERT:

Do you think we know enough about how
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those decisions are made now to be able to go from there to de
tailing the information we should have on financial statements?
MR. HILL:

Well, I think we have at our disposal ma

terial which is prepared and intended to influence investment
decisions.

For example, we see prospectuses, and then we see

how the salesmen don't even pass out the prospectuses, and in
stead emphasize something else in discussing a sale with a pros
pective investor.

I think we know quite a bit about how the in

vesting process works today.

I would agree that I could not

construct a model of one, or...
DEAN CYERT:
you said.

I'm sorry.

I didn't hear the last thing

After you said we know quite a bit about the way de

cisions are made, then...
MR. HILL:

I would agree that we can't construct a

mathematical model, a scientific linear equation that shows the
factors that go in and how the investment comes out.
DEAN CYERT:

Well, I guess one of the things is that

there is quite a bit of information which, let’s say, some so
phisticated investors use, and others don’t.

I'm trying to find

out how far you would go in facilitating the investment decisions
of the future, in terms of this broader range of material.
Do you have in mind any broad criterion?
MR. HILL:

I can be concrete about a few things.

For

example, I believe that a summary of earnings as now prepared in
a prospectus, which is a historical recitation of income state
ments that have been previously circulated, is not necessarily
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the right document for an investment decision.

In a prospectus,

we have a five-year-old income statement; we got that five-yearold income statement together within six weeks or two months af
ter the end of that fifth year back.

We know a lot more about

that year at this point.
We might very well say the accounting principles that
apply to a summary of earnings are not necessarily the ones we
had to apply the day we prepared the annual financial report.
That's one of the kinds of things I ’m thinking about.
DEAN CYERT:
MR. HILL:

Good.

A second one is, I believe that--as collat

eral information, and not the frame of reference--we owe the in
vestor other information.

We owe him the information that we're

going to tear this plant down, and w e ’re going to leave New Eng
land and go to South Carolina, which doesn’t necessarily mean we
need to show him next year’s profit-and-loss statement, but it
means we need to show him something about what’s going to happen,
in order that he may make some kind of an intelligent decision.
DEAN CYERT:

What about things like, say, concentra

tion ratios of the firm, and its various product lines?

In other

words, is the firm one of two or three firms in a number of pro
duct lines, and is it in a highly competitive industry in another
one.

Would this information be some of the kind that you would

want to show?
MR. HILL:

I would certainly believe that product line

information is basic information, yes.
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DEAN CYERT:

But along the lines of something like the

economic characteristics of the industry that the firm is in,
would you extend it that way, or would you argue that that's not
really financial information?
MR. HILL:

To me, that's not accounting information.

I would like to say this company is in the business of the pill,
but I wouldn't like to forecast whether the pill is a good pro
duct or not.

Somebody else has to do that.

DEAN EDWARDS:

Henry, do you visualize your statement

on page 17 as serving--as some people have indicated--as the Con
stitution for the new Financial Accounting Standards Board, in
solving some of the complex problems that it's going to be fac
ing?
MR. HILL:

Yes.

That's really the thrust of our re

commendation, that coming behind this Committee is probably the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, and they are going to have
to solve the details of accounting applications.
DEAN EDWARDS:

Well, do you think the objectives, as

you have stated them, realizing your report was in before the
Standards Board was approved, or even its recommendations were
known, are pervasive enough to serve as a constitution for such
an organization?
MR. HILL:

Yes, I think so.

DEAN EDWARDS:
this.

They are pretty general.

I have one other question related to

Is one of the purposes of your statement to establish

some parameters for accounting?

There is certain material, for

example within the material that has been submitted, that in-
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dicates that anything you can count is accounting.
Was that one of your premises to establish some param
eters on accounting?
MR. HILL:

Absolutely.

I believe it's said in here

somewhere that our reach should not exceed our grasp; there’s a
limit to what accounting can encompass, and just because a thing
is expressed in numbers doesn’t make it accounting.
MR. GELLEIN:

Henry, if you would like to comment on

this, do do; if not, you can simply say so.
You indicate that in a five year summary, for example
in a registration statement, maybe the accounting applied to the
five years might be different from what actually had been applied
to each year of the report.

Would you care to comment on whether

that same information on that same basis ought to be a part of
the shareholders' report?
MR. HILL:

Yes.

I can see it would be suitable to

just put a summary in the shareholders' report which reflects
the decisions that we now see were inadequately made years be
fore.

When you get to things like reserves for bad debts, and

you discover that we had a big investment in Penn Central that’s
now all gone down the tube, and here we took a nice, big, fat
interest on these loans all those years, and then in the fourth
year of the five years we suffered a big, fat loss, it seems to
me we might reconsider carefully whether we don’t want to read
just all years for that interest, and show that we were really
just building up a loss, not building up a profit.
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MR. GELLEIN:

I guess an easy way to make a transition

to this, if this should he a desirable goal, would be to work on
this basis on the historical summaries that are there right now.
MR. HILL:
MR. WESTON:

Yes.
Under those conditions, though, Henry,

what kind of reporting would the CPA make?

H e ’d say:

"This is

the statement today, but two years from now I ’ll give you the
right figures"?
MR. HILL:
MR. WESTON:

Well, he does that many times now.
A few times, but very rarely.

Those are

the rare exceptions.
MR. HILL:

Well, they're growing, and they’re growing

defensively, as we all will admit.
MR. WESTON:

But would statements of that type be use

ful to investors?
MR. HILL:
MR. WESTON:

I believe they would, yes.
Particularly to short term investors that

you indicate are in and out?
MR. HILL:

Well, you know, you can never get a Price

Waterhouse partner out without having him quote G. O . May, and
G. O . said that short term accounting would be indefensible if
it were not indispensable; and it’s a perfectly valid position
even today.
ever.

But that doesn't mean we have to live with it for

We have to make our decisions now.
MR. WESTON:

But would you, in effect, go back and ap

ply subsequent information to an earlier period?
MR. HILL:

I can visualize coming up with a brand new
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summary of earnings which shows what we know now.
MR. PARKER:

I think you might he aware that a good

number of financial analytical tools make rations out of things
that are in the income statement and the balance sheet, and re
late them to other things going on in the economy, either eco
nomic factors or down to and including market prices.

You can

adjust the figures later on for the income statement and the bal
ance sheet.

I don't suppose you would go back and adjust market

prices, and things like that.
What happens to that process if you are going to be re
vising the figures all the time?

If you don't leave the old fig

ures available as well, then you leave, I suggest, a very sub
stantial tool in the hands of the sophisticated analyst who keeps
all the old figures and can use them, as opposed to the investors
you have now provided.
MR. HILL:
bers.
ers.

Obviously, we can't lose the historical num

We have to have some kind of firm foundation for our read
Otherwise they are driving an automobile with a speedometer

on which both the needle and the numbers move, and then they have
nothing.
MR. GELLEIN:

Henry, I just wanted to clarify one thing.

I think you have, but just to be sure it's understood as we in
terpret on page 7, the middle paragraph, where you end the first
sentence : We should show the plans that have been made for the
future.

I think a moment ago you referred to some illustrations

of that sort of thing, but could you elaborate just a little bit
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more, so we understand it?
MR. HILL:

Well, Oscar, I think if you will accept a

degree of accountability as implicit in them, think of the kinds
of things the presidents of corporations stand up and tell the
analysts at the lunches they go to.
to happen to our product.

They tell them what's going

Sure, they make a forecast of earnings

per share, and, sure, their correlation is pretty low. But the
important thing is, they stand up there and say what this company
is going to do-what its plans are.

And without that, the his

torical financial statements have got to be of low utility.
MR. GELLEIN:

Again, if we embrace this--or the exten

sion of it— as an objective, would you think we'd have to do it
more often than once a year?

At least quarterly?

Maybe when

the plans change?
MR. HILL:

As appropriate, yes.

That's what I would

think.
DEAN CYERT:

Do you think that one of the important as

pects of developing this frame of reference that we have talked
about is a more precise definition of what we mean by income?
MR. HILL:

I'd like to think about that.

plicit, but I ’m not sure what’s behind the question.

It seems im
It just

seems to come out that income is the number one thing the in
vestor wants to know, and I'm not quite sure what you have in
mind.
DEAN CYERT:

Well, I'm really just getting a little

guidance on methodology for our procedure, and I wanted to know
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whether you felt that there is a need for a better definition
of income than we are using, or let's say a different defini
tion.

I then would be interested in asking you what areas we

should be concerned about in defining income.
I guess maybe I see where the confusion in the question
is.

What I ’m thinking of is whether we should, for instance, try

to get a little broader definition than accounting has tradition
lly used.

Should we be moving more toward concepts like opportu

nity cost, or should we be considering trying to separate out in
the profit those things that may come about because of historical
accident a low-rent lease things of this kind?
Is this a direction toward the definition of income,
let’s say, as an economist defines it, if you are familiar with
that.
MR. HILL:

Well, I ’m still a little confused, and not

able to deal with your question.
If your question is directed toward the definition of
income do we need to expand the income details?
out things— unusual things, or remarkable things?
yes.

Should we pull
I would say

I believe, where the tendency is today toward a rigid format

of profit-and-loss statement, it really should be the other way.
We should have a kind of free-flowing profit-and-loss statement
whereby you put the things down in a way that most clearly dis
closes what happens, rather than try to force them into the extra
ordinary and the non-extraordinary, for example, which leads to
artificial rules.
to m e .

What’s extraordinary to you may be ordinary
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DEAN CYERT:

Let me just give you a simple example to

help me get a better feeling of what you are thinking about.
Let’s suppose that this company made a lease twenty years ago,
and it pays a very low rent.

And we could compute what the rent

would be if the lease were made today, so what happens is that
in the profits there really is rent.
Now, would you see it desirable to essentially impute
the actual rent and get that out of the profit, so that the in
vestor is not misled in terms of saying:

"Well, the firm is real

ly making this money in its business operation— this kind of de
finition?
MR. HILL:

No, I don’t think you can set up this kind

of bogey, and I would not impute under that circumstance.
DEAN CYERT:

You’d try to keep it still as objective

as one can.
MR. GELLEIN:
enough, really.

I think we have delayed your lunch long

Henry and Bob, we thank you very, very much for

your time and efforts, and your explanations and observations.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think it’s impossible to sum

marize a proceedings such as this in any adequate way, at least
so soon after the heat of the debate, but I would like just to
make a few closing remarks and some general comments.
I was quite impressed by the consistently well done
presentations and their temperateness.

I was very impressed,

as I ’m sure my peers are, by the welcome and encouraging will
ingness on the part of the witnesses to join in the efforts to
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improve financial reporting.

I think there is evidence present

ed by each of the participants of their very broad concern about
all of the matters which have been under discussion.
It's in some respects really overwhelming that it is
possible to channel such a substantial commitment of time and
manpower our way, in order to assist us in our forward deliber
ations.

I can assure you that all members of the Study Group

are most appreciative, and everything that has been said and sub
mitted will be considered very carefully and with deep sincerity.
I think we can pull out just a very few broad areas of
wide agreement.

I think we can say that we agree that objectives

are needed to guide improvements in financial reporting, that
they should be stated explicitly, rather than left unsaid or poor
ly formed or ill defined.

It seems to me that, even though not

implicit in some of the statements, there is a tendency to re
gard a kind of trichotomy here in our practice, with objectives
at the highest level, principles or standards at a second level,
practice and procedure at a third level.

We tend to get them

mixed up, because we use them as examples, as it were.
our purpose is to think mostly at the highest level.

Clearly,
The situ

ation then leaves to the Standards Board, probably, even some of
the more difficult things.
Another area of significance, I think, is that there
is recognition that several categories of interested parties must
be served, that their legitimate interests can be stated, and so
lutions should be directed to varied points of view.

I can think

5.120

of at least three that have been stated by many:

first those

direct users of financial statements, which are, in a sense, the
primary parties at interest; then there are the preparers of fi
nancial statements, the managements of enterprises who act as re
presentatives of owners and potential owners.
Perhaps most importantly, I read out of many of the pre
sentations a recognition that society at large, as distinguished
from the individual investor, has a continuing direct and in
direct interest in all of the professional work of the accountant.
And, finally, in that area I think there is some agreement that
broad concepts, principles, and reporting formats for financial
accounting are not sacred.

They need to be reexamined to see if

they have continuing utility and validity, and determine appro
priate modifications and substitutions in some cases.

Clearly,

all of us feel, on the witness stand and around the table,that
nothing should be retained merely because we have always done it,
or because many people have believed in it for a very long time.
But there is also coming out of these meetings, I think,
a wide range of viewpoints that do not have agreement, and on
which there has been a variety of response, a diversity of con
clusion, about how those issues should be approached, and for
that matter, how those issues may relate to the broad objectives.
Very generally, these views range from a total endorse
ment of present practice, with no change whatsoever, to a sugges
tion here and there for substantial changes across the board, not
only in concepts but in principles and formats.

Clearly, at this
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level, no endorsement of any one viewpoint was unanimous, so the
Study Group will have to examine each of these in detail, giving
attention to all of the arguments on either side which have been
presented, and for that matter which will become available to us
through our other courses of research.
I think we should agree that our ultimate conclusions—
and I now talk about "our" in the professional sense, as distin
guished from the Study Group sense— really should not be formu
lated on a head count basis, if we are going to come up with that
larger frame of reference that Bill Werntz and Henry Hill have
talked about.
I ’ll just take one minute to talk about some of the
principal issues that I see emerging.

Clearly, the first two

days took current and fair value up and down and back and forth,
and forecasting in the same way.

Large questions were raised a 

bout the completed transaction concept and our historical notions
of realization.

In the forecasting area there is a diversity of

points of view about availability and the right to know.

And

there’s the whole problem of the changing environment of the at
test function as it might be extended to such issues as forecast
ing.
I think one of the happier things that I observed as
an individual was that the strict debate about

uniformity versus

flexibility of some years ago has at least diminished in its in
tensity.

It is not solved, but I don’t detect quite the same

strength of position on that subject.

W e ’ve talked a good bit
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about price level distorting effects, as tied in in some ways to
the fair value and the realization concept.
One thing not explicitly on our agenda--I don’t know
how it might be worked into our ultimate product— is a concern
expressed also by the New York Stock Exchange on the enforce
ment of professional standards and the formalization of institu
tional groups for purposes of that enforcement.
Again, perhaps somewhat outside our area of direct res
ponsibility,comments were made very interestingly, about train
ing, education, objectivity, and professional stature of account
ants, as these issues relate to the accountant’s role in serving
the legitimate interests of society.
Finally, let me thank you again.
continue to monitor our program.

Let me urge you to

Let me remind you that tran

scripts of these entire proceedings will be available shortly,
on request, for what we trust will be a modest fee.
The Study Group continues to look forward to making a
meaningful contribution to the profession, to the financial com
munity, and to me, what should be our most important interest—
the general public.
Thank you for your patience, your consideration, and
your excellent attention and considerable help.

Goodbye.

